Robert Fried

The applicant, charged with two counts of murder, brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence extracted from an iPhone seized upon his arrest.

The applicant argued that the search warrant was overly broad, the police ignored its limitations, the affiant misled the issuing justice, and the police failed to file reports to a justice and lost a USB key containing the extracted data.

The court found that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen phone and that the failure to file reports and the loss of the USB key violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant test, the court concluded that the evidence was highly reliable and crucial to the Crown's case, and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

In a pretrial Crown application, the court considered whether a young complainant's videotaped statement in a sexual offence prosecution could be admitted for its truth and stand in place of in-court testimony.

Applying the principled hearsay approach, the court held that threshold reliability was established through the timing and content of the statement, the child's responses, surveillance evidence, and DNA evidence.

The application nevertheless failed because the Crown did not provide a sufficient evidentiary foundation to establish necessity on the basis of psychological unavailability, as the parents' evidence and a brief doctor's letter did not demonstrate a real possibility of psychological trauma from testifying.

The application was dismissed, without prejudice to renewal if additional evidence became available before trial.

During a retrial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of two unidentified cell phone calls made to the victim moments before he stepped outside and was shot.

The Crown argued the calls supported the theory that the victim was lured to an ambush.

The Superior Court of Justice ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding no direct or indirect evidence connecting the calls to the accused.

The court held that inferring the calls lured the victim outside, contrary to family testimony that he went to buy juice, would be based on impermissible speculation and conjecture.

The applicants, jointly charged with first degree murder, applied for directed verdicts of acquittal on first and second degree murder at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including gunshot residue and the applicants' presence near the scene, to prove identity and intent.

The court found sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to infer that both applicants were involved in an intentional killing as either principal or aider/abettor.

However, the court concluded there was no evidence upon which a jury could reasonably infer that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The applications were allowed in part, with the court directing verdicts of acquittal on first degree murder and ordering the trial to proceed on second degree murder.

The offender was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after shooting the victim three times following an altercation.

The court determined the factual basis for sentencing, finding that provocation played a significant role but rejecting self-defence.

Considering the offender's prior youth record for firearms offences, the use of a firearm, and the profound impact on the victim's family, the court sentenced the offender to 15 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody.

The Crown brought an application to designate the offender as a dangerous offender following his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon stemming from a pre-planned attack on a fellow inmate.

The offender was already serving a 15-year sentence for prior violent offences.

The court declined to designate him a dangerous offender, finding that psychiatric evidence could not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that his violent conduct was intractable, given the impossibility of predicting his risk 15 years into the future when his current sentences expire.

Instead, the court designated him a long-term offender, imposing a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order and a determinate sentence of 2.5 years consecutive for the predicate offences.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of statements made by the self-represented accused to police during an interview.

The accused was initially arrested for offering an indignity to a dead body and consulted duty counsel.

During the interview, police received information suggesting the death was a murder and informed the accused they believed she was involved, but did not offer her a further opportunity to consult counsel.

The court found the statements were voluntary, but held that the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights were infringed because the change in jeopardy required police to provide another opportunity to consult counsel.

Statements made after the breach were excluded under s. 24(2).

During jury selection, the self-represented accused sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pretrial publicity and racial bias.

On his own motion, the trial judge ordered that prospective jurors and sworn jurors (after completing their duties as triers) be excluded from the courtroom during the challenge for cause process.

The court held that exclusion was necessary to prevent exposure to prejudicial information, limit the impact of the accused's disruptive remarks, and effectively manage court resources.

The defendant, charged with first-degree murder, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of her s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total anticipated delay was approximately 57.5 months.

Applying the new framework from R. v. Jordan, the court assumed the 30-month presumptive ceiling was breached but found the delay was justified by a transitional exceptional circumstance.

Specifically, the court found that under the previous R. v. Morin framework, the delay would not have been considered unreasonable due to the substantial delay caused by the defence's repeated changes of counsel and strategic conduct.

The application was dismissed.

During a voir dire in a criminal trial, the court considered the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police officers responding to a 911 call at her apartment, where her husband's dead body was found.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of her Charter rights against arbitrary detention and right to counsel.

The court found that the accused was not a suspect at the time of the initial questioning, the statements were voluntary, and she was not psychologically or physically detained.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The defendant, facing a first-degree murder charge, brought a "Rowbotham" application for state-funded counsel during jury selection.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was not a bona fide effort to obtain counsel but a strategic attempt to delay or avoid trial on the merits.

The defendant had repeatedly discharged or refused counsel, including Daniel Moore, who was ready to act, by refusing to sign a funding agreement.

The court concluded her actions were a deliberate tactic to orphan herself from counsel and assert unfairness.

Sentencing following conviction for a violent home invasion robbery involving forcible confinement and threats with knives against occupants of a residence.

The offender was a first‑time offender who maintained his innocence despite conviction after trial.

The court reviewed the sentencing range for home invasion robberies, noting appellate guidance that such offences typically attract penitentiary terms of four to thirteen years depending on severity.

Aggravating factors included the home invasion context, the use of knives, and the traumatic impact on the victims.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of criminal record, supportive family background, and strong prospects for rehabilitation.

A five‑year global sentence was imposed, with one year of credit granted for five years spent on strict house‑arrest bail, leaving four years to be served in the penitentiary along with ancillary orders.

The offender was sentenced following a jury conviction for multiple counts of sexual assault and sexual interference against a child over a period of several years.

The offences involved oral sexual acts and inappropriate touching beginning when the complainant was a very young child and continuing into adolescence.

The court emphasized aggravating factors including breach of trust, the young age of the complainant, the persistence of the conduct, and the long‑term psychological impact.

Although the offender had no prior criminal record and strong community support, denunciation and deterrence were given primacy in sentencing for sexual offences against children.

A global penitentiary sentence of three years was imposed along with DNA, lifetime sexual offender registration, and lifetime weapons prohibition orders.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated as a dangerous offender following his conviction for aggravated assault against a fellow inmate.

The court reviewed the offender's extensive criminal record, which included multiple spontaneous and violent assaults, and considered psychiatric evidence diagnosing him with antisocial personality disorder.

The court found that the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation due to a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and a likelihood of causing future injury.

The court sentenced the offender to two and a half years' imprisonment followed by a ten-year Long Term Supervision Order.

The accused applied to exclude recordings of telephone conversations made while he was an inmate in a federal penitentiary, arguing that the interception violated his s. 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure.

The calls had been recorded by correctional authorities and later seized by police pursuant to a search warrant.

The court held that the accused failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications, given institutional policies, warning signs, and signed acknowledgments indicating calls could be monitored or recorded.

The presence of a third party on the calls further undermined any claim of privacy.

As a result, the court found no Charter breach and declined to exclude the evidence.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial applications to exclude evidence under the Charter.

They alleged arbitrary detention, unreasonable search, and right to counsel violations.

The court found that the initial investigative detentions and arrests were lawful and that the examination of the accused's shoes did not violate section 8.

However, the court found a section 9 violation for both accused because the police deliberately delayed bringing them before a Justice of the Peace within 24 hours in order to obtain statements.

Consequently, the statements made at the police station were excluded under section 24(2).

The expert evidence regarding gunshot residue and footwear impressions was ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, and possession of a weapon following a road rage incident.

The accused and the complainant provided conflicting accounts of the altercation, with each claiming the other was the aggressor.

The court rejected the accused's evidence and accepted the complainant's account, corroborated by an independent witness and video evidence, that the accused was the aggressor.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally used a sharp-edged weapon to cut the complainant's shoulder.

The defence of self-defence was rejected as the accused provoked the assault.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.