Barry Bresner

The plaintiffs purchased a property that had been previously owned and remediated by the defendant, Chrysler.

The plaintiffs sued Chrysler for negligence and negligent misrepresentation, alleging inadequate remediation and reliance on public statements made by Chrysler about the clean-up.

Chrysler moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that caveat emptor applied, Chrysler owed no duty of care to a subsequent purchaser, and there was no special relationship or reasonable reliance to support a claim for negligent misrepresentation.

The appellants sought to amend their statement of claim to add a claim in nuisance against the respondent for failing to properly remediate contaminated land before selling it.

The motion judge denied the amendment, finding that a nuisance claim requires the interference to originate from outside the plaintiff's land.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that an essential characteristic of the tort of nuisance is that the alleged nuisance must emanate from somewhere other than the plaintiff's own land.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants brought a motion for contempt against a respondent who had previously been declared a vexatious litigant and permanently enjoined from communicating with or publishing commentary about the applicants.

The applicants filed extensive electronic materials demonstrating continued communications and publications alleging misconduct and bribery by judges and law enforcement officials involved in the earlier proceedings.

The court considered whether the respondent’s conduct was intentional and whether mental health issues might affect her ability to form the requisite intent for contempt.

Pursuant to s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court ordered a psychiatric assessment before determining liability and sentencing.

Costs were reserved pending completion of the assessment.

The appellant appealed orders declaring her a vexatious litigant, arguing she was denied natural justice because the motion judge concluded the hearing in the morning despite a full day being scheduled.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge provided the appellant ample opportunity to present her case, including adjourning to read her 94-page written submissions and allowing her to answer questions and make further submissions.

The court noted the appellant never indicated what further submissions she wished to make.

The appellant leased a water heater from the respondent.

The respondent proposed an amendment to the rental agreement requiring customers to deal directly with the respondent to terminate the agreement, rather than using an agent.

The appellant sought a declaration that the amendment was invalid under the Consumer Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the amendment did not comply with the Regulation because the right to terminate was not unconditional.

However, the Court upheld the application judge's decision to invoke s. 93(2) of the Act, binding the appellant to the amendment, as the application was brought for a collateral purpose to benefit a competitor and no consumer was prejudiced.