Justice S.R. Clark

A school principal was charged with assault for restraining a nine-year-old grade four student who was demonstrating disruptive and aggressive behaviour in the schoolyard during lunch period.

The defendant attempted to calm and de-escalate the situation verbally before resorting to a rear restraint technique after exhausting all other options.

The central legal issue was whether the defendant's actions fell within the defence provided by section 43 of the Criminal Code, which permits the use of reasonable corrective force by educators.

The court found that the defendant's actions were both corrective in purpose and reasonable in degree under the circumstances, and acquitted the defendant.

The respondent mother brought a motion to change a separation agreement dated January 21, 1998, seeking an increase in child support and retroactive payments for five years, as well as a 50% contribution for section 7 expenses.

The applicant father opposed the retroactive claim but agreed to pay guideline amounts going forward.

The court declined to award retroactive child support or section 7 expenses, finding that the delay in bringing the application, the lack of blameworthy conduct by the payor, the child's circumstances, and the hardship to the payor militated against retroactivity.

The court varied the agreement to increase ongoing child support to the guideline amount effective January 1, 2014, and ordered the father to contribute 50% of section 7 expenses commencing January 1, 2015.

The applicant father sought a final or temporary order for sole custody of two young children, retroactive to April 11, 2014, when the Children's Aid Society placed them in his care following an investigation into alleged abuse by the mother.

The father also sought to restrict the mother's access.

The mother opposed the custody motion and sought to maintain joint custody pending trial, arguing she had cooperated fully with investigations and had taken steps to address concerns.

The court found that while a de facto sole custody arrangement had developed, there was insufficient evidence of a material change in circumstances to warrant changing the joint custody status quo on an interim basis.

The court dismissed the father's motion for custody but maintained primary residence with the father while preserving joint custody and ordering the parties to craft a meaningful access schedule.

A trial concerning retroactive and ongoing child support and section 7 special expenses following a change in custody arrangement.

The parties, who had previously shared joint custody under a 2009 Separation Agreement, experienced a material change in circumstances when the child began residing exclusively with the mother in May 2013.

The father sought sole custody and claimed the mother should not receive child support due to alleged access denial.

The mother sought sole custody, retroactive child support increases, and adjustments to special expenses.

The court determined that custody and access issues are mutually exclusive from child support obligations and that the mother's decision to return to school, while reducing her income, was reasonable given her circumstances.

The court imputed income to the mother for calculation purposes in 2012 and 2013 and ordered substantial retroactive child support arrears.

The respondent father brought a motion to change seeking to rescind or terminate child support arrears and avoid ongoing child support obligations, claiming he was unable to work due to injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant mother opposed the motion and sought to have income imputed to the father for child support purposes.

The court found the father was intentionally unemployed despite having education, skills, and no clear medical evidence of total incapacity.

The court determined there was a material change in circumstances due to the father's continued unemployment and lack of rehabilitation efforts.

The court imputed minimum wage income to the father and ordered him to pay child support retroactively from January 1, 2014, while maintaining the existing arrears fixed at the date of the prior order.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a child support order dated August 26, 2003, seeking to reduce or terminate child support and section 7 expenses for his daughter, who had turned 18.

The applicant mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion seeking retroactive increases to child support based on the father's increased income over the preceding three years, and seeking costs.

The court found that the father had not established a material change in circumstances, as his income had consistently exceeded the amount upon which the original order was based.

The court further found the father was intentionally under-employed following his dismissal from his previous employment and imputed income accordingly.

The court ordered retroactive child support arrears and increased ongoing support based on imputed income, along with costs.

The applicant mother sought retroactive and ongoing child support as well as a proportionate share of private school tuition fees for the parties' eight-year-old son.

The father agreed to pay ongoing guideline support but opposed retroactive support beyond the date of service and refused to contribute to private school fees.

The court declined to award retroactive support prior to December 1, 2012, finding the mother's delay in pursuing the claim was not sufficiently justified despite her safety concerns.

The court also declined to order the father to contribute to private school fees, finding the expense was not necessary and represented a choice by the mother rather than a genuine need that could not be met in the public system.

A mother brought a motion to change a 1999 child support order, seeking retroactive increases from the original order date.

The father had not provided updated financial disclosure since 1999 despite multiple requests.

The court applied the D.B.S. framework and determined that effective notice was provided in June 2012 via registered mail.

The court found the father engaged in blameworthy conduct by failing to increase support despite steady income growth over 13 years.

Retroactive support was ordered from July 1, 2009 (three years prior to effective notice), with ongoing support adjusted based on current income.

The father was required to pay a minimum of $200 per month toward arrears.

A motion to change a child support order where the respondent father sought retroactive reduction of child support from $415 per month (based on imputed income of $45,000) to reflect his actual self-employment income of approximately $20,000-$25,000 annually.

The applicant mother opposed the motion, alleging the father was hiding income and conducting business through his current partner.

The court found the father's financial disclosure inadequate and incomplete, drew an adverse inference, and determined the father had been under-employed.

The court imputed income at $35,000 per annum (a middle ground), reducing child support retroactively to $325 per month.

The court confirmed the mother's sole custody and formalized the father's alternate weekend access.

The applicant father sought to enforce a costs order made on March 20, 2013, in the amount of $2,000.00 against the respondent mother.

The mother sought to change the costs order pursuant to Rule 25(19)(e) of the Family Law Rules, arguing she had inadequate notice and was unable to present evidence regarding her ability to pay.

The court found that the mother was properly represented by counsel at the time the costs order was made, that counsel failed to file submissions and attend court without proper notice to the court, and that the mother could not now claim lack of knowledge or notice.

The court declined to change the order and confirmed the mother must pay $2,000.00 to the father's counsel within 30 days.

The father brought a motion for contempt alleging that the mother breached a June 22, 2011 final order by cancelling approximately 30 weekend access visits without good or valid reason, refusing to make up missed weekends, and refusing to provide report cards and authorization for direct contact with schools and medical professionals.

The mother brought a cross-motion seeking to transfer the matter to Ottawa, reduce access to once per month, obtain child support disclosure, and obtain permission to travel to Poland with the children.

The court found the mother in contempt of the access order, finding that while some reasons for cancellation were legitimate, most were not, and that the mother had unilaterally allowed her influence regarding the children's activities to override her obligation to comply with the clear terms of the order.

The penalty phase was adjourned to January 2014 to allow the mother an opportunity to purge the contempt.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking temporary sole custody of the child with alternate weekend access to the applicant father, or alternatively, primary residence.

The motion was based on recommendations from an Office of the Children's Lawyer report dated March 4, 2013.

The applicant father opposed the motion and sought to maintain the status quo pending trial.

The court dismissed the mother's motion for a change of custody but granted expanded access to the mother, including alternate weekends and mid-week visits, while maintaining the father's primary custody pending trial.

A costs decision following a motion regarding parental travel with a child.

The respondent mother sought permission to travel to England with the subject child during the holiday period.

The applicant father brought a counter-motion opposing the travel, citing concerns about the child's return.

The court granted the travel with restrictive conditions, including a cash security deposit.

The applicant sought costs of $2,000 on a partial recovery basis, citing the respondent's failure to disclose material facts including her marriage to a British citizen and her work visa.

The court awarded costs as requested, finding the respondent's selective disclosure of information unreasonable and contrary to the principle of coming to court with clean hands.

A costs application arising from a motion concerning supervised access to children.

The applicant mother sought costs following a successful motion that resulted in an order for supervised access to the respondent father.

The respondent opposed the costs award, arguing the applicant's behaviour was unreasonable and that his financial circumstances should preclude or substantially reduce any award.

The court awarded costs to the successful applicant, finding the respondent's behaviour was unreasonable and inflammatory, though the award was moderated to account for the respondent's limited financial means and the need to ensure enforceability.

The court addressed whether it was functus (without jurisdiction) to reconsider a costs ruling made on March 11, 2013, after the respondent's counsel's written submissions on costs were inadvertently sent to an incorrect fax number and not received by the court prior to the ruling.

The court determined it was not functus and that it was in the interests of justice and procedural fairness to reconsider the respondent's materials and revisit the costs ruling.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking to suspend the respondent father's access to the children or, alternatively, to impose supervised access.

The father opposed both requests.

The court found that while the threshold for complete suspension of access had not been met, supervised access was warranted on a temporary basis.

The father had demonstrated problematic and inappropriate behaviour over a significant period, including denigrating the mother, making accusations of practicing "black magic" and showing a lack of insight into the impact of his conduct on the children.

The court ordered supervised access for two hours per week at a supervised access facility, conditioned on the father's enrollment in parenting and spousal abuse programs.

A Toronto Police Service officer was charged with assault causing bodily harm against a member of the public.

The Crown alleged the officer used excessive force and made an unlawful arrest for public intoxication.

The defence argued the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the complainant was intoxicated and posed a safety risk, and that any force used was necessary to effect a lawful arrest.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the complainant was intoxicated, that there was a risk to safety, and that arrest was necessary.

The court also found the officer was entitled to the defence of honest mistake of fact.

The charge was dismissed.

The applicant mother sought child support and section 7 expense contributions from the respondent father for three children.

The father acknowledged his legal responsibility but disputed the income imputation and special expenses claimed.

The court found the father was intentionally under-employed and imputed annual income of $36,960.00, resulting in monthly child support of $717.00.

The court awarded contributions toward swimming lessons, religious studies, and child care for the youngest child only.

The restraining order against the father was terminated.

A real estate lawyer pleaded guilty to two counts of fraud over $5,000.

The first count involved operating a Ponzi scheme over 14 years (1994-2008) defrauding individual clients of approximately $4.9 million.

The second count involved defrauding financial institutions of approximately $4.8 million between November 2007 and March 2008.

The Crown sought 10 years imprisonment; the defence sought a blended sentence of 3 years in penitentiary plus a 2-year conditional sentence.

The court imposed a concurrent 6-year penitentiary sentence, rejecting the conditional sentence component and finding that general deterrence and denunciation were paramount given the breach of trust by a member of the legal profession.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a final order dated March 11, 2010, seeking termination of child support for an adult child who had completed university studies, initiation of child support from the mother for another adult child attending university, and a contribution toward special expenses.

The mother opposed, arguing that the child had unilaterally repudiated their relationship and therefore was not entitled to support.

The court found that the child had not voluntarily withdrawn from parental control but rather had been driven from the mother's home due to circumstances involving a third party, constituting a "constructive" withdrawal.

The court ordered the mother to pay child support retroactive to May 1, 2011, and to contribute 40% of special expenses.