M. Flagg

The accused was charged with second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing that occurred during a drug transaction.

The accused claimed he acted in self-defence after the victim suddenly attacked him with body spray and grabbed a knife.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the accused's credibility and the three-part test for self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in lawful self-defence, concluding that the accused's response was reasonable in the rapidly evolving and unpredictable circumstances.

The accused was acquitted.

The offender pleaded guilty to aggravated assault following an unprovoked attack on an older victim.

The offender, who has a history of schizophrenia, sought enhanced pre-sentence custody credit beyond the standard 1.5 to 1 ratio due to time spent in segregation.

The court accepted a joint submission for a 5-year sentence.

The court declined to award enhanced credit, noting a lack of jurisdiction absent a Charter challenge, and finding that the offender's time in segregation was largely at his own request and did not constitute particularly harsh treatment.

The applicant medical centre sought to vary a production order requiring it to produce a patient's medical records, including insulin pump data stored on a third-party website.

The Crown argued the centre had possession and control of the data because it had the patient's permission to access the website.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the centre did not possess or control the data on the third-party website at the time it received the order, as it only accessed the data during patient visits.

The application was granted and the production order was varied to exclude the requirement to obtain data from the third-party website.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to provide a breath sample.

At trial, the adult witnesses, including the police officer and the appellant, were asked to promise to tell the truth rather than being sworn or affirmed.

The summary conviction appeal court held that this was not a minor procedural irregularity curable under s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The failure to have adult witnesses testify under oath or solemn affirmation meant there was no properly sworn evidence before the trial court.

The conviction was quashed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and threatening death, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, applied unequal scrutiny to defence and Crown evidence, and misused his criminal record.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding the trial judge erred in law by using the appellant's record of prior assaults to assess credibility without limiting instructions, effectively using it as propensity evidence.

The court also found the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a social media post and unfairly scrutinized defence witnesses.

The appeal was allowed, convictions vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to pursue a summary conviction appeal from convictions for obstructing police and breach of probation.

The trial judge had relied primarily on circumstantial documentary evidence linking the accused to a rented vehicle involved in the incident after assigning limited weight to tainted identification evidence.

The court considered whether the proposed grounds of appeal were arguable and whether the interests of justice required appointed counsel.

The court found the trial judge had properly addressed identification deficiencies and reasonably relied on the rental documentation to infer identity.

Concluding the proposed appeal lacked arguable merit, the court dismissed the application for appointment of counsel.

The applicants, two young persons charged with multiple counts of robbery, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay between arrest and the scheduled seven-day trial was approximately 13 months.

The court applied the Morin framework, finding that while the delay was longer than ideal for a youth court matter, it was largely attributable to neutral inherent time requirements, including bail proceedings and retaining counsel.

The institutional delay of just over nine months was deemed reasonable given the complexity of the case, and the motion was dismissed.

The applicants, facing multiple fraud-related charges, applied under section 523(2) of the Criminal Code to vacate their pre-trial detention orders.

They argued that new proposed sureties constituted a material change in circumstances justifying release.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the applicants failed to demonstrate a material change in the strength of the Crown's case, and that the newly proposed sureties were unsuitable to supervise the applicants.