Naveen Hassan

The appellant, Kunal Tipu, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that confirmed a Community Treatment Order (CTO) reissued by Dr. O’Brien.

The appellant argued the Board erred by implicitly concluding the CTO was properly renewed within the statutory timeframe and by not considering the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on his ability to comply.

The court dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error by the Board.

The court determined the CTO was properly issued/renewed and that evidence supported the appellant's ability to comply with the treatment plan during the pandemic.

The respondent psychiatrist brought a motion to dismiss the appellant's appeal of a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

The respondent argued the appeal was moot because the CTO in question had expired and a new CTO had been issued.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the appeal was not moot as the appellant was subject to a series of rolling CTOs, making the validity of a predecessor order relevant.

The court also held that even if moot, special circumstances warranted hearing the appeal to prevent substantial injustice.

The respondent's motion to introduce fresh evidence was reserved for the judge hearing the appeal.

The appellant appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her involuntary admission and incapacity to consent to treatment for an eating disorder.

Following the hearing, the appellant was discharged, regained capacity, and her community treatment order was terminated.

The respondent moved to admit fresh evidence of these developments and argued the appeal was moot.

The Superior Court allowed the fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no live controversy or special circumstances to justify hearing it.

In the alternative, the court held it would have dismissed the appeal on the merits, as the Board's decisions were reasonable and free of palpable and overriding error.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision declaring that the limitation period for putative class members remained suspended under s. 28(1) of the Class Proceedings Act following the denial of class certification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 28(1) provides an exhaustive list of circumstances that resume a limitation period, and denial of certification is not among them.

Consequently, the limitation period remains suspended indefinitely following a denial of certification, a result the court noted must be addressed by the Legislature.

Duane Anderson appealed a decision by the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that continued his detention order and imposed a condition prohibiting non-medical use of alcohol or drugs, specifically recreational cannabis.

The appellant argued the condition was not the least restrictive and lacked sufficient evidentiary basis.

The Court of Appeal found that the ORB was entitled to rely on expert psychiatric evidence that cannabis generally exacerbates psychotic symptoms, coupled with evidence of a prior aggressive incident linked to the appellant's excessive cannabis use.

Given the conceded significant risk to public safety, the Board was not required to wait for an actual adverse event.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the ORB's condition.

The applicant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of managing his property under the Mental Health Act.

The applicant failed to comply with the timetable for perfecting the appeal, leading the respondent to request that the appeal hearing be vacated and amicus curiae appointed.

The court granted the respondent's requests, vacating the scheduled hearing and directing the appointment of amicus curiae to assist the court in the interests of justice, pending an investigation into the applicant's legal aid status.

Following the dismissal of a motion to certify a class action regarding unreliable hair drug testing at the Motherisk Drug Testing Laboratory, the plaintiff brought a motion under s. 7 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to continue her action and join approximately 200 co-plaintiffs.

The court held that the limitation periods for the putative class members remain suspended under s. 28 of the Act until the defendants successfully move to dismiss the proceeding without an adjudication on the merits.

The court also held that the test for joining co-plaintiffs under s. 7 is the same as the test under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion to join the co-plaintiffs was dismissed without prejudice due to insufficient pleading of material facts.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant's statement of claim alleged that criminals associated with government had implanted microchips in his body and brain, and that a hospital had misdiagnosed him with schizophrenia when the real cause was the implanted microchips.

He sought damages of $350 billion.

The trial judge dismissed the action without notice to the appellant, finding that the claim disclosed no cause of action and that the appellant required medical assistance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's decision.

The plaintiff moved to certify a proposed class action arising from allegedly unreliable Motherisk hair-strand drug and alcohol testing used in child protection, family, and criminal proceedings.

The court held that while the pleading disclosed a cause of action and there was evidence of a broad group of potentially affected persons, the proposed proceeding failed on common issues, preferable procedure, and representative plaintiff criteria.

The court found the alleged systemic negligence did not materially advance the class members' real claims because compensable harm depended on highly individualized proof that a particular test result was false and adversely influenced a particular proceeding.

The litigation plan for individual hearings was found unworkable and procedurally unfair.

Certification was refused.

An application to extend a youth's committal to a secure treatment program at Syl Apps Youth Centre for an additional three months was dismissed.

The applicant sought to extend the committal based on five statutory criteria under the Child and Family Services Act.

While the youth conceded that he had a mental disorder and was receiving appropriate treatment, the court found that the applicant failed to establish that it was likely the youth would cause or attempt to cause serious bodily harm to himself or others.

The court distinguished between minor assaults and the serious bodily harm required to justify continued detention under the extraordinary measures provision of the Act.