Thomas Mathews

The plaintiff, Robert Matuk, sought summary judgment against the defendants, James Vannelli and associated corporations, regarding claims stemming from the breakdown of their shareholder relationship in HappyGo Marketing Inc. The court granted partial summary judgment, ruling that Vannelli's effective appropriation of Matuk's shares constituted oppressive conduct under the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The court found Vannelli personally liable to compensate Matuk for the fair market value of his shares as of May 20, 2020.

However, the court dismissed Matuk's claims for breach of contract related to the corporation's dissolution without unanimous consent and alleged non-competition by a new entity.

A trial is required to determine the precise amount of compensation for the oppressive conduct and to adjudicate whether Vannelli breached the non-disclosure covenant regarding intellectual property, and if so, the appropriate remedy for that specific breach.

The plaintiff brought a motion for the return of computer files and devices from its former Chief Operating Officer.

The parties agreed to appoint an Independent Solicitor to review the files for privilege.

After the Independent Solicitor's report was released, the defendants eventually returned the non-privileged files and the laptop, settling the motion.

The court determined that the plaintiff was the successful party and awarded costs, but reduced the amount claimed because the parties had acted in good faith to agree on the review process.

The costs of the Independent Solicitor were ordered to be shared equally.

The applicant brought a motion to remove counsel representing both the individual respondent and the corporate respondent in an oppression application.

The applicant argued that counsel had a conflict of interest in jointly representing both respondents and that counsel might be called as a witness.

The court found no basis to remove counsel on the grounds of being a potential witness.

However, the court held that a conflict of interest existed because the interests of the individual respondent and the corporate respondent were not aligned in the context of a shareholder dispute.

The motion was allowed in part, and counsel was disqualified from acting for the corporate respondent.

The applicants, charged with fraud and conspiracy, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial completion was 60.5 months, significantly exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

While a previous s. 11(b) application was dismissed, finding the case complex and acknowledging transitional circumstances, a subsequent 11-month adjournment was caused by the unavailability of judges due to medical reasons and systemic resource shortages.

The court found that while judicial illness is a discrete exceptional circumstance, the extended 11-month delay was primarily attributable to scarce judicial resources, which does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance under the Jordan framework.

Consequently, the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, and the applications for a stay of proceedings were granted.

This decision addresses the quantum and payor of costs following the dismissal of the Plaintiff's motion to restore her action to the trial list.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs for the motion and the action, finding the Defendant's claimed hours excessive for a relatively simple motion.

The court declined to award costs personally against the Plaintiff's solicitor, emphasizing that such orders are reserved for extraordinary circumstances and that the Plaintiff's extra-jurisdictional residence or counsel's misstatements are not sufficient grounds.

The plaintiff brought a motion to restore her action, commenced in 2006 for injuries sustained in 2001, to the trial list.

The action had been struck off in 2010 due to the plaintiff's prolonged lack of communication with counsel while residing in Hong Kong.

The court denied the motion and dismissed the action, finding an unacceptable 8-year delay in prosecution without a satisfactory explanation and minimal evidence of the plaintiff's serious intent to pursue the case.

The court also found a presumption of prejudice to the defendant due to the cumulative 16-year delay from the incident date, leading to inevitably faded memories of parties and potential witnesses, which the plaintiff failed to rebut.

The plaintiffs sued the Bank of Montreal for $211,999.62 arising from unauthorized debits from a corporate account and moved for summary judgment.

The Bank of Montreal also moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the claims based on a limitations period and an account verification agreement.

The court found genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the start date of the limitation period due to conflicting evidence on when the plaintiff discovered the loss and when BMO provided account documentation.

The court also identified an ambiguity in the account verification clause regarding written versus oral notice, suggesting the `contra proferentem` rule might apply.

Both motions for summary judgment were dismissed, and no costs were awarded due to divided success.

The plaintiff, a former member of the Ontario College of Social Workers and Social Service Workers, sued the College, its external counsel, the complainant, and witnesses for damages arising from the revocation of her registration following a disciplinary hearing.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the College and its counsel were protected by statutory immunity under the Social Work and Social Services Work Act, 1998, and that the complainant and witnesses were protected by the doctrine of absolute privilege.

The court also struck claims relying on evidence rendered inadmissible by statute and claims lacking sufficient material facts, granting leave to amend only certain specific claims.