Dagmara Weronika Wozniak

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether comments about future ownership of a family farm gave rise to an enforceable assurance under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.

The trial judge had awarded damages to Tim Metske and Amanda Herlick on the basis of proprietary estoppel, but the Court of Appeal set aside this finding, holding there was no clear promise or assurance, nor reasonable reliance.

The court upheld the trial judge’s findings on unjust enrichment and equitable set-off, resulting in a reduced damages award.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a will's bequest of a home.

The application judge had determined the interest was a licence and the condition that the beneficiary "live in the home" was void for uncertainty, leading to the entire bequest failing.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in characterizing the interest as a licence rather than a life interest.

It upheld the finding that the "no longer living in the house" condition was a condition subsequent and was void for uncertainty.

Consequently, the gift of the home subsists as a life interest without the uncertain condition.

This mid-trial ruling addressed whether the plaintiffs could pursue claims for housekeeping and attendant care losses.

The defendant argued these claims were eliminated during discovery and would cause prejudice.

The court found that the discovery answer regarding "economic component" lacked precision, and the defendant had sufficient notice through pre-trial memoranda and the occupational therapist's report.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to lead evidence on these past care claims, finding no prejudice to the defendant.

The plaintiff moved for an order to abridge the time for service of three expert reports and to grant leave to call them as experts, also requesting a trial adjournment for the defendants to obtain responding reports.

The defendants opposed, citing prejudice.

The court balanced the plaintiff's disadvantage in not leading expert evidence against the defendants' inability to respond and the case's long history of delays, including previous adjournments and late service of documents by the plaintiff.

Justice Rady, referencing a prior decision by Justice Grace, found that the prejudice to the defendants was irremediable without an adjournment, which had already been refused.

Consequently, the motion was dismissed, and leave to call the expert reports was denied.

The plaintiff sued police officers and the London Police Services Board for negligent investigation, false imprisonment, breach of Charter rights (warrantless entry), excessive force, and negligent transport, seeking damages for injuries sustained during arrest and transport.

The court dismissed claims for negligent investigation, false imprisonment, excessive force, and negligent transport.

However, it found a breach of the plaintiff's s. 8 Charter rights due to the officers' warrantless entry into his home, which was deemed to be in bad faith.

Damages were awarded for psychological injuries (PTSD and depression) causally linked to the incident, and for vindication and deterrence of the Charter breach, totaling $32,500.

The defendants brought a motion to adjourn a scheduled trial in a professional negligence action arising from legal and accounting advice provided in connection with a corporate reorganization that allegedly caused adverse tax consequences.

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ damages theory had expanded late in the litigation to include business losses, requiring a responsive expert report and further discovery.

Applying Rule 52.02 and the factors set out in Ariston Realty Corp. v. Elcarim, the court held that proceeding without the defendants’ damages expert would be fundamentally unfair.

A brief adjournment was available and no non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiffs was established.

The interests of justice therefore required that the trial be adjourned.

The plaintiff brought a motion in Small Claims Court seeking to add a corporate party as a defendant or to substitute the named individual defendant with the corporation after the limitation period had expired.

The court considered when the limitation period began in the context of a production contract where payment depended on invoicing.

Applying authority holding that a cause of action arises after a reasonable time to issue and pay an invoice, the court determined the limitation period began after reasonable periods for invoicing and payment had elapsed.

The court further held that the amendment sought was not merely correction of a misnomer but the addition of a new party after expiry of the limitation period.

As the plaintiff had notice of the correct party before the limitation period expired but failed to bring a timely motion, the amendment could not be granted.