Mary D. Bird

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to ss. 253(1)(a) and 255 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal alleged that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and improperly applied the credibility analysis required by R. v. W.(D.).

The Superior Court reviewed the trial reasons and concluded that the trial judge properly assessed credibility in the context of all the evidence, including independent eyewitness testimony, and gave adequate reasons for rejecting the accused’s testimony.

The court found no misapprehension of evidence, no shifting of the burden of proof, and no palpable or overriding error.

The conviction was therefore upheld.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their counterclaim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellants argued that the limitation period was suspended under s. 52 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, because an arbitration had been commenced via correspondence, or alternatively, that the respondent was estopped from pleading a limitations defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the parties' correspondence merely proposed an arbitration agreement and did not commence an arbitration under s. 23 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The court also found no evidence to support an estoppel claim.

The Aboriginal appellants were convicted of night hunting and discharging a firearm on a road after shooting at a moose decoy from a gravel logging road.

They appealed, arguing they were exercising their hunting rights under Treaty No. 9.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the road was a 'right of way for public vehicular traffic' and constituted land 'taken up' for forestry and public use, making it visibly incompatible with hunting.

Therefore, the treaty right did not protect their actions on that specific road.

The appellant appealed an order regarding whether he was acting qua councillor in a suit brought against him by electors concerning his election expenses, and whether a City Council resolution to pay his legal fees was ultra vires.

The Court of Appeal agreed entirely with the motion judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $5,000 to the respondent.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeals, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The appellants argued for no costs due to the novelty and public interest of the issues, while the respondent sought substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle and the appellants' conduct.

The Court of Appeal rejected both positions, noting that Rule 49.10 does not apply to appeals.

The respondent was awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $25,000 total for both proceedings.

The appellants, electors in a municipal election, sought to challenge a municipal councillor's election campaign finances.

They first applied for a compliance audit under the Municipal Elections Act, which the city council rejected.

The appellants then brought an application in the Superior Court, which was stayed on the basis that the Act constitutes a complete code of procedure.

One appellant subsequently swore a private information before a justice of the peace, who issued a summons.

The Superior Court quashed the summons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that the election campaign finance provisions of the Municipal Elections Act constitute a complete code of procedure that reserves the right to commence proceedings to the municipal council, precluding both a private application and a private information.