Allison Taylor

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing her discrimination application as an abuse of process for failing to produce medical records.

In a prior case management direction, a Vice-Chair had ruled that the requirement to produce medical records was moot because the applicant was only pursuing general damages.

The adjudicator subsequently dismissed the application for non-production without addressing the mootness ruling or providing the applicant an opportunity to make submissions on altering it.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the adjudicator breached procedural fairness by implicitly overturning the prior ruling without notice or process.

The HRTO decisions were quashed and the matter remitted to a different adjudicator.

The applicant sought a declaration that its perfected security interest in amounts payable by the City of Toronto to Selectore Ltd. had priority over a garnishment notice served by the respondent Globealive Wireless Management Corp. Globealive argued that the applicant's loan was not in default when the receivable became due, thus precluding the applicant's right to the funds.

The court, relying on section 20(1)(a)(ii) of the Personal Property Security Act, held that a perfected security interest takes priority over a later notice of garnishment, irrespective of whether the secured loan was in default at the time the receivable became due.

The applicant's motion was granted, affirming its priority, and Globealive was ordered to pay costs to both the applicant and the City of Toronto.

The plaintiff moved to remove the defendant's lawyer of record on the basis that the lawyer would be a witness to material facts at trial and that her communications formed the factual foundation for the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal and human rights claims.

The court found that while it was not certain the lawyer would be called as a witness, she was so closely connected to the material facts underlying the action that she was compromised as an advocate.

The lawyer's own words were at the heart of the dispute, putting her credibility in issue and creating a conflict between her role as counsel and participant.

The motion to remove counsel was granted.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that struck certain paragraphs of the statement of claim with leave to amend.

The moving parties argued the motions judge erred in considering the amended statement of claim, granting leave to amend, and failing to deal with the breach of fiduciary duty allegation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and no issue of general or public importance.

The defendants brought a motion to strike various paragraphs of the plaintiffs' Statement of Claim in an action for oppression and breach of fiduciary duty.

The defendants argued the paragraphs were irrelevant, pleaded evidence, constituted conclusions, and were prolix.

The court agreed that many paragraphs, including the 'Overview' and 'Detailed Background' sections, contained evidence, argument, and irrelevant information that could prejudice a fair trial.

The court struck the offending paragraphs and headings with leave to amend, while allowing the plaintiffs to maintain allegations related to the breach of fiduciary duty claim.

The defendants moved for several orders in a wrongful dismissal action, including injunctive relief restricting the plaintiff’s direct contact with them and sanctions for the plaintiff’s failure to pay multiple outstanding costs awards.

The court held that a master lacked jurisdiction to grant interlocutory injunctive relief under the Courts of Justice Act and adjourned that portion of the motion to be heard by a judge.

The court found the plaintiff had failed to pay four costs orders totalling $6,160 and that no appeals remained pending.

Applying Rules 57.03(2) and 60.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claimed inability to pay and concluded that sanctions were warranted.

The action was stayed until the outstanding costs are paid, with leave to the defendants to seek dismissal if payment is not made within three months.

Following dismissal of the defendants' summary judgment motion, the court determined the plaintiff's entitlement to costs.

The court applied rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and assessed objections to the plaintiff's bill of costs, including pre-motion entries, client communications, clerical work, and factum preparation time.

The court rejected a substantial indemnity award but found the claimed partial indemnity fees and disbursements were within the range the unsuccessful moving parties should reasonably have expected.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $36,330 plus disbursements of $2,567.21, inclusive of applicable taxes.

The appellant appealed an order of a Superior Court judge that dismissed his appeal from three interlocutory orders of a Master.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the proper route of appeal from the Superior Court judge's order regarding interlocutory matters was to the Divisional Court with leave.

The plaintiff appealed the trial judge's decision denying her aggravated and punitive damages in a wrongful dismissal action, despite the trial judge extending the notice period by two months due to the manner of dismissal.

The defendant sought leave to appeal the trial judge's decision to award no costs of the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion on damages.

The Court also refused the defendant's leave to appeal costs, finding no error in the exercise of the trial judge's discretion.

As success was divided, no costs were awarded for the appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of an employment standards officer's order finding it to be a related employer to a bankrupt company and ordering it to pay over $500,000 in vacation, termination, and severance pay.

The court exercised its discretion to permit judicial review because the applicant lacked the funds to pay the deposit required for a mandatory review by the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The court quashed the officer's order, finding no evidence to support the conclusion that the applicant was created with the intent or effect of defeating the purposes of the Employment Standards Act.