Jeffrey Wm. Strype

The defendants brought a motion to strike the jury notice in a medical negligence action involving an aeromedical transport.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants' negligence caused a sciatic nerve injury resulting in the amputation of the plaintiff's leg.

The defendants argued the case was too complex for a jury due to the number of experts, conflicting opinions on the standard of care, and pre-existing conditions.

The court dismissed the motion, adopting a 'wait and see' approach, finding that it was premature to strike the jury notice before a trial date was set and the actual contested issues were narrowed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice in a motor vehicle accident action, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic would cause significant delay if the matter proceeded before a jury.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide cogent evidence of prejudice or that the delay in the Toronto Region would be significant once the suspension of civil jury trials was lifted.

The court held that justice to the parties would not be better served by striking the jury notice.

The appellant, a class member in a train derailment class action who had an individual trial for damages, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his appeal for delay and to extend the time to perfect the appeal.

The court applied the test for setting aside a dismissal for delay, noting that the appellant had a continuous intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay related to difficulties in settling the trial judge's orders, and that the respondents suffered no prejudice.

Crucially, the court found that the appellant had an arguable case on appeal regarding the trial judge's credibility assessments and evidentiary rulings.

The motion was granted, the dismissal was set aside, and the appellant was granted an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The plaintiffs sought court approval for the settlement of a personal injury claim arising from a catastrophic motor vehicle accident caused by a defective General Motors ignition switch.

The injured plaintiff, a party under disability, received a substantial settlement through the GM Ignition Switch Claims Resolution Facility.

The court approved the settlement, including a sealing order to keep the settlement amount confidential, as required by the settlement terms.

The court also approved the plaintiffs' solicitors' contingency fee, finding it reasonable given the excellent result achieved, the initial risks of the litigation, and the solicitors' undertaking to cover future guardianship legal costs.

Finally, the court approved the proposed management plan for investing the settlement funds.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action against the defendant lawyers, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should not be awarded due to the lead plaintiff's hardship as a paraplegic, the fact that the defendants were insured by LawPro, and the defendants' failure to make settlement offers.

The court rejected these arguments, holding that hardship does not displace the rule that costs follow the event, and that the presence of insurance is irrelevant to costs awards.

The court fixed the defendants' costs at $250,000 for the main action and $7,500 for the abandoned Family Law Act claims.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a motorcycle accident in Jamaica.

She retained the defendant lawyer to investigate potential insurance claims.

The lawyer advised that her family's Ontario automobile insurance policy would not provide accident benefits due to a territorial restriction limiting coverage to North America, and thus did not file an application for benefits before the two-year limitation period expired.

The plaintiff sued the lawyer for professional negligence, arguing he should have filed the application to preserve her rights, especially given subsequent changes in case law.

The court dismissed the action, finding the lawyer met the standard of care of a reasonably competent expert in insurance law at the time, and that an application for benefits would likely have been denied anyway.