Larry P. Lowenstein

The appellant franchisee operated a gas station under a one-year franchise agreement with the respondent franchisor.

The franchisee sought to rescind the agreement and claim a refund under the Arthur Wishart Act because the franchisor had not provided a disclosure document.

The franchisor successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was exempt under s. 5(7)(g)(ii) of the Act, which applies to agreements valid for no longer than one year that do not involve a non-refundable franchise fee.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the agreement's one-year term and requirement to pay royalties, rather than a franchise fee, satisfied the exemption criteria.

Class counsel appealed an order fixing their fees at $6.3 million plus GST, which was approximately half the amount agreed upon in their contingency fee agreements.

The motion judge had reduced the base fee by 25% and applied a multiplier of 2.6, finding the requested $12 million fee excessive in relation to the $40 million settlement recovery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge applied the proper test, considered all relevant factors, and made no palpable and overriding error in determining a fair and reasonable fee.

Following the plaintiff's successful appeal to certify an environmental claim as a class proceeding, the court determined the appropriate costs awards for the certification motion, the Divisional Court appeal, and the Court of Appeal.

The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to costs for all stages, imputing success at the certification motion stage despite the plaintiff having substantially narrowed the claim on appeal.

Recognizing the public interest nature of the environmental class action under s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, the court awarded the plaintiff $90,000 for the motion, $65,000 for the Divisional Court appeal, and $50,000 for the Court of Appeal.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding against the respondent for environmental contamination caused by a nickel refinery in Port Colborne.

The motion judge and Divisional Court dismissed the certification motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and certified the action.

The Court found that the appellant's narrowed claim for property devaluation met all certification requirements under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including identifiable class, common issues, preferable procedure, and representative plaintiff.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding against Inco Limited for environmental contamination in Port Colborne, alleging that nickel oxide emissions caused a decline in property values following a 2000 Ministry of the Environment announcement.

The motion judge and Divisional Court refused certification, finding the class arbitrary and individual issues overwhelming.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and certified the action, holding that the narrowed claim focusing solely on property devaluation met all certification requirements under the Class Proceedings Act, including identifiable class, common issues, preferable procedure, and suitable representative plaintiff.

The Environmental Commissioner of Ontario brought a motion for leave to intervene as an added party or, alternatively, as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning certification and costs in an environmental class action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to intervene as an added party, noting that interveners are rarely permitted to expand the evidentiary record.

However, the court granted the Commissioner leave to intervene as a friend of the court solely on the issue of costs, finding that the Commissioner could bring a broader public interest perspective to that issue.

The intervention was subject to conditions, including filing a consolidated factum with other interveners.

The appellants appealed a decision interpreting their franchise agreement with First Choice Haircutters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the franchisor only agreed not to grant another franchise in the territory, and the contract did not provide wider protection against competition following the franchisor's acquisition by a company operating competing franchises.

The Court also agreed that the Arthur Wishart Act did not apply to the 'franchisor associate' in this case, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to certify a class proceeding against Inco Limited and others for environmental contamination in Port Colborne, as well as the subsequent costs order.

On appeal, the appellant narrowed the claims to real property devaluation, abandoning health impairment claims.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's findings that the proposed class definition was arbitrary, individual issues would overwhelm common issues, and a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

The court also upheld the costs award of $184,332.14 against the appellant, finding no error in the motion judge's application of costs principles under the Class Proceedings Act and the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff attended a mandatory training program to become a licensed sales representative for the defendant.

After completing the program, she signed a contract containing an arbitration clause.

She later brought a proposed class action claiming the defendant failed to pay minimum wage during the training period under the Employment Standards Act.

The defendant moved to stay the action under s. 7(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the stay, finding that the arbitration clause applied only to disputes arising from the relationship created by the contract, not the pre-contractual training relationship.

On a motion to quash an appeal, the moving party argued that a refusal to stay a class proceeding under the Arbitration Act, 1991 was unappealable under s. 7(6) and, in any event, interlocutory.

The court held that where the motions judge determined the arbitration agreement did not govern the dispute, the matter fell outside s. 7 and the statutory appeal bar did not apply.

The court further held that an order refusing a stay pending arbitration was final because it conclusively determined the forum and deprived the responding party of the substantive right to resolve the dispute by negotiation and arbitration.

The motion to quash was dismissed with costs.