Allan G. Letourneau

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation arising from allegations by a child family member, arguing that the trial judge conflated credibility with reliability, misapprehended material parts of the defence evidence, and applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence of the complainant and the accused.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge expressly considered both credibility and reliability, properly applied the criminal burden of proof, and was entitled to assess the child's evidence in light of her age.

The court further held that no material misapprehension tainted the rejection of the appellant's denial and that the trial judge did not impose a harsher standard on the defence evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after his estranged girlfriend disappeared and her dismembered remains were found two years later.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an unsavoury witness who helped dispose of the body, corroborated by circumstantial and forensic evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions, in admitting hearsay and after-the-fact demeanour evidence, and in allowing bad character evidence regarding a subsequent relationship.

The Court of Appeal found that while some bad character evidence was improperly admitted and misused by the Crown, the curative proviso applied because the remaining evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault against his separated wife, which occurred in the lobby of her brother's apartment building.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim, misapplied the W.(D.) test regarding credibility, provided insufficient reasons under Sheppard, and reached an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered and rejected the self-defence claim, appropriately assessed credibility, and provided adequate reasons for the conviction.

The appellant challenged a summary conviction appeal order on the basis that his right under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed by delay.

The court held that the primary consideration was the appellant's lack of reasonable diligence in seeking special disclosure, and the police disclosure delays could not be treated as running consecutively for the s. 11(b) analysis.

In light of the limited prejudice shown and the nature of the charge, the court found no constitutional breach.

The appeal was dismissed.