Neil Jones

The plaintiffs, Christopher McCullough and Nicholas Nossey, along with their Family Law Act claimants, sued the Hamilton Police Services Board and individual officers for damages arising from malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, negligent investigation, and breach of Charter rights.

McCullough and Nossey were jointly charged with murder in 1990; Nossey was acquitted, and McCullough's conviction was set aside on appeal, with the Crown declining a new trial.

The court found that the police had objectively reasonable grounds for the arrests of both McCullough and Nossey, dismissing all claims for malicious prosecution, negligence, and false imprisonment.

The plaintiff sued the police and the Crown for injuries sustained when he was bitten by a police dog during his arrest.

The plaintiff had fled from a vehicle and hidden in tall grass, prompting the police to deploy a canine unit.

The dog located the plaintiff and bit him, following its 'bite and hold' training.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the police had reasonable grounds to use the dog and that the 'bite and hold' policy was not unreasonable.

The court assessed the plaintiff's general damages at $40,000 in the alternative.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for sexual assaults against three young girls.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred by drawing an adverse inference against the credibility of one appellant's testimony because the defence failed to cross-examine a complainant on alleged written consent documents, invoking the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding that the adverse inference was a proper part of the trial judge's fact-finding and weighing of evidence, not a penalty for a tactical error.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge misapprehended evidence or failed to give separate consideration to the co-appellant's case.

The appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The City of Hamilton appealed a trial judgment finding it liable in negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct standard of care and that her findings were supported by the evidence.

The Court also found that the trial judge correctly applied the 'but for' test for causation, noting that causation is a practical question of fact best answered by ordinary common sense.

The insurer brought a motion for the production of Children's Aid Society (CAS) files relating to the minor applicant and her two sisters.

The applicant sought attendant care benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The arbitrator found the CAS files were arguably relevant to determining whether the applicant's attendant care needs arose from the accident or pre-existed it, and to understanding the overlapping care requirements of the siblings who lived together.

The motion was granted, subject to an order restricting the use and dissemination of the files to protect the minors' privacy.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug offence, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to rely on surveillance evidence of probable drug transactions and the appellant's presence near a barbecue to infer he was aware of and in control of the cocaine hidden inside it.

The appellant was convicted of arson and mischief causing danger to life.

The trial judge delivered brief reasons for judgment, stating that he found the Crown witnesses truthful and rejected the appellant's evidence, but provided no insight into why he reached these conclusions beyond a blanket adverse credibility finding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge's reasons were conclusory and generic, failing to facilitate meaningful appellate review and constituting an error of law.

The Crown sought leave to appeal sentence following convictions for incest and indecent assault arising from historical sexual offences against the respondent's daughter and her friend.

The sentencing judge imposed a suspended sentence and probation after considering the respondent's advanced age, frailty, and medical condition.

The majority held that, although the normal sentencing range for incest involving sexual intercourse with a young child was three to five years' imprisonment, the case was unique and any additional custodial sentence might lead to the respondent's death.

A dissenting judge would have found the sentence manifestly unfit and imposed custody.