MacFarland

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the Belleville Police respondents for false arrest and false imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for possession of stolen property, and that the police were not required to accept the appellants' innocent explanation before laying charges.

The Court also agreed that the intentional tort claims were statute-barred as the limitation period commenced on the date of arrest, and that summary judgment was appropriate as the liability of the Belleville respondents was severable from the other defendants.

The appeal and motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The appellant sought to certify a global class action against an Ontario accounting firm for auditor's negligence regarding a clean audit report used in a US private placement.

The motion judge denied certification, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario for the foreign investors and concluding that joinder was preferable to a class proceeding.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by mischaracterizing the claim as being about the foreign financing rather than the Ontario-based audit, and by failing to properly conduct the comparative access to justice analysis required for the preferable procedure criterion.

The action was certified as a class proceeding.

The appellant insurer appealed an order requiring it to pay interest on retroactive attendant care and housekeeping benefits to the respondent, who was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer argued the benefits were not overdue until a catastrophic impairment determination was made in 2013.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the respondent had been catastrophically impaired since the accident and that the benefits were therefore overdue from the dates they were initially terminated or capped, entitling her to interest.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving causing death following a motor vehicle accident that killed his son.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and inconsistent with his acquittal for impaired driving, asserting that his alcohol consumption should not have been considered.

The Court of Appeal held that alcohol consumption short of impairment is relevant to the mens rea of dangerous driving.

The court also rejected arguments regarding Crown misconduct, jury misdirection, and pre-trial applications.

The court dismissed the fresh evidence application and upheld the sentence of nine months' imprisonment, finding it was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant, 407 ETR, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the application of the Limitations Act, 2002 to unpaid toll debts.

The Court of Appeal held that a civil action to collect unpaid tolls is not an 'appropriate means' under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act until the statutory licence plate denial process has run its course and the debtor's vehicle permit expires.

The Court also held that a 15-year limitation period in a transponder lease agreement is enforceable under s. 22(3) of the Limitations Act, even though it is a consumer agreement, because s. 22(3) permits parties to extend the limitation period.

The appeal was allowed.

The moving parties sought an extension of time to appeal an order dismissing their application as an abuse of process.

Although the moving parties formed an intention to appeal within the time limit and adequately explained their delay, the court found no merit to the proposed appeal.

The claims related to an oil reserve had already been litigated and finally determined in British Columbia, rendering the Ontario application an attempt to relitigate.

Furthermore, the limitation period had expired several years prior.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court.

The moving party had received incorrect advice from the Divisional Court Registrar that such an order could not be appealed to the Divisional Court, leading him to file in the Court of Appeal.

The motion was dismissed because under section 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act, jurisdiction to set aside or vary the decision of a single judge of the Divisional Court is reserved to a panel of the Divisional Court, and a single judge of the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction.

The successful respondent on an appeal sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $93,000 for the action, various motions, and the appeal, in addition to the $75,000 already awarded for the summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal applied principles of reasonableness and proportionality, noting that both sides had unnecessarily complicated a simple collection case.

The court reduced the requested costs to $64,500 and then applied a further reduction for overall disproportionality, ultimately awarding the respondent $44,500 in costs.

The parties separated after a 15-year marriage.

The trial judge granted the respondent a 50 per cent beneficial interest in the matrimonial home on a resulting trust and dismissed the appellant's claims for unequal division of net family property and retroactive support.

The appellant appealed, seeking an interest in the respondent's RRSP and retroactive support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had not pleaded the RRSP trust claim at trial and that the trial judge made no errors in denying retroactive support based on the parties' conduct and circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences based on text messages found on his co-accused's cell phone.

The appellant challenged the search of the co-accused's phone under s. 8 of the Charter.

The application judge held that the appellant lacked standing because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages once they reached the recipient's phone.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the sender loses control over the messages once received, thereby extinguishing any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.

The appellant was convicted of firearms and drug trafficking offences following a police investigation involving wiretaps.

He appealed his convictions, arguing he should not have been named as an 'other known person' in the initial wiretap authorization, and appealed his sentence of five years and seven months on the basis of the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the low threshold for naming a known party in a wiretap authorization was met and the global sentence was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of firearms and drug trafficking offences based largely on historical text messages obtained via a production order.

On appeal, he argued he had standing to challenge the order under section 8 of the Charter and that the police should have obtained a Part VI wiretap authorization instead of a production order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant lacked standing.

The Court further held that a Part VI authorization is prospective and not required for the search and seizure of historical text messages already in existence.

The moving party, Dr. Chandra, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a jury verdict dismissing his $130 million libel and invasion of privacy action against the CBC.

The jury had found that the defamatory broadcast alleging scientific fraud was true.

The Court of Appeal denied the extension, finding that the moving party failed to form a timely intention to appeal, provided no satisfactory explanation for the delay, and that the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The court also noted the moving party's lack of candour and attempts to encumber his only Ontario asset, concluding that the justice of the case required dismissing the motion.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his medical malpractice action against his former family doctor.

The appellant alleged the doctor negligently removed surgical staples from his knee, causing permanent injury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the action was statute-barred, as the appellant knew of the material facts giving rise to the claim more than two years before commencing the action.

The Court also agreed that the claim required expert medical evidence, as it was not one of the clearest of cases where such evidence could be dispensed with.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought costs for two trials and an appeal regarding a property dispute involving adverse possession and prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant was largely successful and that the respondent's actions in maintaining an erroneous claim to the entirety of the disputed property were unreasonable.

The Court awarded the appellant $282,000 in costs for the two trials and set off the $25,000 appeal costs against a previous costs order in favour of the respondent.

The appellant, a dentist, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed damages for future income loss, arguing her injuries prevented full-time clinical practice.

The jury awarded significantly less for future income loss than claimed.

The appellant appealed, arguing the award was inconsistent and that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding the propriety of pre-trial communications between her counsel and an expert witness.

The respondents cross-appealed on costs, assignment of collateral benefits, and prejudgment interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding evidence supported the jury's verdict, counsel had agreed to the jury charge regarding the expert witness, and the trial judge made no errors in her discretionary orders on costs, benefits, and interest.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple offences, including attempted murder and forcible confinement, arising from the abduction of the complainant at gunpoint.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the potential contamination of the complainant's identification evidence from a YouTube video and by misapprehending evidence regarding the attempted murder charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the potential contamination issue and properly relied on the extensive one-on-one time the complainant spent with the appellant.

The Court also held that the trial judge reasonably concluded, based on an objective assessment of the evidence, that the appellant pointed an operable firearm at the complainant's head and pulled the trigger with the expectation of shooting her.

The appellant appealed a conviction but failed to surrender into custody as required by the judicial release order.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The Catholic entities appealed an order allowing residential school survivors to archive their Independent Assessment Process (IAP) documents with the National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation without the consent of alleged perpetrators.

Canada cross-appealed, arguing the IAP documents were government records subject to federal archiving and privacy legislation and could not be destroyed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, holding that only claimants have the right to decide whether to archive their documents.

The Court further held that the IAP documents are not government records because they are not under government control, and upheld the supervising judge's order to destroy the documents after a 15-year retention period to protect the claimants' privacy and confidentiality.

The appellant, a secondary insurer, paid for a claimant's expensive prescription drug after the respondent, the primary insurer, denied coverage.

The appellant later sued the respondent for reimbursement.

The motion judge found the appellant's claim was partially statute-barred because it was discovered when the appellant first learned of the denial in October 2009.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellant could not have reasonably discovered its claim until the respondent finally produced the policy wording in September 2011.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent was ordered to fully reimburse the appellant.