Amanda Worley

The appellant lawyer appealed decisions of the Law Society of Ontario finding him incapacitated due to a delusional disorder and suspending him indefinitely.

The appellant had initiated numerous Federal Court actions alleging acquaintances were government spies, leading to him being declared a vexatious litigant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of expert psychiatric evidence, the dismissal of motions to call witnesses and admit fresh evidence, or the tribunal's handling of the appellant's arguments.

The Law Society of Ontario brought a motion to quash the respondent's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent had appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel dismissing his application for a licence to practice law.

The Divisional Court held that under s. 49.38 of the Law Society Act, appeals to the court are limited to specific types of proceedings, which do not include licensing applications under s. 27(4).

The court rejected the respondent's argument that 'subsection 31(3)' in s. 49.38 referred to s. 49.31(3), finding that the plain language meaning was s. 31(3).

The appeal was quashed, but the respondent was granted an extension of time to commence an application for judicial review.

The appellant, a lawyer disbarred in Florida and Illinois for exploiting elderly clients, appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel upholding his disbarment in Ontario.

The Law Society relied on the foreign disciplinary decisions, arguing they should be recognized and given preclusive effect.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Appeal Panel correctly applied the test for recognizing foreign judgments and issue estoppel, and that the appellant's arguments constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the Florida proceedings.

The Law Society brought a conduct application against the respondent lawyer.

The respondent moved to strike a particular based on a limitation period defence, which the Hearing Panel dismissed.

The respondent appealed to the Appeal Division, which quashed the appeal on the basis that the Hearing Panel's order was not final.

The respondent then appealed to the Divisional Court and sought a stay.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, holding that mid-hearing rulings in regulatory conduct proceedings are not final orders under the Law Society Act, distinguishing the civil jurisprudence on final versus interlocutory orders.

The motion for a stay was dismissed as moot.

The appellant, a lawyer, sought to appeal a decision of an Appeal Panel of the Law Society that dismissed his appeal from an Appeals Management Tribunal's refusal to extend the time to appeal a professional misconduct finding.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found the Appeal Panel's decision was reasonable.

The court agreed that the appellant failed to meet the criteria for an extension of time, noting a lack of bona fide intention to appeal, no reasonable explanation for delay, prejudice to the Law Society, and no merit to the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.