Andrew Cottreau

Pafco Insurance Company brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss third-party claims against it, arguing its automobile insurance policy for Tammy Lea Todish was validly terminated.

Desjardins General Insurance Company cross-moved for a declaration that the policy was in effect.

The court found that the notice of cancellation, despite not explicitly providing an address for payment but rather a broker's name and phone number, was not deficient given the insured's prior understanding and ability to reinstate the policy.

Consequently, the court ruled that no insurance policy was in effect at the time of the accident, granting Pafco's motion and dismissing the third-party claim.

The plaintiffs moved for a stay of a Divisional Court order that reinstated the defendants' jury notices, pending their motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The original motion judge had struck the jury notices due to COVID-19 delays in Ottawa, but the Divisional Court overturned this, finding the decision arbitrary.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test and Sault Dock principles, the Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding a serious question to be tried regarding the Divisional Court's interference with the motion judge's discretion, irreparable harm to the plaintiffs if their scheduled judge-alone trial date was lost, and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice, which was served four and a half months after the close of pleadings.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff had acquiesced to the late jury notice by not formally objecting and by including it in the trial record.

The court found that the plaintiff had objected to the late notice via email and that including it in the trial record was an error of caution, not an admission.

Given the defendant's delay in seeking leave to file a late jury notice and the prejudice to the plaintiff, the court struck the jury notice and ordered the matter to proceed as a non-jury trial.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order requiring him to attend an examination for discovery with accommodations, arguing his medical condition (vascular malformation and conversion disorder) made him physically unable to attend without serious risk of harm.

The plaintiff also appealed the Master's costs award, arguing the Master was functus officio when extending the time for the defendant's costs submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Master made no palpable and overriding error in assessing the medical evidence and had the discretion to extend the time for costs submissions before a formal order was entered.

The plaintiff sought to add two proposed defendants, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. and Rabcon Contractors Ltd., to a personal injury action more than two years after the accident.

The proposed defendants resisted the motion, arguing that the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence in identifying them within the limitation period.

The court considered the discoverability principle, noting that the City of Toronto (the original defendant) had not disclosed the involvement of other parties in its initial response, pleadings, or discovery, despite having commenced a separate action for contribution and indemnity against the proposed defendants.

Applying proportionality and the principle that cases should be heard on their merits, the court found that no further diligence was required from the plaintiff given the circumstances.

The motion to add the proposed defendants was granted, with costs reserved to the ultimate trier of facts.