Justice G.P. Renwick

The defendant was convicted of sexual assault following a trial.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of two to three years, while the defendant sought an intermittent jail sentence.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less one day in a provincial reformatory followed by 18 months probation.

The court considered the seriousness of the offense, the defendant's youth and first-offender status, the significant psychological harm to the complainant, and the collateral consequences of imprisonment during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Following a six-day trial, the defendant was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to a conditional sentence of imprisonment.

The defendant, a middle-aged crisis counselling caseworker, had sexually assaulted a vulnerable teenage girl under his care by touching her and making sexualized comments.

The court rejected the defendant's request for an absolute discharge and the Crown's request for 90 days incarceration plus probation.

Instead, the court imposed a 9-month conditional sentence order with strict house arrest conditions for the first six months, followed by 15 months of probation, along with mandatory DNA collection and sex offender registration for 10 years.

The court considered the impact of COVID-19 on institutional conditions in determining to impose a conditional sentence rather than institutional imprisonment.

The applicant sought disclosure of materials to support a Garofoli challenge to a search warrant executed at his residence.

The applicant was charged with possession of fentanyl for trafficking and possession of a loaded firearm.

The prosecution relied on redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO) to protect a confidential informant's identity.

The applicant challenged the existence of the confidential informant status, asserting the person was a police agent or agent provocateur.

The court determined whether disclosure of various documents was required under the reasonable possibility test for Garofoli applications.

The court issued a judicial summary of redacted information relating to a search warrant application.

The decision addresses the balance between the defendant's right to full disclosure and the right to make full answer and defence against the Crown's obligation to prove allegations beyond a reasonable doubt and the protection of a confidential informant's identity.

The court determined which redactions to Appendix D of the Information to Obtain were necessary to protect the confidential informant while providing sufficient information to allow the defendant to challenge the issuance of the search warrant.

The defendant, a caseworker at a children's centre, was charged with sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference against a fourteen or fifteen-year-old female client.

The allegations arose from incidents occurring one to two years prior to reporting.

The trial focused on credibility and reliability of witnesses.

The court found the complainant credible despite numerous discrepancies in peripheral details.

The court acquitted the defendant of invitation to sexual touching regarding the arcade hug incident, finding insufficient evidence of sexual intent.

However, the court convicted the defendant of sexual assault for the car wash incident, where the defendant commented on the complainant's body and placed his hands around her waist for an extended period.

The court acquitted the defendant of sexual interference.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and assault upon his aunt.

The defendant pleaded guilty to simple assault on count two.

The court conducted a trial on the sexual assault charge.

The Crown called two witnesses and the defendant testified.

The court found the defendant guilty of sexual assault and not guilty of the assault charge, as the assault was committed in circumstances of a sexual nature and formed part of a continuing transaction that began in the boiler room with the defendant's exposure of his genitals and sexually suggestive language.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration (BAC).

Police received a complaint of a possibly impaired driver, identified the vehicle by license plate, and arrested the defendant at his home.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and the breath sample demand under the Charter.

The court found the arrest was lawful based on reasonable grounds, dismissed the Charter application, and acquitted the defendant on the impaired driving charge but convicted him on the excess BAC charge.

The court ruled on a Charter application and voluntariness voir dire regarding the admissibility of the defendant's statement taken by police following arrest.

The defendant was arrested at 10:44 am, informed of his right to counsel at 10:57 am, but was not provided access to a telephone to exercise this right until 1:31 pm—a delay of 2 hours and 47 minutes from arrest.

The court found a serious, deliberate, and unjustified breach of the defendant's s. 10(b) Charter rights.

Although the statement was found to be voluntary under common law, it was excluded from evidence due to the flagrant Charter violation and its impact on the administration of justice.

The court addressed the scope of preliminary inquiries following legislative amendments under Bill C-75.

The Crown argued that preliminary hearings should be limited to offences carrying a potential sentence of 14 or more years imprisonment.

The defendant contended that evidence regarding other indictable offences arising from the same transaction should also be heard.

The court held that all allegations occurring during the same transaction as a 14+ offence may be subject to a preliminary hearing, including non-14+ offences already charged or not initially charged, provided they arise from the same transaction.

The defendant sought permission to be absent from the commencement of his preliminary hearing due to residence in Ottawa and difficulty arranging transportation with a surety as required by his Judicial Interim Release Order.

The Crown did not oppose the application.

The court granted the defendant's request to be absent from part of the preliminary hearing, subject to conditions requiring defence counsel to maintain regular communication with the defendant, provide updates on the proceedings, and seek regular instructions throughout the hearing.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration (over 80 mg/100 ml) under the former s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The central issues were whether the presumption of identity under the repealed s. 258(1)(c) survived the legislative amendments that came into force on December 18, 2018, and whether the revised presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1) of the new legislation was satisfied.

The court found that the presumption of identity remains intact for transitional cases charged under the old statutory regime but tried after the new legislation came into effect.

The court also rejected arguments that the qualified technician's reliance on the analyst's certificate regarding the alcohol standard was improper.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration under the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant challenged the legality of the roadside screening procedure, the pat-down search conducted prior to the screening, the delay in administering the screening, and the delay in providing rights to counsel.

The court conducted a blended voir-dire and ruled on the Charter application.

The court found no violations of the defendant's Charter rights and dismissed the application for exclusion of the evidential breath testing results.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

At trial, the defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking to exclude breath testing results.

The sole issue was whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to rely on the approved screening device (ASD) result.

The officer administered the ASD approximately 14 minutes after the defendant's last known alcohol consumption, rather than the required 15 minutes, due to a mathematical error.

The court found that the officer lacked objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and that both section 8 and section 9 Charter violations occurred.

However, applying the Grant test under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court admitted the breath sampling evidence, finding the violations minor and the evidence reliable.

The defendant was charged with driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration ("over 80").

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath sampling results under the Charter, claiming violations of sections 8 and 9.

The court found technical breaches but admitted the evidence.

The central issue was whether the prosecution could rely on the presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after its repeal by An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to conveyances), which came into force on December 18, 2018.

The court followed R. v. Shaikh and held that the presumption of identity no longer applied to transitional cases.

Without the presumption, the Crown could not prove the defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant had consumed alcohol approximately five minutes before driving.

The defendant was acquitted.