LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

HEARING DIVISION

Date: February 20, 2026

Tribunal File No.: 23H-038

BETWEEN:

Law Society of Ontario

Applicant

• and -

Alisa Mazo

Respondent

Before: Malcolm M. Mercer (Chair), Ingrid Berkeley, Sonia Ouellet

Heard: December 19, 2025, by videoconference

Appearances:

Amanda Worley, for the applicant

Respondent, self-represented

MAZO – Professional Misconduct – Penalty and Costs ‒ The Lawyer had previously been found to have engaged in professional misconduct, including being wilfully blind or reckless regarding transactions; misappropriating funds from her trust account; failing to keep books and records as required; allowing her trust account to be used for purposes unrelated to the provision of legal services; failing to properly identity clients or to ascertain the purpose of retainers; and failing to co-operate with the Law Society’s investigation ‒ The panel determined that presumptive revocation applied and that no exceptional circumstances were established to justify any other penalty ‒ The Lawyer’s licence was revoked and costs of $175,000 were ordered.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON PENALTY AND COSTS

1Malcolm M. Mercer (for the panel):– In Law Society of Ontario v Mazo, 2025 ONLSTH 104, we found that Ms. Mazo had engaged in misconduct. We must now determine the appropriate penalty and address costs.

The misconduct

2Our primary findings[1] were that Ms. Mazo engaged in professional misconduct by:

• Knowingly encouraging or assisting in dishonesty or fraud, by using her CIBC mixed trust account to receive $10 million, more or less, from Corporation A and others, and disbursing the money to various third parties, all purportedly in repayment of a promissory note.

• Knowingly encouraging or assisting in dishonesty or fraud, in the manner in which she set up a cheque clearing arrangement with her client, Corporation A, and used her TD business accounts to process cheques, resulting in a shortfall of approximately $4 million.

• Misappropriating $300,000, more or less, from the funds she held in her Scotiabank mixed trust account.

• Agreeing to act for Corporation B, without making reasonable efforts to ascertain the purpose and objectives of the retainer.

• Failing to maintain books and records, as required by s 18 of By-Law 9.

• Failing to co-operate with an investigation of the Law Society of Ontario, as she has failed to produce information and documents requested by the Law Society’s investigator, since at least July 2021.

3The most serious proven professional misconduct is knowing encouragement or assistance in dishonesty or fraud (a.k.a. knowing assistance) and misappropriation.

4With respect to knowing assistance and as summarized in para 11 of our merits reasons, we concluded that:

• Monies were “circled” between Ms. Mazo’s mixed trust account at the CIBC and a corporate account at the TD Bank maintained by her corporation.

• Cheques were deposited into the CIBC trust account and the TD business account in order to permit cheques to be issued without a belief that the deposited cheques would be honoured.

• Ms. Mazo had at least constructive knowledge of this dishonesty and fraud.

5We concluded that this bad cheque fraud is what is sometimes described as “cheque kiting”.

6With respect to misappropriation, we concluded at para 28 of our reasons that Ms. Mazo misappropriated $300,000 from her mixed trust account in February 2018, which was returned by her to trust in April 2018.

PENALTY AND COSTS POSITIONS

7The Law Society’s position is that presumptive revocation applies, that there are no extraordinary circumstances justifying a lesser penalty, and that Ms. Mazo’s licence to practise law must be revoked.

8The Law Society’s position is that Ms. Mazo should be ordered to pay costs of approximately $67,000 for the dismissed abuse of process motion and approximately $136,000 for the application.

9Ms. Mazo’s position is that presumptive revocation does not apply and that application of the case-by-case approach (i.e. considering penalty objectives, the Aguirre factors, and comparable cases) should result in her being permitted to return to practice. Ms. Mazo has been suspended on an interlocutory basis since November 2024.

10Ms. Mazo’s position is that no costs should be ordered.

DISPOSITION

11For the following reasons, we order immediate revocation of Ms. Mazo’s licence to practise law. We order costs of $50,000 in respect of the abuse of process motion and $125,000 in respect of this application.

Does Presumptive Revocation apply?

12It is well established that presumptive revocation applies in cases of:

• knowing participation in mortgage fraud: Law Society of Upper Canada v Mucha, 2008 ONLSAP 5 at para 23, and

• misappropriation: Law Society of Ontario v Wilkins, 2021 ONLSTA 15 at paras 107-109.

13Presumptive revocation has been found to apply to knowing assistance in some other types of fraud as well as mortgage fraud: Law Society of Upper Canada v Anderson-Clarke, 2017 ONLSTH 10 at para 29, and Law Society of Ontario v Barnwell, 2024 ONLSTA 15 at para 111.

14Both knowing assistance in fraud and misappropriation have been found here.

15In her factum, Ms. Mazo does not address presumptive revocation. Neither her factum nor her affidavit mentions knowing assistance, fraud or misappropriation. In her oral submissions, Ms. Mazo essentially submitted that presumptive revocation should not apply because this case does not involve dishonesty and because of mitigating circumstances.

16Other than the following, Ms. Mazo’s submissions address mitigating factors that do not relate to the nature and extent of her misconduct. Ms. Mazo:

• submits that the misconduct that was found does not involve dishonesty;

• submits that it is significant that no client was harmed or suffered financial loss;

• impugns the investigation of her conduct; and

• impugns the merits decision.

17At this stage of our reasons, we address whether presumptive revocation applies to the misconduct that we have found. Whether presumptive revocation applies, or not, depends on the type of misconduct that is proven. Our conclusion is that presumptive revocation applies in this case.

Misappropriation

18We have found that Ms. Mazo misappropriated client trust funds by taking $300,000 from her mixed trust account in February 2018, which was returned in April 2018.

19Ms. Mazo did not explain why she suggests that misappropriation, as found here, does not involve dishonesty. We firmly reject this submission. Taking client trust money, even temporarily, without the right to do so is dishonest. We find that Ms. Mazo acted dishonestly and without integrity when she took $300,000 from her mixed trust account in February 2018 for her own purposes without the right to do so.

20It is true that there was ultimately no client loss because Ms. Mazo returned the $300,000 in April 2018. In the context of a mixed trust account, it is not necessarily clear exactly whose funds were wrongfully taken. It may be that no client was aware that their funds had been improperly “borrowed”.

21This is irrelevant. Misappropriation occurs whether or not trust monies are returned. It is misappropriation to temporarily “borrow” client trust monies: Law Society of Ontario v Wilkins, 2021 ONLSTA 15 at paras 95 and 108.

22In addition to the fact that “temporary” stealing of client money is serious dishonesty, it is necessary to take a hard line against this practice in the public interest. What may be originally thought to be temporary may not turn out to be.

23We conclude that presumptive revocation applies because we have found misappropriation.

Knowing assistance in cheque fraud

24Strictly speaking, it is not necessary to address whether knowing assistance in bad cheque fraud attracts presumptive revocation given the finding of misappropriation. Nevertheless, we will address this question given its prominence in this case.

25We observe that there has not previously been a case of bad cheque fraud in which the applicability of presumptive revocation has been considered. Presumptive revocation has been applied to the following types of misconduct involving fraud:

• Knowing assistance in mortgage fraud: Law Society of Upper Canada v Mucha, 2008 ONLSAP 5, and The Law Society of Upper Canada v Abbott, 2017 ONCA 525.

• Knowing assistance in advance fee fraud: Law Society of Ontario v Barnwell, 2024 ONLSTA 15.

• Billing fraud: Law Society of Ontario v Bahimanga, 2019 ONLSTA 25, and Law Society of Ontario v Khan, 2020 ONLSTA 18.

• More generally, knowingly making false representations in documents in order to try to get a benefit for a client and/or a licensee: Law Society of Ontario v Spiegel, 2018 ONLSTH 57.

26In Law Society of Ontario v Papasotiriou-Lanteigne, 2025 ONLSTH 12, the hearing panel discussed presumptive revocation at paras 23-24:

Presumptive revocation applies to the most serious types of professional misconduct, indicative of proven dishonesty and a lack of integrity. Such cases have usually involved mortgage fraud and fraud more generally, as well as misappropriation of client funds: Law Society of Upper Canada v Mucha, 2008 ONLSAP 5; Bolton v Law Society, [1993] EWCA Civ 32. Other serious cases of dishonesty or intentional misrepresentation in billing have also a been found to justify presumptive revocation: Law Society of Ontario v Bahimanga, 2019 ONLSTA 25.

As the Ontario Court of Appeal held in Law Society of Upper Canada v Abbott, 2017 ONCA 525, the key point is that the conduct is in a different register or of a different quality than other lawyerly misconduct such that it raises the question of whether, “in the public interest, the profession can accept the continued licensing of a person who has shown himself to be willing to participate” in such conduct, in the sense of having the moral character to continue to be in the position of trust involved in being a licensee.

27The Papasotiriou-Lanteigne reasons considered in obiter that presumptive revocation has been applied to mortgage fraud and to “fraud more generally”.

28We observe that presumptive revocation has been applied, for the most part, to misconduct in a lawyer's professional capacity, as opposed to misconduct in a lawyer's personal or private capacity. This is consistent with the reasons of the Court of Appeal in Abbott which speak of “lawyerly misconduct”. Consider also Law Society of Ontario v Petrolo, 2023 ONLSTH 76 at paras 51-53.

29That said, the panel in Papasotiriou-Lanteigne concluded that presumptive revocation should also apply to a case of first-degree murder because “It would be antithetical to [the Bolton] principle to allow those convicted of first-degree murder to maintain their licences absent exceptional circumstances. To do so would undermine the public’s confidence in the legal professions”.

30We conclude that bad cheque fraud as found here is fully analogous to mortgage fraud. It matters little if monies are fraudulently obtained from a bank in a mortgage loan by value or identity fraud or in the operation of a bank account by bad cheque fraud.

31We reject Ms. Mazo’s submission that her knowing assistance in bad cheque fraud was not dishonest. Ms. Mazo acted dishonestly and without integrity when she knowingly assisted in bad cheque fraud on the TD Bank and the CIBC.

32We concluded in our merits decision that Ms. Mazo engaged in professional misconduct. Her misconduct involved the operation of her trust account and assisted fraud on the bank which provided her trust account. The fraudulent scheme originated with a client. While another bank account (held by Ms. Mazo’s company) at another bank was used, the same client proposed the use of the other bank account. The scheme involved both Ms. Mazo’s trust account and her other corporate account.

33We do not need to determine whether misconduct of this type would attract presumptive revocation if the misconduct was purely in Ms. Mazo's personal or private capacity – as it was not.

34It does not matter whether a client suffered harm. Our presumptive revocation jurisprudence has not distinguished on the basis that the defrauded lender is a client. For example, Law Society of Upper Canada v Bishop, 2014 ONLSTA 19 at para 1, and Law Society of Upper Canada v Abbott, 2014 ONLSTH 194 at para 89.

35It does not matter whether actual financial harm resulted from a fraudulent scheme: Law Society of Upper Canada v Hatcher, 2012 ONLSAP 27 at para 26. Knowing assistance in mortgage fraud depends on whether a mortgage lender put its property at risk by advancing a loan, not on whether there was a loss.

36Both the CIBC and the TD Bank advanced funds on the strength of false cheques. The fact that the most significant overdraft was at the TD Bank does not change the fact that the CIBC funds were put at risk. Indeed, the fact that Ms. Mazo addressed the TD Bank overdraft does not change the fact that the TD Bank funds were put at risk. Using the language of Hatcher from para 25, the property of both the CIBC and the TD Bank were put at risk.

37We conclude that presumptive revocation applies to the knowing assistance in bad cheque fraud that we have found. The subject fraud is analogous to mortgage fraud and, in context, is lawyerly conduct that attracts the principles on which presumptive revocation is based. The facts that fraud was not on a client and that no loss was ultimately suffered by either bank does not matter. Nor does the fact that part of the fraudulent scheme included use of Ms. Mazo’s corporate account with the TD Bank. Our conclusion that presumptive revocation applies is based on the facts of this case rather than on categorization of the proven misconduct. Law Society of Ontario v Mazinani, 2026 ONLSTH 14 at para. 72.

38We express no opinion as to whether presumptive revocation would apply if Ms. Mazo’s knowing assistance was purely in her personal or private capacity.

Alleged Exceptional circumstances

39Having concluded that presumptive revocation applies, we now address exceptional circumstances. We will then separately address Ms. Mazo’s submissions with respect to the investigation and the merits decision.

40The leading authority with respect to exceptional circumstances is Bishop v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2014 ONSC 5057, as confirmed by Law Society of Upper Canada v Abbott, 2017 ONCA 525 at paras 23-26.

41At para 31 of Bishop, Justice Nordheimer stated for the Divisional Court that:

The other observation is that the mitigating factors that will amount to exceptional circumstances in any given case are not restricted to only certain types or forms. Medical reasons or financial desperation or situations of duress serve as examples of the type of mitigating factors that may amount to exceptional circumstances but those situations are not exhaustive of such factors. That said, it remains the case that any such factors will normally have to be ones that would rise to the level where it would be obvious to other members of the profession, and to the public, that the underlying circumstances of the individual clearly obviated the need to provide reassurance to them of the integrity of the profession. I would add, on that point, that factors that provide an explanation for the conduct of the lawyer will generally be ones that would most likely reach that requisite level of mitigation but they are not the only ones that may achieve that result.

42Justice Nordheimer’s statement that “factors that provide an explanation for the conduct of the lawyer will generally be ones that would most likely reach that requisite level of mitigation” is significant here. Ms. Mazo has not sought to explain her conduct. Her evidence and her submissions do not connect what she submits are circumstances in mitigation to the misconduct that we have found.

43Indeed, it is notable that Ms. Mazo submitted no evidence at the merits hearing and has not now provided any evidence with respect to the factual context of what we have found to be misconduct, nor any evidence regarding how and why she conducted herself as she did. This is a very unusual case for this reason.

44With these preliminary observations in mind, we turn to the mitigating factors on which Ms. Mazo relies.

45Ms. Mazo submits that the following should be taken into account:

• the interlocutory suspension, which she submits was imposed without jurisdiction on November 14, 2024;

• the collapse of her 15-year legal practice and the catastrophic financial and professional harm already suffered;

• the flawed investigative foundation, including findings of personal animus, overreach, delay, and inappropriate conduct by the Law Society’s investigators;

• the absence of any client harm or client financial loss;

• her unblemished 17-year discipline record prior to these proceedings;

• her compelling mitigating circumstances, including intimate partner violence, threats to her safety, trauma, gender-based disadvantage, and documented psychological impact;

• the extensive collateral professional and financial consequences already borne by her, far exceeding typical disciplinary outcomes; and

• retaining capable lawyers and supporting equity in the profession.

46We have already addressed the issue of client harm/financial loss. We will address the alleged flawed investigative foundation below.

The interlocutory suspension

47The merits hearing was originally scheduled (in January 2024) to be heard in November 2024. After other unsuccessful attempts by Ms. Mazo to adjourn the merits hearing, an adjournment was granted five days before the scheduled hearing because Ms. Mazo’s then counsel had withdrawn for ethical reasons and because of a breakdown of the lawyer-client relationship.

48Ms. Mazo’s adjournment request was made at a case conference on November 13, 2024. She gave no prior notice of her request and filed no evidence. She requested a six-month adjournment.

49At the time that an adjournment was ordered, the Law Society had already filed its evidence for the merits hearing. Ms. Mazo had not made the required pre-hearing disclosure and had filed no evidence. No further evidence was subsequently filed by either party for the merits hearing.

50As a term and condition of the adjournment, I (as a one-person panel) ordered an interlocutory suspension: Law Society of Ontario v Mazo, 2024 ONLSTH 140 at para 44, sets out the conclusion from my endorsement of November 13, 2024.

Analysis with respect to the interlocutory suspension

51We first address the proposition that the effect of an interlocutory suspension can properly reduce a revocation to a penalty that does not result in loss of licence. We can conclude that this would not be appropriate.

52We then address the submission that it is significant that the interlocutory suspension was ordered without authority. We do not accept this submission.

53For completeness, we consider the claimed quantification of the impact of the interlocutory suspension on Ms. Mazo. We do not accept the claimed quantification but we do accept that the interlocutory suspension no doubt had a significant effect on Ms. Mazo.

54We do not consider that anything turns on whether the interlocutory suspension was ordered with, or without, authority. Either way, the impact of an interlocutory suspension may be relevant to a penalty order: Law Society of Ontario v Gupta, 2022 ONLSTH 14, and Law Society of Ontario v Cengarle, 2022 ONLSTH 114.

Reducing the penalty of revocation because there has been an interlocutory suspension

55Interlocutory suspensions have previously only had the effect of reducing penalty suspensions, not revocations. Many licensees facing revocation have been subject to interlocutory suspensions. An interlocutory suspension has never effectively converted a revocation to a suspension.

56This is not surprising. Revocation is ordered where necessary to maintain public confidence in the professions, to provide strong general deterrence, and to ensure that there is no prospect of recurrence by taking the licensee from practice.

57Inherent in revocation is that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a suspension does not suffice. Converting a revocation to a suspension because a lengthy suspension has already taken place is inconsistent with revocation being the appropriate penalty.

58Using the language of Bishop, it would not be obvious to other members of the professions, and to the public, that an interlocutory suspension clearly obviated the need to provide reassurance to them of the integrity of the professions. Obviously, a suspension does nothing to explain the conduct of the lawyer. A suspension provides no reassurance as to the integrity of the professions.

59We conclude that the fact of an interlocutory suspension is not, and cannot be, an extraordinary circumstance.

60In any event, this penalty hearing has been long delayed. If revocation is the appropriate penalty order, Ms. Mazo’s licence should have been revoked quite some time ago. Had that occurred, her interlocutory suspension would have been much shorter.

Authority to order an interlocutory suspension

61Ms. Mazo promptly retained new counsel after the interlocutory suspension was ordered. Five days after the suspension was ordered, she brought a motion to:

Cancel or vary the interlocutory suspension commencing November 18, 2024 such that the order will be stayed so long as:

a. A hearing on the merits of the misconduct allegations is scheduled to take place on a “with or without” counsel basis at the earliest available date for all parties, including the Applicant’s new counsel; and

b. The Applicant complies with an agreed upon schedule of deadlines in advance of the hearing. Should any deadline be missed, the interlocutory suspension will immediately come into force on consent and will remain in force until the conclusion of the proceedings.

62Ms. Mazo’s notice of motion stated, among other things, that:

In the context of adjournment requests, Rule 6.4 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure permits the Tribunal to include “such terms and conditions” as the panel considers appropriate in adjourning a proceeding. The Tribunal’s decision to impose an interlocutory suspension was seemingly granted pursuant to this Rule as opposed to pursuant to a formal motion.

63In the course of her motion, Ms. Mazo did not suggest that the interlocutory suspension was ordered without authority. Her position was that the order should be cancelled or varied on the basis of fresh evidence or a material change in circumstance.

64While I varied the interlocutory suspension to address specific concerns raised by Ms. Mazo, I did not terminate the suspension. Ms. Mazo did not attempt to appeal or seek judicial review of the suspension order nor of my decision on the termination/variation motion.

65Ms. Mazo first suggested that the interlocutory suspension was ordered without jurisdiction in her responding submissions to the Law Society’s submissions at the merits hearing. Her submissions were not relevant to the question then under consideration, namely the merits of the application.

66Ms. Mazo now claims that I did not have authority to order an interlocutory suspension and that this is relevant to penalty. We do not accept this submission for a number of reasons:

• Whether the interlocutory suspension was made with or without authority, the effect is the same. An interlocutory suspension may, where appropriate, be taken into account at a penalty hearing: Law Society of Ontario v Gupta, 2022 ONLSTH 14, and Law Society of Ontario v Cengarle, 2022 ONLSTH 114.

• It is not for this panel to review the adjournment order or the termination/variation order. These orders are effective unless set aside on appeal or judicial review.

• Ms. Mazo’s submissions with respect to jurisdiction do not address the basis on which the interlocutory suspension was ordered, namely s 49.26 of the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8: Law Society of Ontario v Mazo, 2024 ONLSTH 140 at paras 50-54.[2]

• Ms. Mazo’s submissions do not refer to her motion to terminate/vary the interlocutory suspension and the positions taken, and not taken, by her at that time. Law Society of Ontario v Mazo, 2024 ONLSTH 140 at para 52.

The impact of the interlocutory suspension

67In November 2024, Ms. Mazo filed an affidavit in support of her motion to cancel or vary the interlocutory suspension. She testified that:

25. I practice as a professional corporation. My law firm, Mazo Law, employs six staff members, including an associate and a licensed paralegal.

26. My firm currently represents 47 clients with a total of 63 active files. Two of my clients are catastrophically impaired. One of my catastrophically impaired clients is a highly vulnerable man whose wife is also disabled. He requires constant care. I am involved in an ongoing dispute with the insurer of the driver who struck him, as the insurer is only prepared to fund his care at less than minimum wage. My other catastrophically impaired client is a young man with a rapidly approaching case conference (described below). I have formed a very close relationship with his family over my time spent representing him.

27. I am the sole responsible lawyer for many of my files. I act in a supervisory capacity in relation to my associate and/or my paralegal in relation to others ….

68In her factum filed for the penalty hearing, Ms. Mazo submitted that one of the consequences of the interlocutory suspension was “the forced termination of an 85-person law firm she founded and led”. Taken at face value, this submission is markedly different than the basis on which she sought to cancel or vary her interlocutory suspension in November 2024. However, careful consideration of her supporting affidavit does not reveal evidence in support of her suggestion that an 85-person law firm was shut down as a result of the interlocutory suspension.

69We proceed on the basis that Ms. Mazo’s firm was comprised of an associate, a paralegal, and four other staff members, and represented 47 clients in November 2024.

70Ms. Mazo filed a report from Pinnacle Valuation Group Inc. (“Pinnacle”) which purports to calculate a loss of settlement fees attributable to the interlocutory suspension. The Law Society objected to this report being accepted as expert evidence as notice was not given under Tribunal Rule 10.6, there was no affidavit from the author, and the author was not available for cross-examination. There was no attempt to qualify the author as an expert. An Acknowledgement of Expert’s Duty was not included with the report. We did not strike the report but decided to receive it as information rather than as expert opinion.

71The essence of the report was that Ms. Mazo had 63 active files when the interlocutory suspension was ordered and that, assuming the last 63 files were comparable to the 63 active files, the lost settlement value was either approximately $1,200,000 or $1,500,000.

72Notably, the Pinnacle report:

• Does not attempt to quantify lost profit, as opposed to lost revenue.

• Does not attempt to address what other income Ms. Mazo earned with the time and resources available to her.

• Makes no attempt to either confirm or disprove the assumed facts on which it is based.

73Ms. Mazo’s affidavit does not establish the factual basis for the Pinnacle report.

74We do not consider the Pinnacle report to be of assistance.

75On the other hand, and to repeat, we accept that Ms. Mazo’s interlocutory suspension would have had a significant adverse effect on her.

The absence of a disciplinary record

76Ms. Mazo does not have a discipline record. But that is true for most lawyers and most lawyers who have had their licences revoked on the basis of presumptive revocation. A clean discipline record is not an extraordinary circumstance. It is ordinary.

77Ms. Mazo does more than rely on a clean disciplinary record. She has filed her own affidavit explaining what she says are her significant contributions, including:

• establishing her own firm;

• creation of opportunities for young professionals, including by deliberately seeking out and hired young women from diverse backgrounds, many of whom had been overlooked by other employers due to limited experience or lack of connections in the profession;

• mentoring articling students, law clerks, paralegals, legal assistants, and young lawyers; and

• serving an ethnically diverse and often marginalized client base who frequently had difficulty accessing representation elsewhere.

78However, Ms. Mazo’s evidence in this regard is vague and conclusory. Ms. Mazo has not submitted evidence from anyone else as to her contributions and character.

79Without intending to suggest that Ms. Mazo has not worked hard and has not made contributions, Ms. Mazo’s clean disciplinary record, her achievements, and her contributions are not extraordinary circumstances that can justify less than revocation.

80To state the obvious, misappropriation and knowing assistance in fraud are a serious departure from a clean record and a positive professional history.

81It would not be obvious to other members of the profession, and to the public, that Ms. Mazo’s clean discipline record and professional contributions clearly obviate the need to provide reassurance to them of the integrity of the profession. Certainly, the positive past history described by Ms. Mazo does nothing to explain her misconduct.

82We do not find extraordinary circumstances in these regards.

Intimate partner violence, threats to safety, trauma, and documented psychological impact

83We have found that Ms. Mazo knowingly assisted in bad cheque fraud in the fall of 2017 and that she misappropriated client trust funds in the winter of 2018.

84In the affidavit filed for her motion for an order limiting openness, Ms. Mazo testified that:

• She was married in 2010 to AA, who has abused her.

• She separated from AA in October 2013 but his abuse continued.

• In January 2016, AA was cautioned by the police not to have further contact with Ms. Mazo and to cease other harassing activity.

• She dated BB for approximately three years. Their relationship ended in late 2016. BB suffers from bipolar disorder.

• In November 2016, an unidentified gunman, travelling with an accomplice, shot five bullets into her parent’s garage missing a gas tank by inches. Her child brother’s bedroom was above the garage. This instilled within her a profound and enduring sense of fear. Ms. Mazo filed a copy of an occurrence report and other Toronto Police Service documents with her affidavit.

• Early in 2017, after her break-up with BB, he embarked on a campaign of systematic harassment of her.

• BB, with the assistance of the same nefarious group that AA is said to be connected to, attempted to extort money from Ms. Mazo and repeatedly threatened to submit false claims to the Law Society of Ontario in order to hurt her law practice.

• Due to her fears for her safety, Ms. Mazo arranged for 12-hour security from November 2016 to April 2019 to monitor her house.

• BB and his nefarious associates used threats of an LSO complaint against Ms. Mazo throughout the year of 2017 and 2018 while continuing to extort her.

85This affidavit also addresses the period after the winter of 2018. The “nefarious” individuals have not been identified.

86The reasons of the motion panel before whom this affidavit was filed are at Law Society of Ontario v Mazo, 2023 ONLSTH 158. As the reasons note at paras 21-22:

21A great deal of the “evidence” Ms. Mazo put forward is hearsay and/or not clearly traceable to AA, BB, or the nefarious individuals. She did not provide evidence of anyone who was convicted of a criminal offence for their alleged behaviour. The objective evidence of abuse and harassment is limited. All but two of the incidents Ms. Mazo described are historical.

22Nevertheless, the 2016 gunshots in the garage support her evidence that she was being threatened by someone. Together, these incidents form a reasonable basis for Ms. Mazo to fear harm to her person. Moreover, the two recent events are suspicious enough, when combined with the prior events, to support her fear being genuine.

87Notably, the motion panel observed at para 26 that:

26Ms. Mazo did not explain how or why publication of these proceedings would put her at risk from AA, BB, and the nefarious individuals. She did not explain how AA or BB or the nefarious individuals were connected to the transactions or corporations at issue in this proceeding. None of the incidents causing her to fear for her safety involved Corporation A or B. There is no indication of police involvement in the context of the frauds alleged in the NOA.

88In her current affidavit, Ms. Mazo provides some further evidence with respect to this history and attaches her earlier affidavit. At paras 90-91 of her current affidavit, she testified:

I provide this information because it accurately reflects the conditions under which the LSO was interacting with me, gathering information, and forming the allegations now before the Tribunal.

These documented personal and psychological circumstances form part of the context the Tribunal is required to consider in assessing fairness, proportionality, risk, rehabilitation, and the appropriateness of any further sanction or costs. They help explain the extraordinary pressures I was under during the period in which the LSO investigation was unfolding.

89It is important to recognize that Ms. Mazo has not sought to connect these matters to the misconduct that we have found, but rather to the Law Society investigation.

90We have no basis on which to conclude any of this provides an explanation, in whole or in part, for Ms. Mazo’s misconduct.

91We agree with the motion panel that this information from Ms. Mazo is of limited weight, even though we accept the finding that she has experienced genuine fear. However, we do not accept that the pressure that she may have been under during the period of the LSO investigation amounts to exceptional circumstances that justify a departure from presumptive revocation.

92We do not find that these matters are such that it would be obvious to other members of the profession, and to the public, that Ms. Mazo’s underlying circumstances clearly obviates the need to provide reassurance to them of the integrity of the profession.

Gender-based disadvantage, retaining capable lawyers and supporting equity

93Law Society of Ontario v Wilkins, 2021 ONLSTA 15, acknowledges at paras 159-162 that discrimination and disadvantage can be taken into account in determining an appropriate penalty under the ordinary case-by-case approach to penalty.

94Wilkins also accepted that racial discrimination and disadvantage might play a part in showing exceptional circumstances to overcome presumptive revocation. There is no obvious reason that gender-based discrimination and disadvantage could not similarly be exceptional circumstances.

95To date, the only case in which loss of licence (by revocation or surrender) has been avoided in a case of presumptive revocation is Law Society of Ontario v McCullough, 2022 ONLSTH 63.

96But this case is very different from McCullough:

• Ms. McCullough’s background as an Indigenous woman was explored by a Gladue report, written by a report writer with Aboriginal Legal Services. The McCullough reasons at paras 39-67 detail relevant background and context.

• Ms. McCullough acknowledged and apologized for her misconduct and was found to be deeply remorseful.

• The hearing panel had the benefit of 11 character reference letters, concluding that “A clear thread running through these letters is that the Lawyer is seen to be highly honest, selfless and a tireless worker, who has spent a lifetime helping those around her.”

• The hearing panel found the following factors to provide useful context:

a. the impacts of cultural displacement from her Indigenous identity and community;

b. the steps she took to overcome experiences of hardship, disadvantage and violence as a young person to become a lawyer at age 41;

c. she began her legal career at the same time as she adopted her four nephews and nieces, thus diverting them from entering the child protection system, which has a history of disrupting Indigenous families;

d. during the time of the misconduct the Lawyer was under significant stress as she was financially supporting and caring for her first grandchild and her daughter who was experiencing addiction issues; and

e. the Lawyer serves an important community of clients, many of whom are Indigenous.

• The hearing panel was able to conclude at para 75 that:

… these factors are unique and amount to truly extraordinary and compelling circumstances, which justify a penalty that does not involve loss of licence. They amount to evidence that the misconduct was out of character and not likely to recur. They play a role in explaining why the Lawyer came before this Tribunal. Most importantly, they rise to the level where it would be obvious to other members of the profession, and to the public, that the underlying circumstances of this individual clearly obviate the need to provide reassurance to them of the integrity of the profession.

97In contrast, Ms. Mazo has provided no evidence whatsoever regarding the misconduct that we have found. She has provided no evidence explaining why she came before this Tribunal. We have no evidence or information from anyone other than Ms. Mazo as to her character, her contributions, and any history of disadvantage. Consistent with simply putting the Law Society to the proof of its allegations and general denial of misconduct, Ms. Mazo has not acknowledged her misconduct. She has expressed no remorse. She has shown no insight. To be clear, none of this is aggravating, as Ms. Mazo is fully entitled to deny the allegations of misconduct and to put the Law Society to the proof of its allegations. But the issue here is whether there are extraordinary mitigating circumstances.

98As to retaining capable lawyers and supporting equity, this is not a compelling case on those bases either. While these factors can play a role in less serious cases, misappropriation and knowing assistance in fraud are far too serious to justify a lawyer keeping her licence because of her gender and because she is an able personal injury lawyer who mentors and serves people who are disadvantaged.

99These are not exceptional circumstances that justify a penalty that does not result in revocation and, in any event, loss of licence.

Other collateral consequences

100Ms. Mazo submits that the investigation of her alleged misconduct was very difficult for her, particularly in the context of what Ms. Mazo says is improper conduct by the Law Society and the harassment and abuse that she experienced from BB and the unidentified nefarious other persons.

101Again, we note that the motion hearing panel did not accept Ms. Mazo’s claims of investigative impropriety except in one limited respect.

102As to the impact of the conduct of BB and others in the context of the investigation, it is difficult to effectively assess Ms. Mazo’s claim given that her evidence is rather generic and conclusory. We do not find it necessary to reach any conclusion in this regard as we do not conclude, even if accepted, that this can be properly treated as extraordinary circumstances as contemplated by Bishop.

103We do not accept that a lawyer who has misappropriated client funds and has knowingly assisted in fraud should be permitted to continue to practise law because of the adverse impact of misconduct of others on the Law Society investigation. This has not been connected to, and does not help to explain, Ms. Mazo’s misconduct. Neither the public nor the legal professions would be reassured as required.

Conclusion as to extraordinary circumstances

104For these reasons and applying the test from Bishop, we do not find exceptional circumstances that would justify any penalty other than revocation.

THE ORDINARY CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH

105While we find that revocation is the appropriate penalty applying presumptive revocation, we alternatively apply the ordinary case-by-case approach given Ms. Mazo’s position that presumptive revocation does not apply. We do so summarily as we have already addressed the mitigating circumstances on which Ms. Mazo relies.

106The ordinary case-by-case approach to determining an appropriate penalty involves consideration of:

• The purposes of making penalty orders, the primary of which are (i) specific deterrence, (ii) general deterrence, (iii) maintaining public confidence in the profession and its regulation and, (iv) where appropriate, matters such as rehabilitation, restitution, and improving competence: Law Society of Upper Canada v Strug, 2008 ONLSHP 88.

• The misconduct and mitigating and aggravating factors, following the approach articulated in Law Society of Upper Canada v Aguirre, 2007 ONLSHP 46.

• Decisions in comparable cases for guidance and for reasonable consistency and predictability: Law Society of Ontario v von Achten, 2022 ONLSTH 117.

107A restatement of the non-exclusive list of so-called “Aguirre factors”, which address matters relating to the misconduct and to the licensee, is as follows:

• factors principally related to the misconduct:

a. the nature, extent, and duration of the misconduct; and

b. the potential impact of the misconduct upon others.

• factors principally related to the licensee:

a. the existence or absence of a prior disciplinary record;

b. whether there are extenuating circumstances (medical, family-related, systemic racism, disability or other personal hardship or others) that might explain, in whole or in part, the misconduct;

c. other adverse consequences resulting from the misconduct;

d. whether the licensee has since complied with her obligations;

e. whether the licensee has admitted misconduct, and obviated the necessity of its proof;

f. the existence or absence of remorse, acceptance of responsibility or an understanding of the effect of the misconduct on others; and

g. evidence as to whether the misconduct is likely to recur.

Law Society of Ontario v Oliver, 2023 ONLSTH 140 at para 88.

108The nature, extent, and duration of the misappropriation was very serious. Substantial funds were misappropriated from February to April. Clients were exposed to the risk of loss of the money entrusted to their lawyer.

109The nature, extent, and duration of the knowing assistance in bad cheque fraud was serious. Knowing assistance in fraud is very serious. Millions of dollars were put at risk. Ms. Mazo’s assistance was significant. The potential impact on the two banks was significant.

110Ms. Mazo does not have a prior disciplinary record. This is to be expected and, as such, is a neutral factor.

111There are no extenuating circumstances that might explain, in whole or in part, the misconduct. This is a neutral factor.

112Ms. Mazo’s interlocutory suspension is an adverse consequence resulting from the misconduct as is, to an extent, the stress of a lengthy investigation. These are mitigating factors.

113Ms. Mazo has not since complied with her obligations. We have found that she still has not completely responded to investigative inquiries. This is an aggravating factor.

114There is no evidence of remorse, acceptance of responsibility or an understanding of the effect of the misconduct on others. This is a neutral factor.

115We have no evidence as to whether the misconduct is likely to recur as we have no evidence as to why this misconduct occurred.

116No other factors have been shown which provide meaningful mitigation or aggravation.

117As to comparable cases:

• All misappropriation cases other than McCullough have led to loss of licence, usually by revocation.

• There are no prior cases of knowing assistance of bad cheque fraud. But comparable cases of knowing assistance in fraud have led to loss of licence, usually by revocation.

118We conclude that application of the ordinary case-by-case approach leads to the same conclusion as presumptive revocation. This is entirely unsurprising given the nature of the misconduct, the importance of public confidence and deterrence and the need to treat like cases in like manner.

119The only significant mitigating factor is the interlocutory suspension. The stress of a lengthy investigation has some mitigation given Ms. Mazo’s circumstances. But these factors cannot justify Ms. Mazo’s continuation in practice. It is necessary to protect the public and be clear to the public and the profession that misappropriation and knowing assistance in fraud cannot be tolerated.

SUBMISSIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE INVESTIGATION AND THE MERITS DECISION

120Ms. Mazo submits that we should have regard to what she describes as a flawed investigative foundation.

121Ms. Mazo also appears to suggest that our merits findings should not be relied on here because “The Panel relied heavily on an unexplained chart of unknown origin, prepared by an unidentified person, with no source documents available for testing. No expert evidence was called. No independent witnesses were led.”

122While Ms. Mazo makes these submissions in mitigation, we do not accept this framing.

123Dealing first with our merits findings, a penalty hearing is not the time or place to seek a review of merits findings. Ms. Mazo has appeal and judicial review rights. Our determination of the appropriate penalty is on the basis of the misconduct that we found in our merits decision. The weight of the misconduct that we have found is not lessened by Ms. Mazo’s criticism of our findings.

124That said, there is no “unexplained chart of unknown origin, prepared by an unidentified person”. Our merits reasons, including charts and other findings, are the reasons of the panel, not work prepared by some unidentified person. The same is true for our invitation to the parties for further submissions made prior to our merits decision. The evidentiary basis for the merits reasons was the affidavit evidence submitted by the Law Society, which were not challenged by cross-examination or any evidence submitted by Ms. Mazo. Ms. Mazo is free to address our merits decision, including our charts summarizing the evidence, on appeal.

125As to the investigation, Ms. Mazo made a series of motions during the course of this application including a motion to stay this application on the basis of abuse of process in the investigation. Her motion for a stay was dismissed: Law Society of Ontario v Mazo, 2024 ONLSTH 87. No further abuse of process motion has been made. Ms. Mazo is free to appeal the dismissal of her motion for abuse of process. It is not for this panel to revisit her allegations of abuse of process.

126That said, it is appropriate to review what was alleged and what was found in the abuse of process motion. As set out in paras 2-3 of Law Society of Ontario v Mazo, 2024 ONLSTH 87:

2In brief, the Lawyer alleges that a Law Society investigator misled the Lawyer’s banks into releasing confidential information without legal authority and disclosed confidential information about the investigation in so doing. The Lawyer further maintains that the investigator improperly relied on provisions in the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) to obtain information from one of the banks and improperly obtained confidential information from a complainant who was a representative of that bank.

3The Lawyer also alleges that the investigator had an animus towards her which influenced the investigator’s conduct and constituted bad faith. The Lawyer concedes that the investigator’s conduct constitutes no threat to hearing fairness but argues that it risks undermining the integrity of the administrative process itself. She says that a stay of proceeding is the only appropriate remedy.

127The motion panel summarized their conclusions at para 5 as follows:

5We conclude that, with one exception, the investigatory steps taken by the investigator were appropriate and within the broad authorization granted under s. 49.3 of the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c. L.8 (the Act). The one exception is the investigator’s representation that she relied on specific provisions of PIPEDA in response to a request from TD for judicial authorization. The investigator had no information in her possession to justify relying on these provisions. However, in our view, while this conduct was inappropriate, it did not rise to the level of such exceptional conduct that demonstrated bad faith or other conduct so wrong that it would shock the conscience of the community and thereby amount to an abuse of process that would justify a stay of proceedings.

128With respect to the document which was provided by the TD Bank in response to the inappropriate representation, the motion panel observed at para 95 that “the table of payments itself does not appear to be a critical document for this proceeding and it is open to the Lawyer to seek to have it excluded from evidence at the hearing on the basis of these reasons.” So far as we are aware, the table of payments was not put in evidence before us. In any event, Ms. Mazo made no request for exclusion of any document based on the reasons of the motion panel.

129Ms. Mazo brought her motion for a remedy for abuse of process by investigative misconduct which was disposed of by a motion panel. She has not brought any further motion. We do not accept that her allegations of investigative misconduct at this stage affect the penalty to be ordered.

Conclusion

130For these reasons, we will order immediate revocation of Ms. Mazo’s licence to practise law.

Costs

131As noted above, the Law Society’s position is that Ms. Mazo should be ordered to pay costs of approximately $67,000 for the dismissed abuse of process motion and approximately $136,000 for the application.

Costs of the abuse of process motion

132Ms. Mazo’s motion for a stay for abuse of process was heard over two days in May, 2024.

133The motion hearing was preceded by cross-examinations over three days before a court reporter, rather than the motion panel.

134The motion panel dismissed Ms. Mazo’s motion and reserved the costs of the motion to the panel hearing the conduct application.

135In respect of this motion, the Law Society seeks costs as follows:

a. 170 hours @ $350/hr $59,500.00

b. transcripts of cross-examinations $7,119.90

Total $66,619.90

136Ms. Mazo’s motion was multi-pronged. Her affidavit filed in support was 73 pages long. The motion record was 450 pages long. In her affidavit, Ms. Mazo summarized her claims of abuse of process as follows:

204. There are several components to my claims about abuse of process, as follows:

a) Ms. Skilton’s improper disclosure of confidential information to the banks to assist her in getting the banks to breach my confidentiality;

b) Ms. Skilton’s request to the banks to disclose confidential information, contrary to her knowledge that those banks did not have the legal authority to do so;

c) Concerning the TD Bank, Ms. Skilton’s multiple requests to Ms. Gallienne seeking confidential financial information, when she had not asked me for this information;

d) Ms. Skilton’s requests to the TD Bank that resulted in improper disclosure of confidential information relating to my non-law firm bank accounts and the status of my ongoing bank account balances, continued lists of account deposits, and source of funds for business bank accounts held at TD Bank;

e) Ms. Skilton’s efforts to obtain information from Ms. Gallienne at the TD Bank, with the knowledge that I had already objected to this to the TD Bank, and with the knowledge that the TD Bank had undertaken not to breach my confidentiality;

f) Ms. Skilton's misrepresentation of the law in order to compel Ms. Gallienne to release confidential information to her;

g) Ms. Skilton's multiple communications to the banks generally in circumstances where I requested her not to do so as it was damaging to my reputation with those banks;

h) Ms. Skilton's repeated failure to properly disclose her activities with the banks and misleading statements made to my counsel as to her efforts;

i) Mr. McClyment's breach of my confidentiality contrary to Section 49.12(1) of the Law Society Act in disclosing confidential information about an LSO investigation to a third party leading to irreparable harm; and

j) LSO's inadequate investigation of my breach of confidentiality complaint.

137The Law Society filed three affidavits of Law Society investigators in response to Ms. Mazo’s motion. The Law Society’s motion record was 632 pages in length.

138Ms. Mazo’s motion was filed in December 2023 and was heard six months later. A significant part of the reason for this delay was a motion for disclosure in support of the motion which was heard in April 2023. Costs of the disclosure motion were previously determined.

139In determining the costs of disclosure motion, I discussed the approach to be taken to motion costs as follows in Law Society of Ontario v Mazo, 2024 ONLSTH 75 at paras 24-26:

24In determining the costs that should be ordered, there are three general principles that should be applied. The first is that the professions should not ordinarily bear the costs of unsuccessful motions brought by respondents. The second is that costs should be reasonable. The third is that costs should be reasonably predictable so that parties can make rational choices based on reasonable expectations. The second and third principles are informed by looking at costs in comparable cases: Law Society of Ontario v. Perrelli, 2018 ONLSTH 80.

25The Law Society submits that the James disclosure motion ($13,325), the Piersanti CUPE motion ($15,000) and the Mazo Rule 13 motion (approximately $19,000) are comparable cases. With respect to the Marusic stay motion ($12,000), which the Law Society distinguished, costs were reduced based on inability to pay. With respect to the Patterson disclosure motion ($8,000), which the Law Society also distinguished, costs were reduced given the public interest aspect of that motion. Ms. Mazo did not dispute these comparables, nor did she provide any other comparables.

26Following the approach in Perrelli, I conclude that the appropriate general range for a significant motion is $10,000 to $20,000. Recognizing that this disclosure motion proceeded essentially as two motions could suggest doubling this range.

140For costs of the abuse of process motion, the Law Society submits that Ms. Mazo should bear the full costs of her unsuccessful abuse of process motion. Ms. Mazo focused her submissions on overall costs rather than on the costs of this motion. In respect of the motion costs, in particular we note her submission that the financial impact of her interlocutory suspension has been significant but that she has filed no evidence of ability to pay.

141In considering costs of the motion, we observe that Ms. Mazo took an aggressive approach in responding to this application. The abuse of process motion was no ordinary motion but rather amounted to an evidentiary and legal hearing on a range of issues.

142To repeat, three main principles are engaged. The first is that the professions should not ordinarily bear the costs of unsuccessful motions brought by respondents. The second is that costs should be reasonable. The third is that costs should be reasonably predictable so that parties can make rational choices based on reasonable expectations.

143The first and second principles support the Law Society’s request. The third principle is more difficult to apply as this was no ordinary motion. In contrast to the disclosure motion which was heard in one day, the abuse of process motion was heard over five days inclusive of “out of court” examinations. We do not think that the subsequent suspension and revocation should affect the costs of this motion.

144For the disclosure motion, $20,000 in costs were ordered. Using this as a rough benchmark and taking into account the complexity of the abuse of process motion, a party would reasonably expect costs to substantially exceed the costs for an ordinary but significant motion.

145Considering the complexity of the abuse of process motion, we conclude that Ms. Mazo should be required to pay costs of $50,000. Ms. Mazo chose to bring this significant motion. She was not successful. $50,000 is reasonable and proportionate.

Costs of the application

146This application was brought in April 2023. The facts and conduct in issue are complicated. Substantial case management has been required. The first scheduled merits hearing, scheduled for three weeks, was adjourned at the 11^th hour which no doubt caused wasted costs.

147The hearing ultimately took place in March 2025 despite a further last-minute adjournment request. The hearing itself took two days. There were no agreed facts. No oral evidence was heard because Ms. Mazo decided not to cross-examine the Law Society’s witnesses and called no evidence. At her request, Ms. Mazo was given time to make written submissions on the merits to which the Law Society responded in writing. In the course of considering the parties’ submissions, we invited the parties to address certain matters arising from our review of the evidence and consideration of the submissions.

148By way of overview, this was a complex case, procedurally and factually, which was scheduled to take three weeks to be heard on the merits. However, Ms. Mazo elected not to cross-examine and not to lead evidence. This shortened the hearing but not the preparation for the hearing.

149In respect of this application, the Law Society seeks costs as follows:

a. 369.3 hours @ $350/hour $129,255.00

b. Disbursements $7,705.45

Total $136,960.45

150The Law Society does not seek costs for the investigation which were no doubt considerable.

151Ms. Mazo’s position is that no costs should be ordered.

Costs principles

152In Law Society of Ontario v Khan, 2021 ONLSTA 7 at paras 8-9, the appeal panel summarised the Tribunal’s jurisprudence applicable to the exercise of our discretion to award costs. The process starts by identifying an appropriate range of costs, based on the key litigation steps, and then determining a place within that range after considering relevant factors such as:

a. complexity of the case;

b. nature and importance of the issues;

c. length of the hearing;

d. conduct of the parties and its effect on the hearing, including any conduct which lengthened the proceedings;

e. whether steps in the proceeding were unnecessary;

f. financial hardship/ability of the licensee to pay;

g. reasonable expectations of the parties; and

h. any other factors particular to the case.

153Ms. Mazo summarized her costs submissions as follows:

Costs are not automatic under the Law Society Act. They are imposed only where fair, proportionate, and consistent with the public interest.

Where, as here:

• the LSO contributed significantly to delay, complexity, and prejudice;

• the investigation was flawed;

• the suspension was ultra vires;

• the Respondent has endured devastating financial loss;

• and the evidentiary foundation was weak;

• the Tribunal has discretion to impose no costs

• Ordering costs against a licensee who has suffered catastrophic financial harm due to LSO-caused procedural injustice would offend basic fairness and bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Respondent submits that a no-costs order is the only principled outcome.

154In its submissions, the Law Society noted that panels have long started from the principle that the professions should not bear the cost of discipline proceedings that establish a licensee’s misconduct: Law Society of Upper Canada v Baker, 2006 ONLSHP 21 at para 12.

155But we observe that this is not the only principle. Access to justice is properly balanced against this principle. Costs awards should not be so high as to create a real practical barrier to licensees being able to defend themselves in discipline proceedings. Proportionality is a key consideration: Moore v College of Chiropractors, 2025 ONSC 6190 at paras 143, 144 and 151.

156The Law Society’s submissions are generally in accordance with the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. We do not take the Law Society to say that access to justice and proportionality are not proper principles to be considered.

157Ms. Mazo’s submissions are problematic. We do not accept that the LSO contributed significantly to delay, complexity, or resulted in prejudice to Ms. Mazo. It appears that Ms. Mazo’s position mostly comes down to the Law Society making serious allegations of misconduct that she disputes. This was a complex case because the underlying facts were complex. Significant delay in the investigation stage arose from Ms. Mazo’s failure to promptly and completely respond to investigative requests. Contrary to Ms. Mazo’s submission, the motion panel in the abuse of process motion found that, with one exception discussed above, the investigatory steps taken by the investigator were appropriate: Law Society of Ontario v Mazo, 2024 ONLSTH 87 at para 5.

158As to the litigation stage, the Law Society did not contribute significantly to delay, complexity, or prejudice to Ms. Mazo. Ms. Mazo’s approach to this application was vigorous but unsuccessful. Her approach resulted in delay and complexity.

159As to the claim that the suspension was ultra vires and that the evidentiary foundation for the merits findings was weak, this amounts to a collateral attack on those decisions. The penalty phase is not the occasion to review these decisions.

160This leaves the adverse impact of the interlocutory suspension and the revocation order. On this point, the Law Society notes that Ms. Mazo has submitted no evidence of her income and her net worth. The Law Society relies on the principle that an inability to pay argument requires evidence of financial circumstances: Law Society of Ontario v Marusic, 2023 ONLSTH 63 at paras 55-56, and Law Society of Ontario v Perrelli, 2018 ONLSTH 80 at para 47.

161Accepting this general principle, we note the recent decision of the Divisional Court in Moore v College of Chiropractors, above at para 150, which observes that large costs orders obviously have significant negative impact which should not be ignored.[3]

Assessment of costs

162The Law Society submitted that the appropriate costs range was between $125,000 and $200,000 considering Law Society of Ontario v Stewart, 2023 ONLSTH 153, and the cases cited in para 85 thereof. Ms. Mazo did not make submissions as to the appropriate range.

163As noted above, this is an unusual case in that there was no cross-examination and no evidence submitted by Ms. Mazo. The case was much more significant than a two-day merits hearing would suggest, yet only a two-day merits hearing took place. That said, we accept the costs range submitted by the Law Society.

164Considering relevant factors, we note:

a. Like the other comparable cases referred to by the Law Society, this was a complex case. There were a number of allegations. Some of the allegations were factually complicated, particularly the allegation of knowing assistance in fraud.

b. The issues involved very serious allegations of misconduct. The issues were very important to both parties.

c. The hearing was short which limited costs but it was necessary for the Law Society to fully prepare for what was expected in November 2024 to be a three-week hearing.

d. As she was entitled to do, Ms. Mazo put the Law Society to the proof of its allegations. No facts were admitted nor was the authenticity of any documents. Ms. Mazo’s position was that the Law Society failed to reach agreements as to facts with her. The basis of that position was difficult to appreciate given that Ms. Mazo submitted no evidence and did not challenge any of the Law Society’s evidence by cross-examination. We are left with the impression that Ms. Mazo suggests that the Law Society should not have advanced allegations that we found were made out.

e. Ms. Mazo brought significant motions but the costs of motions were dealt with separately. The adjournment requests in the fall of 2024 added costs and the last-minute adjournment of November 2024 must have resulted in costs thrown away.

f. Ms. Mazo has not shown an inability to pay. However, taking into account the interlocutory suspension and the revocation, any costs order in the range can be expected to be a significant burden for Ms. Mazo.

g. A reasonable person, taking into account the nature of this case and the Tribunal’s cases, would reasonably have expected a six-figure costs award.

165The Law Society seeks approximately $140,000 in costs in the context of a submitted costs range of $125,000 to $200,000. That Ms. Mazo put the Law Society to the strict proof of its allegations without admission (as is her right) suggests a full costs order given the result. The difficulty getting this matter heard, given the last-minute adjournment of long-scheduled hearing dates in November 2024, suggests that the costs order should reflect the resulting costs incurred by the Law Society.

166On the other hand, $140,000 is a large amount for any licensee, particularly for a licensee who has not been permitted to practise since November 2024 and whose licence is now revoked.

167While a costs order of $140,000 would not be unreasonable, we prefer to somewhat discount this amount so that the burden of this application is somewhat shared with the professions in aid of access to justice and recognizing the significant adverse impact of a six-figure costs award. At the same time, we do not think it appropriate to reduce costs below the comparable range.

168We will order costs for the application of $125,000.

ORDER

169For these reasons, we order:

1. Ms. Mazo’s licence to practise law is revoked effective immediately.

2. Ms. Mazo shall comply fully with the terms of the Law Society’s Guidelines for Former Lawyers Whose Licences Have Been Revoked or Who Have Been Permitted to Surrender Their Licences.

3. Ms. Mazo shall pay costs in the amount of $175,000 which is comprised of:

a. $50,000 in respect of the abuse of process motion; and

b. $125,000 in respect of this application;

by March 31, 2026.

4. Interest shall accrue on any overdue part of this amount at a rate of 4% per year.

Malcolm M. Mercer,

for the panel

1We need not recite alternative findings for current purposes.

2Ms. Mazo filed a legal opinion from J. Gardner Hodder as to jurisdiction which we have treated as legal submissions. We need not address Mr. Hodder’s opinion but that should not be taken as agreement with all that he has written.

3Costs of $690,376.24 were ordered in Moore.