Paul Neil Feldman

This appeal concerned the personal liability of an individual who signed dishonoured cheques under an unregistered trade name.

The appellant, a directing mind of several corporations, argued he did not intend personal liability, believing he was signing on behalf of a corporation.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that under section 131(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act, signing a bill in a trade name or assumed name incurs personal liability, especially when the name is not registered to the corporate entity.

The court emphasized the Act's purpose of ensuring certainty in negotiable instruments.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff, an auto parts supplier, brought a motion for summary judgment against corporate defendants operating auto body repair facilities and an individual defendant for unpaid invoices.

The corporate defendants consented to judgment for the principal amount, leaving the issues of pre-judgment interest and costs for the court.

The court found that the credit application stipulated a 2% monthly interest rate on unpaid accounts and ordered pre-judgment interest at this rate from December 1, 2019.

The issue of costs was reserved, and the motion against the individual defendant was adjourned by consent.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order requiring it to return a pre-authorized debit payment of $83,734.05 made post-NOI (Notice of Intention to file a proposal) to the respondent, less amounts owing for post-NOI fuel purchases.

The motion judge found the payment constituted a prohibited remedy under section 69(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether the parties had entered into a legitimate agreement to pay past debts in order to secure future fuel supply.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The case addresses complex estate, property, and support issues arising from a three-way joint tenancy, an erroneous probate transfer, discoverability, and unpaid child support.

The plaintiff, Sui Sun Wong, abandoned his family and failed to pay child support, while the defendant, Mee Fong Wong, maintained the property.

The court found Sui's oral promise to transfer his property interest unenforceable but determined that Sui's transfer of his interest to his mother in trust severed his joint tenancy, leaving Mee and the mother as joint tenants.

Consequently, Mee inherited the mother's share upon her death.

The court also ruled that Mee's claims were not statute-barred due to fraudulent concealment and her vulnerability.

Mee was awarded unpaid child support arrears with compound interest, to be set off against Sui's share of the property sale proceeds, not exceeding his interest.

The plaintiff, Unlimited Motors Inc., sought to continue a $30 million action for breach of contract and other claims after it had lapsed, requiring a status hearing under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the plaintiff's explanation for a 2.5-year delay unacceptable, primarily due to a deliberate choice to prioritize another lawsuit.

The plaintiff also failed to provide robust evidence demonstrating an absence of non-compensable prejudice to the defendant or trial fairness, despite the defendant's own inaction on its counterclaim.

The motion to continue the action was dismissed, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs.

This costs endorsement followed successful summary judgment motions by the Bachly Defendants, the Township of Oro-Medonte, and the third party W.R. Hodgson, dismissing the plaintiffs' grading claims and the Bachly Defendants' third-party claim against Hodgson.

The court assessed the reasonableness and proportionality of the costs sought by the successful parties against the plaintiffs.

It determined that the plaintiffs were liable for the costs of the Bachly Defendants and the Township, and also for the third party Hodgson's costs, applying principles that allow for third-party costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff when the third-party proceedings were a natural and inevitable consequence of the plaintiff's action.

The court fixed specific amounts for partial indemnity costs for each successful party.

The plaintiffs brought claims for lot grade deficiencies against the defendants (Bachly Investments Inc., 411931 Ontario Ltd. o/a Heights of Moonstone, The Township of Oro-Medonte) and a third party claim was brought by the Bachly Defendants against W.R. Hodgson.

The defendants and third party brought summary judgment motions to dismiss these claims, primarily arguing they were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, and that there was no evidence of professional negligence against Hodgson.

The court granted the summary judgment motions, finding that the plaintiffs' grading claims were statute-barred as they knew or ought to have known of the issues by summer/fall 2010, and that the plaintiffs failed to provide expert evidence establishing a breach of standard of care or causation against Hodgson.

The court also found that a prior release only covered a specific driveway issue and not the broader grading claims.

The plaintiff mortgagor sought relief from forfeiture and challenged the accounting and enforcement of seven mortgages held by the defendants.

A reference was ordered to determine whether defaults existed at the time notices of sale were issued and to calculate the amounts owing.

The court found technical defaults existed for all seven mortgages due to factors including unpaid property taxes, lack of insurance, and missed payments.

However, several charges claimed by the mortgagee—including legal fees and certain administrative charges—were disallowed due to insufficient evidentiary support.

The court recalculated the mortgage accounts and determined the correct balances, finding both overpayments and underpayments across the different properties.

The appellants appealed a judgment, arguing only one point regarding fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence would not have changed the result.

The amount in the fresh evidence was consistent with the internal allocation of payments found by the motion judge and did not affect the finding that interest was being paid on all three loans, which defeated the limitations defence.