Justice H. Pringle

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to import cocaine.

The conspiracy involved the importation of approximately 40 kilograms of cocaine (28 kilograms pure) into Australia with a street value of approximately $20 million.

The accused, a 23-year-old journalist at the time of the offence, recruited and directed multiple couriers to transport the drugs.

The court determined the accused was a middle-man in the conspiracy rather than a principal or leader, and imposed a sentence of nine years imprisonment, less presentence custody credit of 113 days.

The accused was charged with driving while over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood and impaired driving following an incident at a fire station parking lot.

The Crown's case relied on observations by firefighters and police officers, as well as breath sample analysis.

The central issue was whether the Crown could prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt given the "bolus drinking" defence—the possibility that the accused consumed large quantities of alcohol while driving rather than before.

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest but acquitted the accused on both counts because the evidence established a reasonable inference of bolus drinking, which undermined a necessary precondition of the toxicology expert's opinion.

The Crown brought a motion to vacate a preliminary inquiry scheduled for October 1, 2019, and to require the defendant to re-elect pursuant to amended Criminal Code provisions that came into force on September 19, 2019.

Bill C-75 fundamentally changed the preliminary inquiry regime by restricting preliminary inquiries to offences punishable by 14 years or more of imprisonment.

The defendant's offences did not meet this threshold.

The central issue was whether the new amendments applied retrospectively to cases already in progress or only prospectively to future cases.

The court held that the presumption against retrospective application applies, that the amendments affect substantive rights (the right to a preliminary inquiry and the right to elect), and that there was no clear legislative intent to rebut this presumption.

The Crown's motion was dismissed.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay.

The applicant was arrested on August 28, 2018, and his trial was scheduled to conclude on February 24, 2020, just four days before the Jordan 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The applicant was in custody awaiting trial.

The court found that while the applicant demonstrated no defence delay and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, the applicant failed to establish that he took meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings.

Specifically, the applicant did not bring a severance application after learning that co-counsel scheduling issues would delay trial by almost one year, and took no proactive steps after trial dates were set.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving on March 3, 2018, after police responded to a report of an unconscious driver on Spadina Avenue in Toronto.

The defendant was found asleep at the wheel in a live lane of traffic with the engine running.

Police observed signs consistent with impairment including the smell of alcohol and bloodshot eyes.

The defendant was arrested and advised of his rights to counsel.

The Crown did not rely on breath sample results due to an error in the demand read by police.

The trial focused on whether the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest and no Charter breaches regarding arrest or rights to counsel.

However, on the merits of the impairment charge, the court found a reasonable doubt existed and acquitted the defendant.

A 19-year-old first-time offender with no criminal record pleaded guilty to discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life contrary to s. 244(1) of the Criminal Code.

The offender arrived at a confrontation armed with a loaded handgun and fired at a group of men near a vehicle.

He was shot in the arm during the exchange of gunfire.

His bullets struck no one, though innocent bystanders in nearby vehicles were endangered.

The offender subsequently passed the firearm to an associate who fired additional shots.

The court imposed a sentence of five years and six months in custody, with enhanced presentence custody credit of one year to account for a jailhouse beating and gunshot wound suffered while in custody.

The accused was convicted of unlawful possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a search warrant execution.

Although a Charter breach was established, evidence was admitted under s. 24(2).

The Crown sought six years incarceration and argued gang membership as an aggravating factor.

The court rejected the gang membership finding due to insufficient evidence and unreliable police synopses and occurrence reports.

The court imposed a global sentence of four years less three months as remedy for the Charter breach, with the firearm offense receiving two years nine months and one year consecutive for fentanyl trafficking.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Over a three-year period, the accused developed a serious cocaine addiction that led him to sell cocaine to an undercover officer on four separate occasions, totalling approximately 30 grams, with additional cocaine found in his residence.

The accused successfully completed a residential addictions treatment program prior to sentencing and demonstrated genuine rehabilitation.

The court imposed a sentence of 90 days incarceration to be served intermittently, along with one year of probation, finding that while incarceration was necessary, the accused's exceptional rehabilitative efforts and demonstrated sobriety warranted a departure from the standard sentencing range for cocaine trafficking.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired by drug following observations of erratic driving, two motor vehicle accidents, and physical indicia of impairment.

The trial judge found Charter breaches regarding the suspension of the right to counsel at the roadside and the failure to obtain an informed and unequivocal waiver of counsel at the police station.

Evidence obtained following these breaches was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the trial judge found the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on admissible evidence including civilian witness testimony of erratic driving, police observations of physical impairment indicators, and expert evidence regarding the effects of drugs on driving ability.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case rested entirely on breath test results obtained following the accused's arrest.

The defence raised three Charter applications: (1) a section 8 breach based on the arresting officer's chemically impossible articulation of the legal BAC limit; (2) a section 8 breach for failure to "transfer grounds" to the breath technician; and (3) a section 10(b) breach regarding the implementation of the right to counsel of choice.

The court found a section 10(b) breach but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach fell on the lower end of the seriousness spectrum despite its significant impact on the accused's protected interests.

The accused was convicted.