Krawchenko

The applicant, a registered clinical psychologist, sought judicial review of a decision by the College of Psychologists of Ontario's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) ordering him to complete a specified continuing education or remedial program (SCERP) regarding professionalism in public statements.

The ICRC's order followed an investigation into the applicant's social media posts and public statements, which the committee found posed moderate risks of harm to the public and the profession.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the ICRC reasonably balanced the applicant's Charter right to freedom of expression with the College's statutory mandate to regulate the profession in the public interest, in accordance with the Doré framework.

The Court also held that the ICRC's decision met the Vavilov standard of justification, transparency, and intelligibility.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his contempt motion against the respondent mother for failing to comply with court-ordered access.

The motion judge had found the mother's non-compliance was not intentional, as she could not afford travel due to the father's failure to pay ordered costs, and that Quebec, where the child had lived for over three years, was the proper jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the test for contempt or her determination that Ontario was no longer the appropriate jurisdiction.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision regarding statutory accident benefits.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the application, finding that the applicant ought to have pursued a statutory appeal under s. 11(6) of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, which limits appeals to questions of law.

The court held there were no exceptional circumstances to justify bypassing the statutory appeal mechanism and declined to convert the application into an appeal.

The application was dismissed without prejudice to the applicant seeking an extension of time to pursue a statutory appeal.

The applicant municipality sought judicial review of a decision by the respondent Board to reaffirm a cost apportionment formula for shared social services that had been used since 2004.

The applicant argued that the governing regulation required a 'double majority vote' in every year the alternate formula was continued.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the legislation did not require an annual double majority vote once the alternate formula was initially approved, and that the Board's decision was neither ultra vires nor unreasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash a municipal council resolution directing staff to proceed with the development of an arena/event centre.

The applicant alleged procedural unfairness and bad faith, arguing that a staff update report failed to include requested information.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no evidence of procedural unfairness, bad faith, or arbitrary conduct by the council.

The court also noted that while an alternative statutory remedy existed under the Municipal Act, it exercised its discretion to hear the judicial review to avoid further delay in the long-standing planning process.