Constanza Pauchulo

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a failed residential subdivision development project in Fort Erie, Ontario.

The central issues were whether the parties had entered into an enforceable written agreement dated December 13, 2005, whether there was a breach or repudiation of that agreement, and the validity of a construction lien filed by Ravenda Homes.

The motion judge had dismissed Ravenda Homes's breach of contract action, vacated its certificate of pending litigation, allowed its lien action, and allowed the respondent's counterclaim in part.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld most of the motion judge's findings but set aside the award of damages under section 35 of the Construction Lien Act, referring that issue to trial.

Joyce Bernstein, the successful plaintiff in a class action certification motion against Peoples Trust Company and Peoples Card Services LLP, sought costs of $146,492.72.

Peoples Trust disputed the amount, arguing for divided success due to a reduced class period based on limitation periods, and proposed $120,000 with a portion payable in the cause.

The court awarded the full amount sought by Bernstein but ordered $10,000 of it to be payable in the cause.

The court found no divided success on the certification motion itself but deemed the plaintiff's failure to concede the limitation period issue as conduct that unnecessarily lengthened proceedings, warranting a small portion of costs to be payable in the cause as a salutary message against over-pleading in class actions.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action against the defendants regarding prepaid payment cards.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants breached the Consumer Protection Act, 2002 and O. Reg. 17/05 by charging illegal fees and imposing expiry dates on the cards.

The defendants argued that the cards were exempt from the legislation.

The court found that the plaintiff satisfied the five-part test for certification under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and certified the action as a class proceeding, subject to an adjustment to the class definition to account for the limitation period.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his personal injury action following a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge had found the appellant failed to prove his injuries or causation, making it unnecessary to determine the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal raised the issue of jurisdiction on its own motion and concluded that, because the judgment contained no declaratory relief regarding the threshold, the appeal and cross-appeal properly lay to the Divisional Court under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The proceedings were transferred accordingly.

The appellant creditor sought a declaration that the bankrupt's judgment debt survived his discharge from bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the bankrupt owed no fiduciary duty to the appellant, even though he had breached a fiduciary duty to a third party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that s. 178(1)(d) applies only if the bankrupt owed a fiduciary duty directly to the creditor seeking the declaration.

In a discovery motion arising from three related civil proceedings concerning an alleged subdivision development agreement, model homes, and a renovation claim, the moving parties sought answers to undertakings and refusals and leave to examine on an expert loss-of-profits report.

The court held that Rule 31.10 barred examination of the expert author, and that there was no express or implied right to discover a party on its delivered expert report absent exceptional circumstances and clearly identified holes in the expert's analysis.

Relying on proportionality and accessibility principles, the court rejected what would amount to an end run around the expert discovery rules.

The court nevertheless ordered re-attendance to answer outstanding discovery matters, a further and better affidavit of documents, an adjournment of the trial, and a judicial pretrial after the contemplated summary judgment motion.