Donald Mitchell

The applicants sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Assessment Review Board denying their motion to amend their Statement of Issues to include evidence of reduced property values during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the application was premature, did not meet the high threshold of exceptional circumstances required to review an interlocutory decision, and that the applicants had an adequate alternative remedy in the form of a statutory appeal from the Board's final decision.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion with costs fixed at $3,500 to the respondent, noting that consistent with usual practice, no reasons are provided for decisions on leave to appeal.

The City of Hamilton appealed the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation's (MPAC) assessment of a steel manufacturing property owned by Stelco Inc. The sole issue was the current value of 411.6 acres of unused residual lands.

MPAC assessed the lands at a nominal value of $100 per acre due to the likelihood of environmental contamination and lack of market interest, while the City argued for a value of $125,000 per acre based on comparable sales of uncontaminated industrial lands.

The Assessment Review Board accepted MPAC's evidence that the lands were unmarketable due to contamination concerns and confirmed the nominal assessment value.

MPAC brought a motion for disclosure of rent rolls, operating statements, and other financial information from the appellant in a property assessment appeal concerning a premium outlet mall.

The appellant agreed to disclose information for 2015-2017 on the condition that MPAC execute a non-disclosure agreement, but opposed disclosure for 2018 and 2019.

The Assessment Review Board held that a non-disclosure agreement was not required, as existing statutory and common law protections were adequate.

The Board also granted MPAC's disclosure requests for 2018 and 2019, finding the information relevant to valuing new additions to the property and proportionate to the issues in dispute.

The appellants brought a motion requesting an order for the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) to disclose documents relating to properties not under appeal, pursuant to section 53(5) of the Assessment Act.

Notice was served on the owners of the other properties, and although some initially objected, none filed a response opposing the motion by the deadline.

As the motion was unopposed by all parties, the Assessment Review Board granted the request and ordered MPAC to disclose the requested documents subject to its statutory terms.

The requesting parties sought an order requiring the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) to disclose documents relating to properties not under appeal.

Notice was served on the owners of the other properties, and no objections were received.

As the request was unopposed and on consent of all parties, the Assessment Review Board granted the order for disclosure subject to terms imposed by MPAC under section 53(5) of the Assessment Act.

The applicants, a private management company and a school board, sought a declaration that a sports facility operated by the company on school board land was exempt from property tax.

The municipal assessment corporation had assessed the land as taxable, arguing the company was a tenant.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the licence agreement between the company and the school board created a landlord-tenant relationship.

The company satisfied the essential elements for rateable occupation, including actual occupation, exclusivity, value, and permanence.

Consequently, the land was not exempt from taxation under the Assessment Act.

The County of Wellington and the Township of Puslinch brought a motion under section 40.1(b) of the Assessment Act to extend the time for bringing appeals for four properties, arguing they were improperly classified as farm or residential when they were used for aggregate extraction.

The Assessment Review Board found that there were palpable errors in the assessment roll, as the errors were inadvertent and mischaracterized the fundamental use of the properties.

However, the Board declined to exercise its discretion to extend the time for appeals, finding that the municipalities had the necessary information to appeal in a timely manner but failed to do so, and that altering the historical tax liability would be highly prejudicial to the taxpayers.

The City of Toronto appealed the classification of a property from multi-residential to commercial parking lot for the 2007 and 2008 taxation years.

The Assessment Review Board found that a change event occurred after June 30, 2006, when the property's use changed from vacant land to a commercial parking lot.

The Board determined it had jurisdiction to change the classification because MPAC had the legislative authority to do so but failed to issue a supplementary classification.

The appeal was allowed and the classification was changed.

MPAC requested a review of an Assessment Review Board decision that deemed section 40 appeals for the 2013 and 2014 taxation years and found a valid appeal was filed for 2014.

The Associate Chair granted the request for review, finding that appeals cannot be deemed for the first year of a reassessment cycle and that the appellant failed to provide evidence of filing the mandatory Request for Reconsideration for 2014.

The section 40 appeals for 2013 and 2014 were dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for the production of confidential information held by the respondent regarding 24 pharmaceutical companies and five non-pharmaceutical companies, to assist in valuing its purpose-built pharmaceutical manufacturing facility.

The respondent and third-party property owners consented to the release of information for the pharmaceutical properties but objected to the non-pharmaceutical properties.

The Assessment Review Board found that the non-pharmaceutical properties lacked sufficient similarity to the subject property and denied disclosure for those five properties.

The Board ordered the disclosure of information for the 24 pharmaceutical properties, subject to strict confidentiality undertakings.

The appellant appealed the property assessment of his seasonal recreational property, arguing that his lot did not extend to the water's edge and therefore its value as a waterfront lot was too high.

The Assessment Review Board found that it was bound by a previous Superior Court declaration, affirmed by the Court of Appeal, which held that the boundaries of the lots in the subdivision extended to the water's edge.

The Board rejected the appellant's arguments that the Surveys Act conflicted with the judicial declaration.

The Board determined the current value of the property was $340,000, which was higher than the returned assessments of $319,000 and $321,000.

Since MPAC did not seek an increase, the Board confirmed the returned assessments.

The moving party requested to set aside the 2014 and 2015 Minutes of Settlement, arguing that the 2008 current value assessment phase-in value was incorrectly changed.

MPAC agreed to set aside the minutes to determine the correct phase-in value but disputed the moving party's proposed value.

The Assessment Review Board set aside the 2014 and 2015 minutes on consent, determined the correct 2008 phase-in value was $1,046,435 based on the addition of the unimproved land value and the revised improvement value, declined to order a new hearing for 2014 and 2015 as the overall assessment value was agreed upon, and ordered the implementation of the 2013 Minutes of Settlement.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board classifying 32 of its natural gas gate stations as industrial rather than commercial properties.

The Board had found that adding odourant to natural gas constituted 'processing' under the Assessment Act regulations.

The Divisional Court clarified that the test for leave to appeal where the standard of review is reasonableness is whether there is reason to doubt the reasonableness of the decision, rather than its correctness.

Finding that there was reason to doubt the reasonableness of the Board's interpretation of 'processing' and that the issue was of sufficient importance, the Court granted leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed the property assessment classification of 32 natural gas gate stations, arguing they should be classified as commercial rather than industrial.

The issue was whether adding an odorant (Mercaptan) to natural gas constitutes 'processing anything' under O. Reg. 282/98.

The Assessment Review Board applied the Federal Farms test, finding that the addition of the odorant changes the nature of the gas and makes it more marketable.

The Board followed its previous decision in Enbridge, dismissing the appeals and confirming the properties are properly classified in the industrial property class.

The original owner of a hotel appealed its property assessment.

After selling the property, the original owner's agent improperly requested a withdrawal of the appeals, which the Board erroneously processed despite the assessing authority's objection and notice seeking a higher assessment.

Over two years later, the Board administratively re-instated the appeals without notice to the parties.

The new owner brought a motion to cancel the re-instated appeals.

The Board found that while it had jurisdiction to re-instate the appeals, doing so after such a long delay without notice or submissions was a denial of natural justice.

The Board cancelled the re-instated appeals, finding that the new owner would suffer undue prejudice by facing a potential retroactive tax liability for years it did not own the property.

The applicant church sought a declaration that its single-building complex, which housed both a place of worship and a religious school, was exempt from property taxation under the Assessment Act.

The respondent assessment corporation argued that the school portions were taxable because the school was operated by a separately incorporated entity.

The court found that the church and the school formed a single patrimony, with the church controlling and dominating the school's operations.

The court held that the exemptions for a place of worship and a non-profit educational seminary applied to the school-use areas, granting the application.

The City of Toronto brought a motion to adjourn the hearing of its property tax assessment appeals for the 2007 and 2008 taxation years to allow for production and discovery against the property owner, Philmor.

The City sought to reclassify the subject property from multi-residential to a commercial parking lot.

The parties had previously operated under the misconception that the facts were not in dispute and intended to proceed via an Agreed Statement of Facts.

However, shortly before the hearing, Philmor requested the City's evidence, taking the City by surprise.

The Assessment Review Board found that while both parties' pleadings were defective and the City could have been more diligent, the delay was reasonably explained.

To ensure procedural fairness and a determination on the merits, the Board granted the adjournment and ordered production and discovery.

The appellant appealed the 2013 and 2014 property tax assessments for a contiguous 5.16-acre parcel improved with multi-residential townhouse structures.

The properties were assessed at a combined current value of $9,676,000.

The appellant argued for a 50% reduction due to the dilapidated condition of the properties at the time of acquisition.

The Assessment Review Board dismissed the appeal and confirmed the assessments, finding that the appellant's recent purchase of the properties for $10,000,000 as a redevelopment site was the best indicator of current value.

The Board rejected the appellant's expert evidence for failing to account for this recent market sale.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

A summary hearing was scheduled, and notice was provided to the parties.

The applicant failed to attend the hearing and did not communicate with the Tribunal to explain the absence.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.