Peter Edward Dubas

A costs application arising from a motion concerning supervised access to children.

The applicant mother sought costs following a successful motion that resulted in an order for supervised access to the respondent father.

The respondent opposed the costs award, arguing the applicant's behaviour was unreasonable and that his financial circumstances should preclude or substantially reduce any award.

The court awarded costs to the successful applicant, finding the respondent's behaviour was unreasonable and inflammatory, though the award was moderated to account for the respondent's limited financial means and the need to ensure enforceability.

The court addressed whether it was functus (without jurisdiction) to reconsider a costs ruling made on March 11, 2013, after the respondent's counsel's written submissions on costs were inadvertently sent to an incorrect fax number and not received by the court prior to the ruling.

The court determined it was not functus and that it was in the interests of justice and procedural fairness to reconsider the respondent's materials and revisit the costs ruling.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking to suspend the respondent father's access to the children or, alternatively, to impose supervised access.

The father opposed both requests.

The court found that while the threshold for complete suspension of access had not been met, supervised access was warranted on a temporary basis.

The father had demonstrated problematic and inappropriate behaviour over a significant period, including denigrating the mother, making accusations of practicing "black magic," and showing a lack of insight into the impact of his conduct on the children.

The court ordered supervised access for two hours per week at a supervised access facility, conditioned on the father's enrollment in parenting and spousal abuse programs.

The respondent brought a motion to transfer a family law application from Brampton to Pembroke.

The applicant sought custody of their child, born in Petawawa, and had relocated to Mississauga without the respondent's consent after initially representing she would return.

The court applied the test from Re: D.J.C. and W.C. to determine the child's ordinary residence, considering where the child had predominantly resided, the forum of convenience, and the circumstances of how the case came before the court.

The court found the child ordinarily resided in Petawawa and transferred the case to Pembroke, noting the applicant's deceitfulness in removing the child and then claiming Peel Region as the ordinary residence.