G. Joseph

The Crown brought an application under the Youth Criminal Justice Act to sentence the young person as an adult for the offence of manslaughter.

The young person, who was one month shy of 18 at the time of the offence, participated in a fatal attack on a friend.

The court considered the young person's significant Gladue factors, history of trauma, and rehabilitative progress while in custody.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and that a youth sentence was sufficient to hold the young person accountable.

The application was dismissed, and the young person was ordered to be sentenced as a youth, with sentencing delayed to allow for the development of a release plan.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing that occurred during a drug transaction.

The accused claimed he acted in self-defence after the victim suddenly attacked him with body spray and grabbed a knife.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the accused's credibility and the three-part test for self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in lawful self-defence, concluding that the accused's response was reasonable in the rapidly evolving and unpredictable circumstances.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder following the death of a highly intoxicated victim who was beaten and stabbed in a park.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of an eyewitness who observed the accused and another individual jointly assault the victim, including striking him with a heavy pole and kicking him in a ditch.

Although it could not be determined who inflicted the fatal stab wound, the court applied the principles of co-principal liability under s. 21(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused's participation in the brutal group assault was a significant contributing cause of death and that the requisite intent for murder could be inferred from the viciousness of the attack on an incapacitated victim.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for stabbing his 18-year-old stepbrother to death.

The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment was imposed.

The Crown sought an 18-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years.

The court considered the aggravating factors, including the familial relationship, the victim's vulnerability, and the offender's criminal record, alongside mitigating factors such as remorse.

The court set the period of parole ineligibility at 15 years.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder, uttering death threats, and forcible confinement following the stabbing death of his brother's common-law partner.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of three highly intoxicated witnesses, which contained inconsistencies.

The court accepted the evidence that the accused had a knife, threatened the occupants, and fled the scene before police arrived.

Applying the test for circumstantial evidence, the court found that the only reasonable inference was that the accused stabbed the victim and had the requisite intent for murder despite his intoxication.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to adduce evidence of an alternate suspect and inadequate police investigation.

The defence sought to cross-examine police officers about information they received regarding another individual who allegedly had a motive and recent violent encounter with the victim, but whom police failed to investigate.

The court allowed the application, finding there was an air of reality to the alternate suspect theory and that the proposed evidence was relevant to the adequacy of the police investigation.

The accused was convicted of first degree murder and kidnapping in relation to a drug debt.

The court sentenced the accused to the mandatory life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years for first degree murder.

For the kidnapping conviction, considering the accused's role as an aider and his limited criminal record compared to his co-accused, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of 15 years imprisonment.

The respondent brought a motion for the release of the net proceeds of sale of two jointly owned properties.

The applicant opposed the full release, seeking to have a portion held in trust to secure her equalization claim, and brought a cross-motion for the partition and sale of a third property.

The court ordered a partial release of the proceeds, holding $778,000 in trust to secure the applicant's equalization claim, finding she had established a strong claim and a risk of dissipation.

The court also granted the cross-motion for the partition and sale of the third property, finding no compelling reason to delay the sale until trial.

The accused threw a heavy trailer hitch from a moving vehicle, striking the victim in the abdomen and rupturing her small bowel.

The victim, who suffered from advanced liver disease, underwent surgery but died five months later from complications including peritonitis and pneumonia.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault but contested the manslaughter charge, arguing his actions did not cause her death or that delayed medical treatment broke the chain of causation.

The court found that the blunt force trauma was a significant contributing cause that accelerated her death, and that no intervening act severed legal causation.

The accused was found guilty of manslaughter.

The parties separated after an 11-year marriage.

The trial addressed the equalization of net family property and spousal support.

The respondent sought to include a $500,000 settlement payment the applicant made to his first wife as a date-of-marriage liability or as grounds for an unequal division of property; the court dismissed both arguments.

The court imputed income to both parties, finding the respondent intentionally underemployed.

The applicant was ordered to pay an equalization payment and a lump sum for spousal support based on the high end of the SSAG for an eight-year duration, less credits for post-separation overpayments.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown alleged a strong circumstantial case involving a fatal stabbing related to the drug trade.

The court found that the accused met his onus under the primary and secondary grounds due to his lack of a criminal record and the strength of the proposed sureties.

On the tertiary ground, the court balanced the gravity of the offence against the circumstantial nature of the evidence and the strict release plan, concluding that a reasonable person would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if the accused were released.

The application was granted, and the accused was released on strict conditions, including house arrest and significant financial pledges from his sureties.

The applicant was successful on a motion regarding the residential schedule of the parties' daughter and sought costs of $50,000 on a substantial indemnity basis.

While the applicant was presumptively entitled to costs due to his success and beating his offer to settle, the court found that both parties had engaged in blameworthy conduct that escalated the conflict contrary to the child's best interests.

Consequently, the court reduced the applicant's cost recovery and awarded him $15,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The moving party father brought a motion for access to his two-year-old daughter.

The responding party mother argued the court lacked jurisdiction because the motion was brought after a 30-day deadline set in a previous order.

The court extended the time to hear the motion under Rule 3(5) of the Family Law Rules, noting the father had not seen the child in several months.

The mother sought supervised access, but the court found no basis for her concerns or that the father was a flight risk.

The court ordered temporary unsupervised access twice a week and prohibited the removal of the child from Ontario.

The applicants brought two motions: one to vacate a longstanding non‑dissipation order secured against their property and another seeking an extension of time and leave to appeal an interlocutory mistrial order declaring a mistrial after thirteen days of trial.

The court considered the test under Rule 62.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the mistrial decision raised serious and important issues regarding whether trial length and scheduling constraints could justify terminating a trial.

The court granted both the extension of time and leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal open to serious debate and of significance to the administration of justice.

The court also vacated the non‑dissipation order, concluding that the evidentiary basis for the order had been discredited and that there was no ongoing risk of asset dissipation warranting such security.

The accused was charged with communicating with a person under 18 for the purpose of facilitating a sexual assault after a 15-year-old complainant received solicitations via Kijiji.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including IP address logs, computer key logger data, and cell phone records linking the offending email address and phone number to the accused.

The court found that the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence, including the accused's access to the specific computers and his connection to the cell phone used, proved his identity as the sender beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found guilty.

The applicant mother brought a motion for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The court previously denied the motion, allowing the respondent father to remain in the home.

The mother renewed her motion, providing evidence of vitriolic and threatening text messages sent by the father.

The court found that the text messages constituted 'violence' under section 24(3)(f) of the Family Law Act, as they were intended to intimidate and caused psychological harm.

Given the violence and the risk of exposing the child to adult conflict, the court granted the mother exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.