Robert Macdonald

The applicant, a minority shareholder in a family-owned commercial real estate corporation, brought an oppression application against the majority shareholder and the corporation.

The applicant alleged oppression regarding the provision of financial information, the triggering of a shotgun buy-sell clause while the application was pending, and improper disbursements made to the majority shareholder.

The court found no oppression regarding the information provision or the shotgun clause, concluding the applicant was not entitled to an additional sum for her shares beyond the designated price.

However, the court found the majority shareholder's receipt of improper disbursements was oppressive and ordered an equalization payment of $154,717 to the applicant.

The plaintiffs purchased a cottage property with the intention of severing it into three lots, relying on the defendant solicitor's advice that severance would be straightforward due to a Planning Act consent stamp on title.

The solicitor later admitted this advice was negligent, as the consent was qualified and severance was not guaranteed.

The plaintiffs sued for the lost hypothetical value of the severed lots and carrying costs.

The court applied the Messineo measure of damages, finding that the plaintiffs suffered no loss because they paid fair market value for the unsevered property, which had since significantly increased in value.

The court awarded only $3,100 in special damages for the wasted retainer and application fees.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to collect on a $500,000 promissory note.

The defendants failed to file responding materials on time, citing a conflict of interest and an internal corporate deadlock, and sought an adjournment on the eve of the motion.

The court refused the adjournment, finding the defendants' internal disputes did not constitute a defence to the debt, and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff for the full amount claimed.

The applicant mother brought a motion to stay or consolidate a civil action commenced by her father-in-law with her family law application.

The father-in-law had advanced $1 million for the purchase of the matrimonial home, which the mother claimed was a gift and the father-in-law claimed was a loan.

The father-in-law commenced a civil action for possession of the home, while the mother sought exclusive possession and equalization in the family proceeding.

The court found that the central issue of whether the advance was a gift or a loan was common to both proceedings and ordered that the civil action be heard together with the family application to avoid inconsistent findings and save time and expense.

The applicant brought an application to assess the accounts of his former criminal defence counsel, alleging misappropriation of a $20,000 retainer and professional misconduct.

The application was dismissed after a three-day trial where the court found the allegations to be entirely without merit and the applicant's evidence unreliable.

The respondent sought costs on a full or substantial indemnity basis.

The court awarded the respondent substantial indemnity costs of $50,000, finding that the applicant's unfounded allegations of dishonesty and illegality warranted elevated costs.

The applicant, a former client, brought an application under the Solicitors Act to assess the accounts of his former criminal defence lawyer.

The application was converted to a trial of an issue.

The applicant claimed he had paid a $20,000 cash retainer that was not credited, and that the lawyer provided inadequate representation.

The court rejected the applicant's evidence as unreliable and accepted the lawyer's evidence that no cash retainer was paid.

Because the accounts were delivered more than a month prior and mostly paid, the applicant had to demonstrate special circumstances to justify an assessment.

The court found no special circumstances and dismissed the application.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to discontinue their counterclaim and a related fraud action, and to redeem a mortgage.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for leave to discontinue its claim for foreclosure.

The court granted the defendants leave to redeem the mortgage upon payment of the principal, interest, and costs totaling over $1.2 million, and granted leave to discontinue their actions upon payment of costs of $516,395.23.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to discontinue the foreclosure claim was dismissed.

This costs endorsement followed motions arising out of a foreclosure action, related construction lien actions, and a fraud action concerning contaminated industrial property.

The moving parties sought to discharge or assign a mortgage by paying principal, interest, and limited costs, while the mortgagee resisted and sought broader recovery.

After divided success on the underlying motions, the court held that neither side should recover costs of the motions.

No costs were awarded.

The moving party (mortgagor) sought leave to redeem a mortgage on a commercial property that was the subject of a foreclosure action, a fraud action, and construction lien actions related to environmental contamination.

The responding party (mortgagee) opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to discontinue its foreclosure claim, arguing the mortgagor was attempting to avoid paying remediation costs and legal fees.

The court granted the mortgagor leave to redeem the mortgage upon payment of the principal, interest, and assessed legal costs, finding that the mortgagee's attempt to discontinue the foreclosure action would unfairly prejudice the mortgagor's equity of redemption.

The appellants appealed multiple orders and judgments made during a commercial trial that spanned 50 days but was never decided on the merits.

The trial judge had permitted the respondents to add new defendants and causes of action mid-trial, granted an ex parte Mareva injunction, issued 19 directions for massive document production, and found the appellants in contempt for failing to fully comply, ultimately striking their pleadings and granting partial default judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the cumulative effect of the trial judge's conduct—including interjections, adverse credibility findings mid-trial, and disproportionate production orders—created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judgments and orders were set aside, and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.