Andrew A. Evangelista

The appellant school boards appealed an arbitral award that dismissed their claim for a proportionate share of the respondent insurance exchange's Guarantee Fund upon terminating their memberships.

The court upheld the arbitrator's interpretation of the Reciprocal Agreement, finding that section 7 clearly extinguished a departing subscriber's rights to the fund.

The court also rejected the argument that an implied trust existed outside the contract.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant developer sought declarations that its insurers, Aviva and Northbridge, owed a duty to defend and indemnify it in a class action.

The class action alleged the developer negligently misrepresented that condominium units would include a heating system and storage locker, which were not provided.

The insurers denied coverage on the basis that the developer's failure to provide the items was an intentional business decision, not an 'occurrence' or accident.

The court agreed with the insurers, finding that the negligent misrepresentation claims were entirely derivative of the intentional breach of contract.

The applications for coverage were dismissed.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for negligent misrepresentation.

The plaintiffs alleged that during a settlement meeting for a fire loss claim, the insurer misrepresented that the plaintiffs could sue their former insurance broker for the shortfall in coverage, inducing them to sign a release and settle for less than they were entitled to.

The insurer argued the action was barred by the release and the limitation period.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether the misrepresentation was made, whether reliance was reasonable, and when the limitation period commenced.

The applicants sought a declaration that they were entitled to further coverage under the pandemic-related business income interruption provision of their insurance policy.

The insurer argued the coverage was restricted to an aggregate maximum limit of $50,000 for the policy period, while the insured argued the limit applied to each of their seven daycare locations.

Applying the principles of contractual interpretation, the court found the policy ambiguous but concluded that reading the policy as a whole supported the insured's interpretation.

The court granted the application, declaring the limit of liability is $50,000 for each of the seven scheduled risk locations, for a maximum aggregate coverage of $350,000.

The insurer brought an application to regularize a dysfunctional insurance appraisal process following a fire at a condominium construction project.

The insured brought a cross-application to terminate the appraisal process.

The court found that the appraisal process had become a 'procedural shipwreck' due to the joint and several fault of the umpire, the appraisers, and the lawyers for both parties.

The court dismissed the insurer's application and granted the insured's cross-application, permanently terminating the appraisal process and leaving the valuation of the loss to be determined in the concurrent court action.

The applicants sought a declaration that their automobile insurer had a duty to defend them in a personal injury action arising from an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) accident.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the ATV was an off-road vehicle driven on private property and not an automobile under the Insurance Act.

The court found that the underlying statement of claim contained alternative allegations that the applicants owned the ATV but were not occupiers of the property where the accident occurred.

If proven, these facts would mean the ATV was a newly acquired automobile covered by the policy.

The court granted the application, holding the insurer had a duty to defend.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the action against four defendants, the defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs had commenced the action seeking damages for a severe brain injury sustained in an assault.

The court declined to award costs to the successful defendants, finding this to be a rare case where the plaintiffs' impecuniosity and exceptionally sympathetic circumstances justified a departure from the normal costs rules.

The insured, McKeown & Wood Limited, sought a declaration that its insurer, Federated Insurance Company of Canada, owed a duty to defend a third-party claim arising from a fuel tank leak.

The insurer denied coverage and later moved for summary judgment dismissing the third-party claim based on a one-year contractual limitation period in the policy.

The motion judge found the limitation period unenforceable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal applied a correctness standard of review and held that the insurance policy was a 'business agreement' under s. 22 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

Consequently, the one-year contractual limitation period was valid and enforceable, barring the insured's claim for a defence.

In a personal injury action arising from a bicycle and motor vehicle collision allegedly caused in part by unlit streetlights on a boundary bridge, a municipal defendant appealed summary judgment dismissing its crossclaim and the action against a co-defendant utility contractor.

The appeal court held that the servicing agreement and the evidence about responsibility for identifying and maintaining boundary-road streetlights were ambiguous and contradictory.

The motion judge erred by treating the parties' common understanding as determinative despite live disputes over contractual allocation of responsibility.

The claims against the contractor were restored for trial.

The plaintiff sued the property owner and the winter maintenance contractor after slipping on black ice.

The contractor had breached its service contract by failing to name the property owner as an additional insured on its liability policy.

The motion judge ordered the contractor to defend and indemnify the property owner.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the order, holding that the indemnification order was premature and that the breach of the insurance obligation gave rise to a remedy in damages for defence costs, not a duty to defend.

The contractor was ordered to pay the property owner's defence costs, except those incurred exclusively to defend claims not arising from the contractor's performance of the contract.