Rebecca Liu

The grievor, a bus driver, resigned from her employment after being mistakenly informed by the employer that her probationary period was being extended.

She sent a resignation email while in a state of severe emotional distress and later slept for several hours, missing the second half of her split shift.

The next day, she sought to rescind her resignation, but the employer refused.

The arbitrator upheld the grievance, finding that the grievor lacked a continuing objective intent to resign because her actions were heavily influenced by emotional upset caused by the employer's error.

The resignation was deemed invalid.

The applicant filed an application alleging age discrimination after his employment was terminated by the respondent.

The respondent named the staffing agency that placed the applicant as an affected person.

The staffing agency filed a Request to Intervene.

The Tribunal applied the factors for intervention and granted the request, finding the agency had a significant interest and could provide assistance regarding the facts and context of the applicant's employment.

The grievor's position was declared surplus, and she sought to exercise her displacement rights under the collective agreement to bump into an Assessment Officer position.

The employer denied the displacement, arguing she was not qualified to perform the core duties of the role, specifically the independent adjudication of complex surgical claims.

The Grievance Settlement Board applied the established test requiring a surplus employee to demonstrate the present ability to perform all major components of the job at a minimum level of competence without a training period.

The Board found that while the grievor had extensive experience as a Claims Assessor, the Assessment Officer role required specialized skills and months of on-the-job training to adjudicate complex claims independently.

As the grievor could not perform this core function without training, the grievance was dismissed.

Judgment creditors brought a motion seeking production of a law firm’s books, trust records, bank statements, and documents relating to mortgages held in trust for the debtor, and asserted that the mortgage interests themselves were garnishable debts.

The court considered whether mortgage interests held in trust constituted “debts payable” under r. 60.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and whether the requested records could be compelled under r. 60.18(6).

The court held that a mortgage interest in land is not a liquidated money demand and therefore not a debt subject to garnishment until converted into money.

It further held that the broad documentary disclosure sought would breach solicitor-client privilege and no recognized exception justified disclosure.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant sought to add the respondents as defendants to an action arising from a 2009 oil spill.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding it was statute-barred.

On appeal, the appellant argued she only discovered the specific conduct giving rise to the claim during a 2013 examination for discovery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant's insurer had put the respondents on notice of a potential claim related to renovations as early as July 2010.

Therefore, the limitation period began to run no later than July 2010, and the 2014 motion to add them as defendants was statute-barred.

The moving parties sought a review of a motion judge's order dismissing their motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in rejecting hearsay evidence from the moving parties' solicitor regarding their intention to appeal.

Given the short delay, the lack of prejudice to the respondent, and the arguable merit of the proposed appeal, the Court set aside the motion judge's order and granted the extension of time.