Kate Zadorozhnya

This sentencing decision concerns two co-accused, Tafari Bezabeh and Justin Harker, convicted by a jury of attempt murder and first degree murder arising from two closely connected shootings in Toronto on June 19, 2022.

The court reviews the facts, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the applicable case law, ultimately imposing life imprisonment for both offences, with no parole eligibility for 25 years on the murder count and a concurrent life sentence for attempt murder.

The decision emphasizes the need for denunciation and deterrence in the context of planned, public gun violence.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and an indeterminate sentence for the defendant, Jason Perrault, following his guilty pleas to multiple offences including assault with a weapon, which involved intimate partner violence.

The court found that Perrault met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation due to a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour and a likelihood of causing severe psychological damage.

However, based on expert psychiatric evidence and the defendant's expressed commitment to change, the court determined that a determinate sentence of 10 years, with credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order with strict conditions, would adequately protect the public, rather than an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of extrinsic discreditable conduct, including cell phone images of the accused in possession of handguns and ammunition seized from a townhouse, in a murder and attempted murder trial.

The court applied the `Handy` test, admitting the cell phone images and ammunition due to their high probative value regarding identity, party liability, and planning, which outweighed their prejudicial effect.

However, the court excluded the admission of two specific handguns seized from the townhouse, as they were not the murder weapons and their probative value was minimal compared to the already admitted evidence and potential for prejudice.

The appellant, Daniel Tiessen, appealed his conviction for conspiracy to kidnap and related offences, and his three-year sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the admissibility of intercepted communications, arguing that initial investigative orders (tracking, number reader, data recorder warrants) were improperly made due to inadequate Information to Obtain (ITOs) and that evidence derived from them should have been excised from the wiretap application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the motion judge's findings that the initial orders met the "reasonable grounds to suspect" standard, the wiretap order met the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard, and the "investigative necessity" requirement was satisfied.

The court found no error in the motion judge's assessment of the ITOs or the trial judge's sentence.

Peter Bouctsis, a youth, was convicted of second-degree murder.

The Crown sought an adult sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, arguing that the presumption of diminished moral culpability was rebutted and a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability, rehabilitation, and public safety.

The court found that the offender demonstrated adult-level maturity and sophistication in planning the crime and continued criminal conduct while in custody.

The court granted the Crown's application, imposing a life sentence with parole eligibility after seven years, emphasizing the need for long-term monitoring for public protection.

The accused, a young person, was tried for second-degree murder following a drug rip-off where he shot the victim twice, including once in the head.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused had the requisite specific intent for murder under s. 229(a) of the Criminal Code, or whether he should be convicted of manslaughter.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to the accused's out-of-court exculpatory statements and found them implausible.

Applying the common sense inference that a sane and sober person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions, the court concluded the accused intended to cause bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless whether death ensued.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

Following convictions for child luring, sexual assault, sexual interference, and related breaches involving two complainants, the Crown sought a psychiatric assessment order under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the threshold for such an order is low and requires reasonable grounds to believe the offender might be found to be a dangerous offender or long-term offender.

Applying that standard, the court found the record disclosed an apparent failure to control sexual impulses, repeated targeting of underage complainants, and offending while bound by protective recognizance conditions.

The application for an assessment order was allowed.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the court convicted the accused of child luring, sexual assault, sexual interference, multiple recognizance breaches, and breach of probation arising from online communications and in-person sexual assaults involving two complainants under 16.

The court accepted the complainants’ evidence, relied on social media, Facetime, phone, and text-message evidence, admitted prior discreditable conduct and after-the-fact conduct evidence, and found no collusion.

Applying the mistake-of-age jurisprudence, the court held the accused either knew the complainants were underage or failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain age.

The court also used cross-count similar act reasoning as additional support for the sexual offence findings.

The accused was acquitted on two recognizance counts concerning attendance at school grounds or a park, and on the SOIRA reporting count because the Crown did not prove the address change fell outside the seven-day reporting period.

The accused brought a severance motion in a prosecution involving child luring, sexual assault, sexual interference, and related breach charges arising from allegations by two young complainants.

The court accepted that the fail to comply charges should be severed from the sexual offence counts, but refused to sever the counts relating to each complainant from one another.

Applying the interests of justice analysis under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code and the framework in Last, the court found a strong factual nexus, significant overlap in digital and disclosure evidence, the prospect of similar fact reasoning, and a serious risk of re-traumatizing vulnerable complainants through duplicate testimony.

The court held that any prejudice to the accused could be managed by jury instructions and that separate trials would undermine efficiency and the truth-seeking function.

The offender, a 20-year-old first-time offender at the time of the offences, was convicted of robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault, and discharging a firearm with intent following a home invasion.

During the robbery, the victim was shot in the back with a shotgun by a co-accused and suffered grievous injuries.

The Crown sought 9-10 years, while the defence sought 5 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence but considered the offender's youth and the principle of parity with a co-accused who received 8 years.

The offender was sentenced to 8 years concurrent on each count, less 554 days of pre-sentence credit, including enhanced credit for harsh lockdown conditions.

The accused, Andrew Douglas, was charged with robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault, and discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life following a home invasion.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on forensic evidence (DNA, gunshot residue on discarded clothing), cell phone records, and the testimony of the getaway driver, Mohamed Taha.

The defence argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt and that Taha's testimony was unreliable.

The court found Taha's evidence credible due to corroboration by other circumstantial evidence.

The judge concluded that the cumulative effect of all evidence established Douglas's guilt as a co-principal or aider for robbery, and as a party under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code for aggravated assault and discharging a firearm, as these were objectively foreseeable consequences of the common unlawful purpose.