Angela Casey

The moving party sought to set aside or vary an ex parte order that required her to file an application for a certificate of appointment of estate trustee or be deemed to have renounced.

The court found that the responding party failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts on the ex parte motion, specifically omitting that the moving party's counsel had responded and sought production of the drafting lawyer's file.

The ex parte order was set aside under Rule 39.01(6).

However, the court declined to grant the moving party's requested variation to compel production of the file, finding it overly broad for a motion to vary.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the moving party.

The applicant ex-spouse sought a declaration for the proceeds of the deceased's Locked-in Retirement Account (LIRA) based on a 1997 beneficiary designation.

The respondent estate and parents opposed, relying on a 2001 designation changing the beneficiary to the parents, of which only a photocopy could be found, and a 2005 final matrimonial release.

The court dismissed the application, finding the 2001 photocopy was a valid instrument under the Succession Law Reform Act that revoked the 1997 designation.

Furthermore, the 2005 matrimonial settlement and release precluded the applicant's claim, and awarding her the LIRA would result in unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following its decision on the main appeal.

In accordance with the parties' agreement, the court ordered that the costs of the appeal be paid out of the estate of the deceased.

The successful appellant was awarded $46,000, and the respondents were awarded $25,000.

The deceased left a will that expressly disinherited his daughter, stating she had had no communication with him for several years.

The daughter challenged the will, adducing extrinsic evidence that her father's actual motive was racially discriminatory because she had a child with a white man.

The application judge admitted the evidence and set aside the will on public policy grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that third-party extrinsic evidence of a testator's motive is inadmissible when the will is clear and unambiguous.

Furthermore, the court held that the public policy doctrine cannot be used to void an unconditional, private testamentary bequest based on a testator's alleged discriminatory motive, affirming the principle of testamentary freedom.

The moving party sought an adjournment of his motion to set aside consent orders previously made in complex estate litigation.

The respondents opposed the adjournment, arguing prejudice and delay in the sale of an estate property.

The court refused to adjourn the portions of the motion relating to the dismissal of claims against former counsel and the removal of the Estate Trustee During Litigation, finding no merit to those claims and emphasizing the need to enforce court orders.

The court granted an adjournment for the remaining issues regarding the consent orders but ordered the moving party to personally pay the ongoing expenses of the estate property and awarded costs of $54,490 to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant sought the court's direction on whether she properly exercised her right under a separation and trust agreement to purchase the trust's 50% interest in the matrimonial home.

The applicant relied on an appraisal valuing the home at $700,000, while the property subsequently sold to a developer for $1.35 million.

The court ruled in favour of the respondent trustee, finding that the actual sale price was the best indicator of fair market value and that the trustee acted properly to maximize the trust's interest.

The moving parties, estate trustees for the deceased's estate, brought a motion to remove the responding party's daughter as her litigation guardian and attorney for property.

The responding party, who was mentally incapable, had appointed her two children as attorneys, but one withdrew due to a conflict of interest.

The court found that the remaining attorney had a conflict of interest, resided outside the jurisdiction, and had previously depleted the incapable person's funds by selling her home and taking the proceeds.

The court removed the daughter as litigation guardian and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee to act as litigation guardian and guardian of property.

The testator executed a will in Spain in 2002 dealing with her European property.

In 2006, she executed a Canadian will dealing with her entire estate, which contained a standard revocation clause.

The drafting solicitor was unaware of the Spanish will.

Following her death, the appellants sought to introduce third-party affidavit evidence to prove the testator did not intend to revoke the Spanish will.

The application judge ruled the evidence inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the common law rule that direct extrinsic evidence of a testator's intention is inadmissible to construe an unambiguous will.

The applicant race track sought judicial review of an Ontario Racing Commission (ORC) decision ordering it to allow the respondent owners' horses to enter races.

The race track had indefinitely banned the horses after another horse trained by the same trainer tested positive for a banned performance-enhancing drug, despite the owners' horses testing negative and the owners having unblemished records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the ORC's decision reasonable.

The ORC properly applied the burden of proof, considered relevant evidence, and correctly balanced the race track's private contractual rights against the public interest in fairness and the integrity of horse racing.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Racing Commission decision that upheld Woodbine Entertainment Group's (WEG) indefinite suspension of his racing privileges.

The suspension followed the discovery of Erythropoetin (EPO) in three of the applicant's horses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission reasonably balanced WEG's private property and contractual rights with the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the horse racing industry.