MacFarland

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action under Rule 21 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's analysis that the claim was utterly unmeritorious and found no error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to each appearing respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that its claim for breach of contract was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the claim was discoverable when the appellant received an arborist report detailing the respondent's substandard work.

Because the action was commenced more than two years after the receipt of the report, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing that the Board Chair's conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the Board failed to recognize a treatment impasse with the hospital.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the high burden for a bias claim was not met despite some disrespectful comments by the Chair.

The Court also found no treatment impasse, noting the appellant's refusal to engage with the hospital treatment team.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

They appealed their convictions on the grounds that jurors were exposed to extrinsic information (including internet searches and old newspaper articles) during the trial, and that the trial judge erred in her instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility that the extrinsic information affected the verdict given the trial judge's instructions and the nature of the information.

The court also upheld the trial judge's conspiracy instructions as compliant with the Carter and Mapara framework.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's third reason for disbelieving the appellant—that he perjured himself at a PSA hearing—was unsupported by the trial record.

Because this error greatly affected the credibility assessment, the appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondents' acquittals on drug and firearms charges.

The trial judge had excluded evidence found during a search of the respondents' home, ruling that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked objectively reasonable grounds and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in weighing the first Grant factor.

Given the trial judge's finding of good faith by the police, the lack of objective grounds alone did not justify excluding the evidence.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant condominium corporations sought a declaration that they owned a clubhouse within their development and that a mortgage granted by the respondent developer was void or subordinate to their interests.

The developer had retained legal title to the clubhouse, but the disclosure statements provided for its future conveyance to the appellants once the developer no longer owned any lands in the project.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the disclosure statements did not constitute an executory contract of purchase and sale.

Consequently, the appellants did not have an equitable interest in the clubhouse capable of registration under the Land Titles Act, and the developer was entitled to mortgage the property.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent father overnight access to their six-year-old child.

The trial judge had adopted the parenting plan proposed by a court-appointed assessor, despite the mother's allegations of domestic violence and her reliance on critique evidence from another expert.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the best interests of the child under the Children's Law Reform Act, appropriately weighed the expert evidence, and did not err by declining to make a formal 'custody' order or by ordering the parties to engage a mediator/arbitrator based on prior consent.

The appellants failed to appear for the hearing of their appeal.

The respondents' counsel advised that the appellants had indicated they would be filing a Notice of Abandonment.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action against a grocery store after the deceased was struck by another customer's overloaded shopping cart.

The appellants argued the store's safety policies were inadequate and that employees failed to intervene despite seeing the hazard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the store's general safety policy was reasonable and did not require a standard of perfection.

The court also found it was reasonable for the trial judge to conclude that the store employees did not have a realistic opportunity to intervene in the seconds before the tragic accident occurred.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The trial judge had imposed two consecutive sentences of six months less a day, acknowledging a fit sentence would be 48 months, and gave 17 months credit for 11 months of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a fit sentence would be a further 19 months of incarceration.

However, because the respondent had already served the conditional sentence and the Crown did not seek further incarceration, the sentence was stayed.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued his detention order at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant argued the Board erred by failing to meaningfully consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded that a detention order was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition given the appellant's need for close medical supervision, history of substance abuse, lack of insight into his mental illness, and the risk of rapid decompensation without medication.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari, which sought to quash his committal for trial on drug trafficking charges.

He argued the preliminary inquiry judge lost jurisdiction by refusing to grant a further adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the preliminary inquiry judge's refusal was a reasonable exercise of discretion and that the appellant had been afforded fairness and natural justice throughout the lengthy proceedings.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and was sentenced to one year of imprisonment.

On appeal, she introduced fresh evidence that her trial counsel failed to advise the sentencing judge of a co-accused's six-month sentence and the immigration consequences of a sentence of six months or more.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, found the appellant's culpability similar to her co-accused, and reduced the sentence to six months less a day to preserve her right to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division.

The appellant, a former estate trustee, appealed a summary judgment granted in a mortgage action against the estate.

The appellant argued the mortgage should be set aside under the Family Law Act as the property was a matrimonial home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant lacked standing as he was no longer an estate trustee and was not sued in his personal capacity.

Furthermore, the court upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant failed to prove the mortgagee had actual or constructive notice that the mortgagor was a spouse and the property was a matrimonial home.

The appellant appealed from an order dismissing his motion to set aside a previous order that dismissed his action.

The action had been dismissed after the appellant failed to comply with two separate court orders requiring him to answer undertakings and pay costs.

The motion judge found no adequate explanation for the delay or non-compliance, and noted prejudice to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusions, noting the appellant's counsel admitted to non-compliance because he did not anticipate strict enforcement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a 16-year-old, was rendered paraplegic after falling from a tree in a municipal park.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the municipality's monitoring of the park was reasonable and the danger of falling from a tree was obvious.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming there is no duty to warn of such an obvious and self-evident danger.

The Court also dismissed the appeal regarding costs awarded against the Family Law Act claimants, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's discretion.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the application judge, arguing he failed to invalidate actions taken at a national convention in December 2013.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly treated the issue as collateral because it was not specifically addressed in argument.

Furthermore, a prior unappealed order had specifically permitted the convention and elections to proceed.

The appellants' remedy was to appeal the refusal of the injunction or put the issue squarely before the application judge.

The appellant appealed an order removing her as power of attorney for property and care for her elderly mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge had sufficient evidence to support the order and made no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings.

The parties engaged in mediation-arbitration for family law matters.

The arbitrator awarded retroactive child support after finding the respondent misrepresented his income.

The appeal judge overturned the award, finding the arbitrator erred by not conducting a D.B.S. analysis.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding the appeal judge applied the wrong test for sufficiency of reasons and erred by disallowing the award without performing the analysis or remitting it.

The matter was referred back to the arbitrator to determine if D.B.S. applies.

The court also refused to hear the respondent's submissions due to his deliberate misconduct in failing to pay costs, child support, and disclose tax returns.