Major J.

The appellant employer dismissed the respondent employee for unsatisfactory work performance (non-culpable incompetence).

The arbitration board found the dismissal was without just cause because the employer failed to follow the Re Edith Cavell criteria.

The board awarded damages in lieu of reinstatement under s. 142(2) of the Labour Relations Code, finding reinstatement inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal set aside the board's decision, holding that s. 142(2) did not apply to non-culpable dismissals and ordering reinstatement.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for both the board's interpretation of s. 142(2) and its remedial award was reasonableness.

The Court found the board's broad interpretation of s. 142(2) to include non-culpable dismissals was reasonable, and its decision to award damages in lieu of reinstatement due to exceptional circumstances (the breakdown of the employment relationship) was also reasonable.

The appellant episcopal corporation appealed a finding of direct liability for sexual assaults committed by a parish priest over two decades.

The respondents cross-appealed, arguing the corporation was also vicariously liable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming the corporation was directly liable because the bishop's failure to properly direct and discipline the priest constituted negligence by the corporation.

The Court also held the corporation vicariously liable, finding a sufficiently close relationship between the diocesan enterprise and the priest, and a strong connection between the employer-created risk and the wrongful acts.

The appellant sought a declaration that s. 43 of the Criminal Code, which justifies the reasonable use of force by way of correction by parents and teachers against children, violates ss. 7, 12, and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 43 does not offend the Charter.

The Court found that s. 43 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and does not discriminate against children, as it is grounded in their actual needs and circumstances by protecting them from the blunt instrument of the criminal law for minor disciplinary contacts.

During a strike by its unionized stage technicians, the Société de la Place des Arts de Montréal (SPA) decided to cease providing technical services to its tenants, requiring the tenants to hire their own technicians.

The union obtained an injunction from the Superior Court, upheld by the Court of Appeal, preventing the SPA from allowing tenants to use their own technicians, on the basis that this violated the anti-strikebreaking provisions of s. 109.1(b) of the Labour Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and vacated the injunction, holding that the SPA had genuinely abandoned the technical services part of its business and was not 'utilizing' the services of persons employed by another employer within the meaning of the Code.

The appellant, acting as curator for an elderly woman, sought indemnification from the Chambre des notaires du Québec after her notary fraudulently acquired her home for one dollar and sold it for $550,000.

The Chambre's Administrative Committee rejected the claim, concluding the notary acted in a personal rather than professional capacity.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this decision was patently unreasonable, as the notary was acting as a legal adviser and owed a professional duty of impartiality.

The Court ordered the Chambre to pay the remaining maximum indemnity of $187,464.04, plus interest and an additional indemnity, finding that the statutory cap on indemnities does not preclude awards for interest or delay.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

Duguay later pleaded guilty to manslaughter after a new trial was ordered.

A public inquiry subsequently revealed that the Crown and police failed to disclose significant relevant evidence to the defence at the original trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown's failure to disclose this evidence infringed the appellants' right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court clarified the test from Dixon for assessing the impact of non-disclosure on the verdict and trial fairness, and adapted it for cases involving guilty pleas.

Taillefer's conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

Duguay was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, and a stay of proceedings was entered due to the significant time he had already served.

The plaintiffs, the estate and family of a man fatally shot by police, brought actions for misfeasance in a public office and negligence against the involved officers, the Chief of Police, the Police Services Board, and the Province.

The claims arose from the officers' alleged failure to cooperate with the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation.

The defendants moved to strike the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the actions for misfeasance in a public office against the officers and the Chief, and the negligence action against the Chief, could proceed, as it was not plain and obvious they would fail.

However, the negligence actions against the Board and the Province were struck out because they did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiffs to ensure officers cooperated with the SIU.

The appellant, Imperial Oil, formerly operated a petroleum depot on a site that was later sold and developed for residential use.

When hydrocarbon contamination was discovered, the present owners sued the developers, the city, and the Minister of the Environment.

The Minister subsequently ordered Imperial Oil to prepare a site characterization study at its own expense under the polluter-pay principle.

Imperial Oil challenged the order, arguing the Minister was in a conflict of interest and breached the duty of impartiality because he was a defendant in the civil suits.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Minister was exercising a discretionary, political power to protect the public interest, not an adjudicative function, and therefore the strict judicial standard of impartiality did not apply.

The deceased, a Quebec resident, was killed in a motor vehicle accident in British Columbia.

His spouse and children received statutory death and dependants' benefits under the Quebec no-fault insurance scheme.

They also brought a tort action in British Columbia.

The appellants sought to deduct the Quebec benefits from the tort settlement under s. 25 of the British Columbia Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Quebec benefits were 'similar' to those under the British Columbia Insurance Act and must be deducted from the overall tort award to prevent double recovery, rejecting the requirement for a specific 'match' between heads of damage.

The appellants, who suffered from chronic pain attributable to work-related injuries, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Nova Scotia Workers' Compensation Act and related regulations that excluded chronic pain from the regular workers' compensation system.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of its enabling statute.

The Court further held that the blanket exclusion of chronic pain sufferers from the general compensation scheme violated section 15(1) of the Charter by imposing discriminatory differential treatment based on physical disability.

The infringement was not justified under section 1 of the Charter, as it did not minimally impair the rights of the affected workers.

The respondent was sexually assaulted by her foster father while in the care of the provincial government.

She sued the Crown for vicarious liability and breach of non-delegable duty.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying its companion decision in K.L.B. v. British Columbia, held that the Crown was not vicariously liable for the torts of foster parents and did not owe a non-delegable duty to ensure no harm came to foster children.

The Court also held that social assistance benefits received by the respondent must be deducted from her damage award for past loss of earning capacity to avoid double recovery, and that prejudgment interest on such an award should be calculated incrementally.

The appellant, a taxi driver, repeatedly solicited fares at Pearson International Airport without a permit, contrary to regulations and notices under the Trespass to Property Act.

An airport inspector attempted to arrest the appellant for trespassing under s. 9 of the Act.

The appellant resisted, shoving his car door into the inspector and fleeing.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant of assault with intent to resist arrest, finding the inspector had no authority to use reasonable force.

The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the power of arrest under the Trespass to Property Act implicitly includes the authority to use reasonable force to effect and maintain the arrest.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Canada Elections Act requirement that a political party must nominate candidates in at least 50 electoral districts to obtain registered party status and its associated benefits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 50-candidate threshold violates the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process guaranteed by section 3 of the Charter.

The Court found that the threshold diminishes the capacity of marginal or regional parties to communicate their ideas, thereby undermining the right of citizens to play a meaningful role in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under section 1 of the Charter, and the relevant provisions were declared unconstitutional.

The respondent, who suffers from bipolar disorder, refused proposed medical treatment.

The attending physician found him incapable of making this decision, and the Consent and Capacity Board confirmed this finding.

On judicial review, the Superior Court of Justice overturned the Board's decision, finding it unreasonable and based on a misapplication of the statutory test for capacity.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's finding of incapacity was unreasonable because it conflated the respondent's best interests with his capacity to decide, and failed to recognize that the respondent understood his condition and the consequences of refusing treatment.

The respondents filed an action in the Federal Court for damages to cargo during rail transit.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings, relying on a forum selection clause in the bill of lading that granted exclusive jurisdiction to the courts in Antwerp, Belgium.

The prothonotary, motions judge, and Federal Court of Appeal denied the stay, applying the tripartite test for interlocutory injunctions and considering whether a fundamental breach voided the clause.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the 'strong cause' test is the proper standard for enforcing forum selection clauses in bills of lading, and that allegations of fundamental breach should be determined by the chosen forum.

The insured, a physician with a history of opiate addiction, died from an intravenous injection of Demerol.

His life insurance policy provided coverage for death effected through 'accidental means'.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the self-injection was a deliberate act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'accidental means' does not refer to a narrower subclass of 'accidental deaths'.

Both phrases connote a death that was unexpected.

The Court found that the insured did not expect to die but made a miscalculation regarding the dosage.

The appeal was dismissed, and the beneficiary was entitled to the accidental death benefit.

The taxpayer failed to pay federal and provincial taxes for the 1980 to 1985 taxation years.

Revenue Canada assessed the taxpayer in 1986 but took no collection action until 1998.

The Crown appealed a decision holding that it was statute-barred from collecting the tax debts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the six-year limitation period prescribed by section 32 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act applies to the statutory collection procedures under the Income Tax Act.

The Court also held that the provincial tax debt was barred by the six-year limitation period under the British Columbia Limitation Act.

The appellant, a journalist, requested access to a document detailing the expenses of Members of the National Assembly.

The request was denied under ss. 34 and 57 of the Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information.

The Commission d’accès à l’information upheld the refusal, finding the document was produced 'for' a Member and that Members are not 'public bodies'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for the Commission's decisions is reasonableness, and that the Commissioner's interpretations of ss. 34 and 57 were reasonable.

The respondent was dismissed from his employment after his daughter and wife accused his employer (who was his brother-in-law) of sexual abuse.

The respondent filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of marital and family status.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the enumerated grounds of marital and family status in the Ontario Human Rights Code are broad enough to encompass discrimination based on the particular identity of a complainant's spouse or family member.

The Court found that the respondent was arbitrarily disadvantaged based on stereotypical assumptions about his familial affiliations, constituting prohibited discrimination.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Law Society of Alberta sought to discipline a Crown prosecutor for failing to disclose exculpatory DNA evidence to the defence in a timely manner.

The prosecutor argued that his actions were protected by prosecutorial discretion and that the Law Society lacked jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while core elements of prosecutorial discretion are immune from review absent flagrant impropriety, the duty to disclose relevant evidence is a legal obligation, not a matter of discretion.

Therefore, the Law Society has the jurisdiction to review a prosecutor's conduct to determine if a failure to disclose was done dishonestly or in bad faith, as this constitutes a breach of professional ethics.