Marshall Matias

This case involves a status review application by the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto seeking extended society care for three young children (B, C, and D) with no access to their parents, JM and MH.

The court reviewed extensive evidence including Statements of Agreed Facts, police and hospital records, and testimony from society workers, foster parents, and the parents themselves.

The children have special needs, including autism for B, and have been in care beyond statutory time limits.

The parents have a history of instability, mental health issues, substance abuse, domestic violence, and lack of cooperation with the society.

The court found the parents neither credible nor reliable and concluded that returning the children to their care would pose significant risks.

The court ordered extended society care with no parental access but allowed access among the siblings.

The decision carefully applies the legal framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, including the best interests of the child and the new access test for children in extended society care.

This was a status review application brought by the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto concerning two children, E (8) and N (6), who had been in society care since 2021 due to their mother's severe mental health issues.

The Society sought a final custody order granting sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence to S.T., the father's partner, with whom the children had been living since the father's departure following domestic violence charges.

The mother sought custody for herself, while the father initially sought custody but later supported S.T.'s custody.

The court granted S.T. sole custody under section 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, finding it to be in the children's best interests due to the mother's profound and unaddressed mental health challenges and the father's deceitful conduct, family violence, and lack of insight.

The court ordered supervised access for the mother and structured, reduced day access for the father, emphasizing the children's need for stability and protection from conflict.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a protection application concerning an 11-month-old child, KL, alleging the mother, A.M., was unable to provide adequate care due to severe mental health challenges, non-compliance with treatment, and lack of support.

The father, K.W., was in default.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the mother's inconsistent medication adherence, poor insight into her mental health, and inability to provide a stable environment.

The court ordered the child to remain in the care and custody of a kith caregiver, H.O., for six months, subject to society supervision.

The mother's access was reduced to supervised bi-weekly visits, and the court provided a roadmap for the mother to work towards reunification.

This appeal concerns the interaction between a provincial legislative scheme governing child protection (CYFSA) and a federal legislative scheme for removing those without citizenship or immigration status from Canada (IRPA).

Specifically, it addresses a disclosure order granted to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in a child protection status hearing.

The motion judge granted the disclosure, which was upheld by the Superior Court.

The appellants (the parent, the Children's Aid Society, and the Office of the Children's Lawyer) argued that the disclosure order improperly prioritized the Minister's interests over the children's privacy and best interests.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge had jurisdiction to order disclosure, she erred by not requiring the Minister to establish a prima facie basis for the scope of submissions or the requested disclosure.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted to the motion judge for reconsideration based on a new framework requiring the Minister to justify the scope of submissions and disclosure.

The appellant children's aid society appealed an order granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness disclosure of child protection records.

The Minister sought the records to make submissions under s. 50(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act regarding a pending removal order against the respondent mother.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Minister had a legitimate interest in determining whether a genuine lis existed in the child protection proceedings, and that the Ontario Court of Justice had jurisdiction under the Family Law Rules to order disclosure to a non-party to ensure a fair procedure.

The court also rejected arguments that the motion judge demonstrated bias during a case conference.

The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness brought a motion within ongoing child protection proceedings, seeking disclosure of case documents and the right to make submissions regarding a final supervision order.

This was prompted by an existing deportation order against the mother and one child, which is stayed if the Minister has an opportunity to make submissions under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, the mother, and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer opposed the extent of the Minister's requested involvement, arguing for limited submissions and no disclosure.

The court found it had jurisdiction, either explicitly under the Family Law Rules or implicitly, to order disclosure to a non-party.

It ruled that the Minister was entitled to make informed and meaningful submissions on all relevant issues, including whether a genuine lis existed between the parties, and ordered the society to provide past and future relevant documents, with strict conditions on their use to protect privacy.

A motion by the respondent father (VF) to split a child protection status review application into two separate cases was dismissed.

The application involved three children with two different fathers and a common mother.

VF sought to separate the case involving his child from the case involving the other father's children, citing privacy concerns regarding his criminal history involving child pornography convictions.

The court found that splitting the cases would not result in fairness to all parties, would not protect the interests of all children, and would not save time and expense.

The central issue of VF's criminal convictions, rehabilitation, and ongoing risk to all children required unified proceedings.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion seeking a non-removal order to prevent the deportation of a mother and one of her two children to St. Lucia, where a removal order had been issued by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

The mother and one child lacked legal residency status in Canada, while the other child was a Canadian citizen.

The society had commenced child protection proceedings in 2013 and obtained multiple supervision orders based on ongoing protection concerns.

The court found that a genuine lis existed in the child protection proceeding, that the supervision order would be directly contravened by enforcement of the removal order, and that the Minister had been given full opportunity to make submissions.

The court granted the non-removal order, finding that the supervision order acts as an automatic stay of the removal order under paragraph 50(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

A child protection application concerning a nine-month-old child born to parents with histories of substance abuse and incarceration.

The society sought extended society care with no access.

The father sought continuation of weekly supervised access.

The court considered whether an access order would be in the child's best interests under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, applying the holistic best interests test.

The court found that while the father's visits were positive in quality, they were inconsistent in frequency and timing.

Critically, a prospective adoptive family willing to adopt the child with her half-sibling was prepared to do so only without an access order.

The court determined that no access order was in the child's best interests, balancing the benefits of maintaining biological connection against the certainty of immediate permanent placement with a racially and culturally matched family.

In a child protection proceeding, the court determined motions regarding medical decision-making authority and school placement for a child with ADHD and learning disabilities.

The mother sought to retain decision-making authority based on her historical involvement in medical decisions, while the father sought authority to make medical decisions, particularly regarding ADHD medication (Biphentin).

The court found both parents had acted contrary to the child's best interests by allowing parental conflict to cloud their judgment.

The court ordered both parents to jointly consult with an ADHD specialist and follow that specialist's recommendations.

The child was to remain in his current school pending further order.

The issue of which parent should have final medical decision-making authority was not determined on the motion but was to be resolved through further court process if the parties could not agree.

Parents sought an extension of time to file their Answer/Plan of Care in a child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The application was served on the parents on June 10, 2017, seeking a finding that the children were in need of protection due to excessive school absences.

The parents were initially granted an extension to September 25, 2017, but failed to file by that date.

Five months after service, they retained counsel and brought a motion for a further extension.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the parents' stated objectives could be achieved without filing pleadings, that no genuine issue for trial existed given the parents' agreement with the society's recommendations, and that the children's right to timely disposition outweighed the parents' right to participate through late-filed pleadings.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that a newborn child was in need of protection and should be made a crown ward with no access for adoption purposes.

The parents opposed the motion.

The court found that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the child's need for protection, based on the parents' history with their first child and ongoing protection concerns including mental health issues, cognitive impairments, poor access attendance, and limited cooperation with the society.

However, the court found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the appropriate disposition, as the parents had demonstrated some improvements in their parenting abilities and mental health stability since the apprehension.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion on disposition and ordered a structured trial to determine whether the child should be returned to the parents' care under a supervision order or made a crown ward.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a motion seeking a declaration that T.O.M., the biological father of a 15-year-old child, is not a parent within the meaning of the Child and Family Services Act.

The motion was supported by the child's mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that T.O.M. qualifies as a parent under the statutory definition because he was married to the child's mother at the time of birth, which triggers the presumption of paternity under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court held that separation at the time of birth does not constitute an exception to the statutory definition of parent.

In a child protection disposition hearing, the court determined that a child apprehended at birth and in foster care for over 16 months should be made a Crown ward without access to the mother.

The mother proposed placing the child with a friend as an alternative to the Society's adoption plan, but the proposed caregiver had not met the child, lacked adequate documentation of her circumstances, and the assessment process was incomplete.

The court found that the mother's plan was not sufficiently viable and that Crown wardship for adoption purposes was in the child's best interests.

The court also declined to grant access to the mother, finding that the relationship was not sufficiently beneficial and meaningful to the child.

This is a child protection case involving five children of the B. family.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship for all five children based on findings of neglect, inadequate supervision, failure to meet educational and health needs, and parental non-cooperation.

The court found that the children were in need of protection and made orders for Crown wardship with varying access provisions.

The case involved a complex history of Society involvement dating back to 2006, with persistent concerns about supervision, school attendance, health care, and parental responsiveness to intervention.

A child protection application under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning a child apprehended at birth.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the child was in need of protection and a crown wardship order without access for adoption purposes.

The respondent parents opposed the application and sought either dismissal or, alternatively, a society wardship order followed by a supervision order.

The court found the child was in need of protection based on the parents' extensive prior child protection history, the mother's criminal convictions including fraud offences, the father's inconsistent commitment to parenting, and the lack of a viable plan for the child's care.

The court made a crown wardship order without access, finding that permanency planning through adoption was in the child's best interests.

A temporary care and custody motion under the Child and Family Services Act concerning a newborn child.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society sought to place the child in their care, while the mother sought placement with herself or alternatively with the maternal grandparents subject to supervision.

The court applied the two-part test requiring the society to establish reasonable grounds that the child would likely suffer harm if returned to the respondents and that the child could not be adequately protected by supervision terms.

While finding the first part satisfied regarding placement with the mother alone, the court determined that placement with the maternal grandparents, jointly with the mother and subject to strict supervision terms, was appropriate and the least disruptive alternative consistent with adequate child protection.