P.A. Schreck

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to review a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondents on charges of first degree murder.

The preliminary inquiry judge had committed one respondent for second degree murder and the other for accessory after the fact, concluding there was 'no evidence' of planning and deliberation.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by concluding there was no evidence, rather than insufficient evidence, given the circumstantial evidence of the respondents following the deceased and shooting him.

The application was granted, the discharges quashed, and the matter remitted with a direction to commit both respondents for first degree murder.

The offender was convicted of possessing a sawed-off shotgun with readily accessible ammunition and uttering threats to kill a former friend.

At the time of the offences, she was subject to a 10-year firearms prohibition and kept the weapon in an apartment shared with her two children.

The court distinguished the sentencing range for sawed-off shotguns from semi-automatic handguns but emphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The offender was sentenced to 36 months for the firearm offence and a consecutive 60 days for threatening, resulting in a net sentence of 33 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and related offences.

He brought an application to stay the proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay was calculated at over 44 months, with a net delay of over 30 months after deducting defence delay.

The court found the net delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The Crown failed to establish that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied, as the delay was also unreasonable under the previous Morin framework.

The application was granted and the proceedings were stayed.

The Crown and the Ontario Provincial Police applied for certiorari to quash a trial judge's order requiring the disclosure of a Drug Recognition Expert's (DRE) rolling logs to the accused in an impaired driving trial.

The applicants argued the logs were irrelevant third-party records and that disclosure was prohibited by s. 258.1 of the Criminal Code and s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the rolling logs are relevant to the DRE's proficiency, constitute 'fruits of the investigation' subject to first-party disclosure, and are not shielded from disclosure by statutory privacy or public interest provisions.

During a jury trial for firearms offences, the defence called evidence suggesting third parties were responsible for the crime without bringing a pre-trial application to determine its admissibility.

The Crown applied for a mistrial, arguing the evidence was inadmissible and its late introduction caused irremediable prejudice.

The court ruled that while an application should have been brought, the failure to do so was an honest mistake.

The court found the evidence regarding two unidentified males was logically relevant and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect, making it admissible.

However, evidence suggesting the complainant possessed the firearm was excluded as speculative.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding the Crown was not irremediably prejudiced, but allowed the Crown to reconsider calling reply evidence.

During a jury trial for firearms offences, the Crown sought to call reply evidence to undermine the credibility of a defence witness who testified about two unidentified men looking for the complainant.

The Crown also sought to re-open cross-examination of the witness.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed reply evidence related solely to the witness's credibility and therefore offended the collateral fact rule.

The court also declined to permit further cross-examination, noting the Crown had already been given a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness.