Megan Melinda Schwartzentruber

This decision addresses the admissibility of evidence of other sexual activity under section 276 of the Criminal Code in a sexual assault prosecution.

The court allowed evidence that the complainant propositioned the Applicant and his girlfriend, C.E., for a threesome, finding it relevant to impeach the complainant’s credibility and establish a motive to fabricate.

The court further permitted limited questioning about the complainant’s sexual interest in C.E., concluding that this evidence had significant probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice, particularly in a judge-alone trial.

The ruling clarifies the scope of permissible cross-examination regarding sexual interest as it relates to motive to fabricate allegations.

The applicants sought to quash charges of fraud on the public and conspiracy to defraud the public, arguing that the evidence identified 38 specific corporate victims, thus requiring individual naming in the indictment.

The Crown contended that the charges were properly framed against the public due to the impossibility of identifying all victims (e.g., individual condominium owners affected by increased fees) and the broad interpretation of "public" in the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the charges were appropriately framed as offenses against the public, consistent with recent jurisprudence where a segment of the community or a regulated industry can constitute "the public," and where a ripple effect on unidentifiable parties exists.

The defendant brought a motion to sever two counts of sexual assault involving two separate complainants, seeking to have two separate trials during a scheduled four-day trial period.

The Crown opposed the application, intending to bring a similar fact application between the counts.

The court applied the "interests of justice" test under section 591(3) of the Criminal Code, considering factors including general prejudice, legal and factual nexus, testimonial intention, avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings, and the viability of a similar fact application.

The court found that while some factors favoured severance, the viability of the similar fact application and the truth-seeking function of the trial weighed significantly against severance.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants brought applications to exclude evidence obtained during a drug trafficking investigation, alleging Charter violations under sections 8 and 24(2).

The Crown charged both defendants with conspiracy to commit robbery and various firearms and drug offences.

The defendants challenged: (1) police observations made in a condominium hallway on February 22, 2016; (2) the search of a residence on June 9, 2016; and (3) the search of a vehicle incident to arrest.

The court rejected all applications, finding that the police conduct was lawful and that the defendants' reasonable expectations of privacy were not violated.

The accused were charged with assault causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, and intimidation following an incident in which the complainant was lured to the defendant's home and severely beaten.

The Crown alleged that the male defendant, motivated by jealousy over the complainant's intimate relationship with the female defendant, orchestrated the assault with an unknown second assailant.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and accepted his evidence that he was set upon by two individuals and beaten, suffering fractured ribs and significant facial injuries.

The male defendant was found guilty of all charges.

The female defendant's charges were dismissed due to insufficient evidence of her knowledge and intent to participate in the assault, though the judge found her at least wilfully blind to the possibility of violence.

The defendant brought a Jarvis application seeking to exclude evidence obtained through search warrants on the grounds that the CRA's audit function had improperly transitioned into a criminal investigation, thereby breaching his Charter rights under sections 7 and 8.

The defendant was charged with two counts of fraud and four counts of tax evasion related to a GST refund scheme involving a dormant company.

The court found that the defendant lacked standing to bring the application, as he had no legitimate privacy interest in the mail box or bank account that were the subject of the search warrants, having fraudulently misappropriated the identity of the company.

Alternatively, the court found no breach of the Jarvis doctrine, as the predominant purpose of the inquiry remained audit-focused until after November 4, 2005, when the bank requirement revealed the connection between the defendant and the fraudulent refunds.

The court admitted all evidence.

The accused were charged with assault causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, and intimidation.

The Crown alleged that following a sexual encounter between the female accused and the complainant, the male accused lured the complainant to the home where he and an unidentified assailant attacked him, causing serious injuries including fractured ribs and a collapsed lung.

The defence sought to exclude evidence of flirting between the complainant and the female accused, and evidence that the female accused encouraged alcohol consumption, arguing such evidence relied on discriminatory stereotypes about women's sexual conduct.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it relevant to establishing motive and context while carefully distinguishing between proper and improper uses of such evidence.

A youth charged with impaired care and control, over 80, possession of cannabis resin, and a Highway Traffic Act offence brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged breach of section 11(b) of the Charter (right to trial within a reasonable time).

The court examined the timeline from arrest in February 2012 to trial in April 2013, assessing delays attributable to the Crown, defence, and institutional factors.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that institutional guidelines for youth should mirror those for adults, holding that the shorter guidelines under the Youth Criminal Justice Act apply consistently.

The court found that while the delay exceeded the administrative guidelines of five to six months for youth, the modest specific prejudice adduced by the defendant, combined with the community's strong interest in adjudicating the matter on its merits, did not warrant a stay of proceedings.