cannabis

The accused, who are Indigenous persons, were charged with possessing cannabis for the purpose of selling it at unlicensed dispensaries located on First Nations reserves.

The Crown conceded a section 8 Charter breach regarding one dispensary due to the improper use of a telewarrant, but the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

For the other two dispensaries, the court found the search warrants valid despite minor inaccuracies in the premises descriptions.

The court found the essential elements of the offences proven but refrained from entering convictions pending a constitutional challenge.

The appellant, a subtenant operating an unlicensed cannabis store, appealed the dismissal of his claim regarding improper sublease termination and denial of relief from forfeiture.

The head landlord had issued a notice of breach and later repossessed the premises after a police raid, relying on the original notice.

The application judge found that the landlord had not waived the breach because they were misled by the subtenant regarding a valid licensing exemption.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, affirming that a waiver requires full knowledge of rights, which was absent due to the misleading information.

The Court also upheld the denial of relief from forfeiture, considering the seriousness of the breach and the subtenant's conduct.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The applicant municipality brought an application for an injunction to restrain the respondent from growing cannabis on his property in contravention of municipal by-laws.

The respondent brought a motion to stay the application, arguing that the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether his cannabis cultivation was a 'normal farm practice'.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the Board's jurisdiction is limited to issues of disturbance and does not extend to broad land-use planning and zoning by-law compliance, which form the core of the municipality's application.

The appellants sought leave to appeal an arbitration award that upheld a condominium rule prohibiting the retail sale of cannabis from their commercial units.

The appellants argued the arbitrator erred in law by finding the rule consistent with the condominium declaration and by validating certain proxies used to pass the rule.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion for leave, concluding the alleged errors were questions of mixed fact and law, not extricable questions of law as required under section 45 of the Arbitration Act.

However, the court exercised its equitable jurisdiction to grant a temporary extension for the appellants to wind down their business and dispose of perishable inventory.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a recreational hockey game when the defendant delivered a blindside hit to his head.

The plaintiff suffered a concussion, broken teeth, and facial cuts, leading to long-term cognitive and functional limitations that impacted his ability to work as a personal trainer.

The defendant argued the collision was accidental and that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent due to his choice of facial protection and chronic cannabis use.

The court found the defendant fully liable, concluding the hit was intentional or reckless and outside the bounds of fair play.

The court awarded the plaintiff $702,551 in damages, including general damages and past and future income loss.

The offender, a 29-year-old first-time offender, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic cocaine and cannabis, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought 4.5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence for mid-level drug trafficking operations motivated by profit.

Balancing the serious nature of the offences with the offender's guilty pleas, lack of prior record, and strong family support, the court imposed a global sentence of 4 years, reduced by 6 months for strict bail conditions, resulting in 42 months imprisonment.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug following a minor property damage accident.

Police observed signs of impairment and conducted a Drug Recognition Evaluation, which indicated the presence of Lorazepam and an inactive cannabinoid metabolite in the accused's urine.

The Crown sought to prove impairment by drug beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that while there was evidence of impairment, the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the impairment was caused by the drugs found in the accused's system, as urine testing cannot reliably determine the timing or concentration of drug ingestion or its effects at the time of driving.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with four counts of trafficking in cannabis marijuana (less than 3 kilograms) on or about February 15, 2011, March 1, 2011, and two counts on March 10, 2011, all in Halton Hills.

The Crown's case relied on undercover police operations and surveillance evidence.

The defence argued the accused was merely assisting with pizza deliveries.

The court found the accused guilty on all four counts, rejecting the defence narrative and finding the pizza delivery story was a cover for drug trafficking operations conducted in conjunction with a co-accused youth offender.

The accused was charged with unlawful production of cannabis, two counts of possession of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking, and fraud under $5,000 of electricity.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging unreasonable delay under section 11(b) and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin, considering the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

The total delay was approximately 16 months from the information being sworn to the trial date.

The court found that while the Crown caused approximately 1 month and 18 days of delay in providing initial disclosure, the remainder of the delay was attributable to inherent time requirements of the case, including the complexity of the charges, the need for a judicial pre-trial, and the time required for counsel preparation.

The court dismissed the application.