Dhiren Rajesh Chohan

The applicant sought an order for production of financial disclosure from third parties (the respondent's father, family corporations, and a family trust) pursuant to the Family Law Rules and Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicant and respondent are involved in family proceedings concerning child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property.

The applicant sought to set aside a domestic contract and alleged the respondent's reported income had declined significantly post-separation despite evidence of substantially higher cash flow during the marriage.

The third parties opposed production, arguing the motion was premature and that the domestic contract must first be set aside.

The court found the motion was not premature, that the applicant had met her onus, and that disclosure was necessary to fairly determine the respondent's true income and net family property.

The court ordered production of financial statements and corporate tax returns from the companies and details of non-arm's length expenses from all third parties, subject to confidentiality terms.

A family law trial addressing decision-making responsibility, parenting time, child support, and spousal support following the separation of parties married for approximately ten years with two children.

The applicant sought joint decision-making and increased parenting time with both children, as well as spousal support.

The respondent sought sole decision-making regarding one child and shared parenting time.

The court ordered shared decision-making with tie-breaking authority allocated differently for each child based on their circumstances and preferences.

Parenting time arrangements were maintained as established.

Child support was set at a nominal amount reflecting shared custody of one child and sole custody of the other with the respondent.

Spousal support was awarded on a time-limited basis to recognize the applicant's economic disadvantage from having left the workforce to care for the children.

The respondent brought a motion for a temporary order for primary residence of the children and weekend parenting time for the applicant.

The applicant cross-moved for the children to attend a different school on Bear Island and for primary residence with her.

The court found that the applicant had been removing the children from their current school in North Bay, Vincent Massey, despite a previous order.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding her reasons for relocation and school change unconvincing and her actions detrimental to the children's best interests.

The respondent's motion was allowed, granting him primary residence and establishing a new parenting schedule for the applicant, with the children to remain at Vincent Massey.

Costs were awarded to the respondent due to the applicant's inappropriate conduct.

The applicant moved for a parenting time order, a refraining order against the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) regarding driver's license suspension, and a retroactive variation of child support.

The motion was opposed by the respondent and FRO.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no authority to remove FRO, that the applicant failed to meet procedural conditions for a refraining order (e.g., filing a sworn financial statement, bringing a proper Motion to Change), and failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances or "clean hands" for the support variation.

The parenting time request was dismissed without prejudice, allowing the applicant to provide further evidence of required counselling.

The respondent, L.R., brought a motion to admit fresh evidence at trial and to suspend the applicant, P.G.'s, parenting time, following P.G.'s breach of a consent order by removing a child from L.R.'s care.

The court granted the motion to admit fresh evidence, applying the four-part test from R. v. Palmer.

Despite finding P.G. in breach of the order, the court declined to suspend P.G.'s parenting time, reasoning that there was no immediate threat to the child's well-being, the summer parenting schedule would soon commence, and a final decision on parenting time was imminent at trial.

The court ordered P.G. to return the child to L.R.'s care by a specific date and for parenting time to resume according to the existing summer schedule, emphasizing parental encouragement for parenting time.

This was a temporary order pending final trial submissions.

This case concerns a dispute over decision-making responsibility, primary residence, and parenting time for two young children.

The applicant mother sought sole decision-making and primary residence, proposing reduced parenting time for the respondent father and a change in the children's school and daycare for her convenience.

The respondent father initially sought to maintain joint decision-making and equal parenting time, later seeking sole decision-making and primary residence due to the applicant's unilateral actions.

The court found the applicant's actions, including unilaterally changing the child's school and daycare and misrepresenting an expired court order, demonstrated a lack of cooperation and disregard for the children's best interests.

The court also noted the applicant's history of domestic violence against the respondent.

The respondent's efforts to address past substance abuse were acknowledged.

The court ultimately granted sole decision-making responsibility to the respondent father and ordered the continuation of equal, week-about parenting time, with the children remaining at their current school and daycare in the respondent's community.

The applicant, Mr. G., brought motions to vary child and spousal support orders, change a parenting schedule, and prevent the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) from suspending his driver's license.

The respondent, Ms. R., brought a cross-motion to strike Mr. G.'s pleadings for his failure to comply with previous support orders and to obtain costs.

The court dismissed Mr. G.'s motions regarding child support, parenting time, and the refraining order, finding his disability claim unsubstantiated and his actions aimed at avoiding support obligations.

The motion to vary spousal support was adjourned for three months, conditional on Mr. G. significantly reducing child support arrears, failing which his pleadings would be struck and the matter would proceed without his full participation.

This appeal concerned the jurisdiction of an Ontario court to make a child support order under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002 (ISO Act) when a foreign support order from Finland already existed, but its registration in Ontario had been set aside due to the payor's fraudulent misrepresentations.

The Superior Court had quashed the Ontario Court of Justice's order for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that two valid support orders could not coexist.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 21 of the ISO Act explicitly grants Ontario courts jurisdiction to hear a new support application in such circumstances, especially given the payor's deceptive conduct.

The court emphasized the ISO Act's purpose of facilitating support enforcement and dismissed concerns about potential double recovery.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's tort action arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff was an excluded driver under an OPCF 28A endorsement, and therefore, pursuant to s. 267.6 of the Insurance Act, was precluded from recovering damages.

The plaintiff claimed an honest but mistaken belief that the exclusion applied only to a specific vehicle and not the newly acquired vehicle involved in the accident.

The court found the excluded driver endorsement to be clear and unambiguous, applying to "ALL VEHICLES INSURED UNDER THIS WAWANESA CERTIFICATE," and deemed the plaintiff's explanations implausible.

Concluding there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's action.

The appellants sought to review an order dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment.

The original action arose from a purchase of equipment in November 2007, with default judgment obtained in March 2011.

The appellants delayed over three years before bringing a motion to set aside the default judgment, which was dismissed by the motion judge.

The appellants then appealed but failed to perfect their appeal, resulting in dismissal for delay in April 2015.

After over three years of inaction, they brought a motion to review the dismissal order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the delay extraordinary and the equities of the situation favored dismissal despite the appellants' arguable defences on the merits.

The applicant sought an order setting aside a decision by Doherty J.A. dismissing his motion for leave to intervene as an added party in an appeal.

The applicant claimed to be the effective alter ego of the appellants and sought to adduce evidence he characterized as important and not previously presented.

The court found that the applicant had not satisfied the threshold criteria under Rule 13.03(1) for intervention as an added party, noting that the arguments he sought to make were more properly made by the appellants through their counsel.

The motion was dismissed.

Following a trial where the jury found no negligence or liability against the defendants, the defendant Cedar Fair Entertainment Company sought costs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Cedar Fair's Rule 49 offer to settle.

Despite Cedar Fair's complete success at trial, the court applied the principle of proportionality, finding the requested costs disproportionate to the case's complexity and the amount reasonably at issue.

A global costs award of $45,000, all-inclusive, was made in favour of Cedar Fair, to be paid by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a decision that set aside a default judgment against the defendant.

The original default judgment found the defendant liable for breach of confidence, intentional infliction of mental distress, and invasion of privacy, awarding significant damages and an injunction.

The motion judge (Dow J.) set aside the default judgment, allowing the defendant to defend on the merits, conditional on a costs payment.

The plaintiff argued that the motion judge erred by considering the defendant's proposed defence despite intentional default, failing to distinguish liability from damages, and not adequately considering psychological harm.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and emphasizing the importance of a trial on the merits for the development of tort law in this unique area.