Lamer J.

The appellant, a young offender, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's alternative measures programme, arguing that its admission criteria infringed sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, relying on its concurrent judgment in R. v. S. (G.), which held that section 4 of the Young Offenders Act does not oblige provinces to implement such a programme and that the admission criteria do not infringe the Charter.

The appellant, a battered woman, shot and killed her common law partner in the back of the head as he left the room following an argument where he physically abused her and threatened to kill her.

At trial, a psychiatrist testified as an expert on battered woman syndrome to explain her state of mind and why she reasonably apprehended death or grievous bodily harm.

The jury acquitted the appellant, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is admissible to assist the jury in assessing the reasonableness of a battered woman's apprehension of death and her belief that lethal force was necessary.

The respondent, a fire fighter, was subjected to mandatory retirement at age 62 pursuant to a collective agreement.

He filed a complaint alleging age discrimination under the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code.

The Board of Inquiry found discrimination, but the Court of Queen's Bench reversed this decision.

The Court of Appeal restored the Board's decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the mandatory retirement policy was a reasonable occupational requirement, applying the principles established in a companion case.

The appellant elected to be tried by judge and jury for a narcotics offence but failed to appear for jury selection and the commencement of his trial.

The trial judge ruled that under s. 526.1 of the Criminal Code, the appellant lost his right to a jury trial because he did not have a legitimate excuse for his absence.

The appellant was convicted by a judge alone.

He appealed, arguing that s. 526.1 violated his right to a jury trial under s. 11(f) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that while s. 526.1 infringes s. 11(f), it is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter because it protects the administration of justice and public respect for the criminal trial process.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder after a victim was beaten to death with a baseball bat over a bounced cheque.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a first degree murder conviction can be sustained by combining the mens rea of intending to cause bodily harm likely to cause death (s. 212(a)(ii)) with the requirement of planning and deliberation (s. 214(2)).

However, the Court ordered a new trial because the Crown improperly cross-examined a defence alibi witness using intercepted private communications without first proving the interceptions were lawful under s. 178.16 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, an off-duty serviceman in civilian dress, was found in possession of cocaine outside the military base.

He was convicted by a military tribunal for possession of a narcotic under the Narcotic Control Act and the National Defence Act.

He appealed on the basis that the military tribunal lacked jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the Court Martial Appeal Court that there was no error in the result.

The appellant applied for a re-hearing to vary a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the Social Service Tax.

The Court granted the application and varied the judgment to include prejudgment interest at the District Registrar's rate from the date of the several remittances to March 15, 1984, and postjudgment interest for the period following March 15, 1984.

The appellant was awarded costs of the re-hearing.

The employer, Paccar, terminated its collective agreement with the union and, after negotiations reached an impasse, unilaterally imposed new terms and conditions of employment.

The union complained to the Labour Relations Board, which held that the employer had the authority to unilaterally alter terms after expiry, subject to the duty to bargain in good faith.

The British Columbia Supreme Court and Court of Appeal quashed the Board's decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was not patently unreasonable and that the courts must show curial deference to the specialized tribunal's policy choices.

The Court also held that the Board had standing to make submissions defending the reasonableness of its decision.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his application for certiorari regarding the jurisdiction, independence, and impartiality of a Justice of the Peace.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant did not challenge the constitutionality of the relevant Criminal Code provisions and failed to provide evidence that the Justice of the Peace infringed his rights under section 7 of the Charter.

The appellants, charged with murder in Ontario, sought to waive their right to a jury trial and be tried by a judge alone.

The Criminal Code required a jury trial for murder in all provinces except Alberta.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while an accused can waive the benefit of a jury trial under s. 11(f) of the Charter, this does not create a constitutional right to a non-jury trial that overrides the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that the geographic distinction allowing non-jury trials only in Alberta did not violate s. 15 of the Charter, as persons accused of murder outside Alberta do not constitute a disadvantaged group subject to discrimination.

The plaintiff Indian Band brought a trespass action in the Federal Court against the defendant Indian Band regarding the use and occupation of a reserve, alleging the Crown breached its fiduciary and statutory duties.

The defendant Band moved to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Federal Court has jurisdiction under section 17(3)(c) of the Federal Court Act, as the dispute involves conflicting claims to an obligation owed by the federal Crown, and the claim is based on 'laws of Canada' including the Indian Act and the federal common law of aboriginal title.

The appellant employee was dismissed without just cause after ten years of service.

He complained to the Director of Labour Standards, who ordered reinstatement and lost wages under s. 67A of the Labour Standards Code.

The Labour Standards Tribunal upheld this decision.

The employer successfully appealed to the Appeal Division, which held that the provisions conferring this power on the Tribunal violated s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court applied the Residential Tenancies test and held that while the Tribunal exercises a judicial function broadly conformable to that of s. 96 courts at Confederation, it does so as a necessarily incidental aspect of the broader policy goal of providing minimum standards of protection for non-unionized employees.

The appeal was allowed and the legislation was upheld as intra vires the province.

The Woodstock Indian Band barricaded a railway right-of-way that crossed their reserve, claiming the railway company had no right to use the land.

The railway company sought a permanent injunction to restrain the Band from interfering with its right-of-way.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the railway company's predecessor had acquired a statutory easement in the nature of a right-of-way over the land prior to Confederation, with the permission of the Crown.

This valid right-of-way was sufficient to support the award of a permanent injunction against the Band, without needing to determine whether the Band's underlying interest in the fee held by the Crown had been extinguished.

The respondents were charged with indictable offences and required to appear for fingerprinting under the Identification of Criminals Act prior to conviction.

They challenged the requirement as a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while mandatory fingerprinting deprives a person of liberty and security of the person, it does not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court found that fingerprinting is a minimally intrusive, reliable, and necessary tool for law enforcement that is less serious than the arrest itself.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligence of her husband, who was driving a car owned by her father.

At the time of the accident, the Married Woman's Property Act barred spouses from suing each other in tort, and the Insurance Act excluded insurer liability for bodily injury to a spouse.

These provisions were repealed by the Family Law Reform Act, 1975 before the action was commenced.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the repeals affected substantive rights, not merely procedural rules, and therefore did not operate retrospectively.

The appeal by the insurance company was allowed, and the actions against the husband and the insurer were dismissed.

The respondent, a nursing assistant, challenged regulations requiring her to pass a French language test to obtain a professional permit, arguing they were discriminatory and contained an unauthorized subdelegation of power.

The regulations exempted candidates with three years of secondary instruction in French.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the issue was not moot despite legislative amendments, as the government had an interest in the validity of its regulations.

The Court concluded the regulations were not discriminatory under the Charter of human rights and freedoms because they did not impair the right to full equality, and the subdelegation to a testing committee was purely administrative and authorized by statute.

The appellant brought an application to vary the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada pronounced on October 9, 1986.

The Court allowed the application and varied the judgment to specify that interest runs until August 9, 1982, in accordance with the pre-trial agreement between the parties.

No costs were awarded on the motion for a re-hearing or on the re-hearing.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal which allowed an appeal from the appellant's acquittal on charges under the Combines Investigation Act and ordered a new trial.

The issue was the admissibility of evidence discovered as a result of an unconstitutional search.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's finding under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants, a union and individual provincial civil servants, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Ontario Public Service Act that prohibited them from engaging in certain political activities, including during federal elections.

They argued the province lacked jurisdiction to legislate regarding federal elections.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the impugned provisions were intra vires the province.

The Court found the legislation was validly enacted under the province's power to amend its constitution and regulate the tenure of provincial offices, as it aimed to ensure the political impartiality of the provincial public service, a fundamental principle of responsible government.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge misdirected himself on the burden of proof, failed to warn himself about the risks of accepting accomplice evidence, and disregarded relevant evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada, in a 4-3 split decision, dismissed the appeal, with the majority substantially agreeing with the majority decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal.