Joseph Youssef Obagi

The plaintiff brought a motion for the disclosure of documents over which the defendants asserted litigation privilege in an action alleging bad faith by the insurer.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants' conduct in the underlying tort action, including making joint settlement offers with the tortfeasor, constituted actionable misconduct that pierced the litigation privilege.

After reviewing the documents, the court found they were innocuous communications and did not evidence abuse of process or blameworthy conduct.

The motion for disclosure was dismissed.

The applicants' home was destroyed by a flood and deemed a total loss.

Their homeowners' insurance policy with the respondent included a guaranteed rebuilding cost (GRC) endorsement.

The applicants sought a declaration that the GRC coverage included the increased costs of rebuilding in compliance with conservation authority regulations and building codes.

The respondent argued that such costs were excluded by a clause limiting coverage for increased costs due to the operation of any law.

The court held that the GRC endorsement covered the compliance costs and that the exclusion clause, which was restricted to 'any law', did not apply to rules, regulations, or by-laws.

The court also found that applying the exclusion as interpreted by the respondent would virtually nullify the GRC coverage.

The plaintiff commenced an action against the automobile defendants for damages under the Family Law Act arising from a motor vehicle accident that injured his mother.

He also sued his mother's former lawyers in the alternative for failing to advance his claim in the original tort action.

The automobile defendants crossclaimed against the lawyer defendants for contribution and indemnity.

The plaintiff moved to discontinue his claim against the lawyer defendants, which was granted.

The lawyer defendants moved to strike the crossclaim.

The court struck the crossclaim without leave to amend, finding that the lawyer defendants and automobile defendants were not concurrent tortfeasors who caused the same damage, and therefore no right of contribution and indemnity existed under the Negligence Act.

The plaintiff was awarded over $1.1 million in damages following a personal injury trial.

The parties appeared before the court to determine the costs of the trial and the calculation of a management fee.

The court found that the plaintiff had made reasonable offers to settle that were more favourable than the judgment, entitling her to elevated costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff $852,528.03 in costs and disbursements, and fixed the management fee at $125,000 based on an annualized sliding scale rather than a fixed percentage.

The plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity scale after successfully certifying her action as a class proceeding and defeating the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The defendant argued that costs should be reduced or not awarded because the plaintiff failed to obtain a reverse summary judgment and the class definition was narrowed.

The court found the plaintiff was substantially successful and awarded costs of $300,000 plus HST and disbursements, slightly reduced from the claimed amount to reflect the lack of success on the reverse summary judgment request.

The defendant, Sun Life, brought a motion for summary judgment in a class proceeding regarding the calculation of annual indexing increases on long-term disability benefits.

The plaintiff argued for a reverse summary judgment.

The court found that the interpretation of the policy and the correct methodology to calculate the annual indexing of benefits where 'other income' is deducted raised a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court dismissed both the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff's request for a reverse summary judgment.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class proceeding against Sun Life, alleging it incorrectly calculated long-term disability benefits by wrongfully deducting the inflation component from CPP and PSSA benefits.

Sun Life argued the plaintiff failed to meet the certification criteria.

The court found the pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action for breach of contract, though not for punitive damages.

The court amended the class definition to include a temporal limit based on the ultimate limitation period and certified the action, finding a class proceeding to be the preferable procedure.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a further and better affidavit of documents in an action alleging bad faith by her insurer, Pilot/Aviva.

The plaintiff sought production of communications between Aviva and counsel for the tortfeasors' insurer, Traders/Aviva.

The defendants claimed litigation and solicitor-client privilege over the contested documents.

The court ordered that the contested documents be delivered to Associate Justice Kaufman for judicial review to determine whether they are protected by privilege or ought to be produced.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to remove the respondent's lawyer as her appointed appraiser in an insurance dispute arising from tornado damage.

The umpire had suspended the appraisal process due to concerns about the appraiser's dual role as counsel in an impending bad faith claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the umpire must be impartial, the Insurance Act does not require party-appointed appraisers to be independent or disinterested.

The Court also clarified that the appraisal process is a collaborative valuation mechanism, not an administrative tribunal.

This endorsement addresses a request from the parties to schedule a 20-day judge-alone trial in two non-consecutive, two-week tranches to secure earlier trial dates.

The court, acting as the local administrative judge for civil cases, granted the request.

The decision acknowledged the general preference for continuous trials but found the non-continuous format warranted due to significant delays in the case (partially administrative and pandemic-related) and the consent of all parties.

The court emphasized the need to avoid further deterioration of evidence and provide closure to the plaintiff, who had been involved in litigation for many years.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the defendant driver ran a red light and t-boned the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger.

The court found the defendants 100% liable.

The plaintiff, a self-employed jewelry designer, suffered a mild traumatic brain injury, chronic pain, PTSD, and post-concussion syndrome.

The court awarded $1,101,568.55 in total damages, including $225,000 for general damages, $328,402.20 for past and future economic loss, and $489,300 for future care costs, plus a management fee and tax gross-up.

The defendant doctors brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to produce settlement documents and a pre-trial conference brief from two prior actions (a tort action and a statutory accident benefits action).

The plaintiff refused on the basis of settlement privilege.

The defendants argued that disclosure was necessary to prevent double recovery regarding a litigation loan that was claimed as damages in all three actions.

The court granted the motion, finding that the public interest in preventing overcompensation and facilitating meaningful settlement discussions in the current action outweighed the public interest in protecting the prior settlements, distinguishing the Supreme Court's decision in Sable Offshore.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to implement a Pierringer settlement agreement with 18 of the defendants following a multi-vehicle collision, and to strike the jury notice filed by the non-settling defendants due to anticipated COVID-19 trial delays.

The court granted the order implementing the settlement with some modifications to the proposed terms, including a mechanism to enforce the settling defendants' discovery obligations.

The motion to strike the jury notice was dismissed as premature, as no pre-trial conference had yet occurred to determine the expected length of the trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons to its earlier judgment in Nemchin v. Green, 2021 ONCA 238, which had allowed the appellant's appeal regarding the "top-up" of long-term disability benefits assigned to the respondent's insurer, Aviva.

This addendum addresses the treatment of potential tax refunds from Sun Life's remittances and the allocation of expenses related to pursuing such refunds.

The court clarified that while Aviva is not compelled to seek tax refunds or cease tax deductions, if Aviva chooses not to pursue a tax refund, it must reimburse the appellant's reasonable expenses for bringing such an application, as Aviva would ultimately receive the benefit of any tax refunds.

This appeal concerned the standing of a defendant to challenge a s. 38 order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

Traders General Insurance Co. appealed the dismissal of its motion to set aside a s. 38 order that allowed the Carrolls to commence a bad faith action against Traders.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that a proposed defendant generally lacks standing to challenge a s. 38 order, except in limited circumstances like abuse of process or misrepresentation, which were not found here.

The court also addressed, obiter, arguments regarding whether the Carrolls were creditors and whether the bad faith claim was property of the bankrupt estate, concluding these were not determinative issues for the s. 38 order itself, but rather for the merits of the assigned action.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Kossay El-Khodr, appealed an application judge's order to release $385,000 from a trust to Northbridge Commercial Insurance Company.

The funds were held pending the outcome of a previous appeal (the "Assignment Appeal") concerning the assignment of statutory accident benefits (SABs) for future medical and rehabilitation expenses.

The appellant argued that the conditions for release in the Minutes of Settlement were not fully met because the Assignment Appeal did not grant an assignment of *all* medical and rehabilitation benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly interpreted the Minutes of Settlement in the context of the Assignment Appeal, which had assigned the specific categories of benefits at issue, thereby satisfying the conditions for the release of funds to the respondent and preventing double recovery.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the Court of Appeal allowed the appellant's appeal, setting aside a trial judge's order requiring the appellant to "top up" assigned benefits due to tax deductions.

The appellant was awarded partial indemnity costs for the appeal.

This endorsement specifically addresses the costs of a prior motion before the trial judge (the "top up motion"), for which the trial judge had made no costs order.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant entitled to costs for this motion, ordering the respondent to pay $10,000, reasoning that the unanticipated nature of the trial judge's order and the parties' failure to seek an advance tax ruling contributed to the litigation.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order requiring her to "top up" assigned long-term disability benefits to account for income tax deductions, arguing procedural unfairness and misinterpretation of s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal found the "top up" order procedurally unfair as it was not requested by parties and misinterpreted the statutory trust and assignment provisions.

The court held that the assignment applies to net after-tax payments, and the respondent's insurer, as assignee, must bear the burden of addressing tax implications with the insurer and CRA.

The appeal was allowed, and the "top up" order was set aside.

At the outset of a motor vehicle accident trial, the parties sought a ruling on whether section 12 of the Evidence Act, which limits a party to calling three expert witnesses without leave, applies to participant experts and non-party experts.

The plaintiff intended to call four litigation experts and two participating experts, and file numerous medical reports under section 52.

After reviewing the jurisprudence, including Westerhof v. Gee Estate, and the Osborne Report, the court ruled that section 12 applies only to litigation experts retained for the purpose of the proceeding, and not to participant or non-party experts.

The plaintiff, who had pre-existing disabilities including hydrocephalus and kyphoscoliosis, suffered paraparesis after the defendant radiologists punctured his heart during a filter removal procedure.

Liability was admitted, and the trial proceeded as an assessment of damages.

The defendants argued the 'crumbling skull' doctrine applied, suggesting the plaintiff would have become wheelchair-bound regardless of their negligence.

The court rejected this argument, finding no cogent evidence to support it.

The court awarded substantial damages, including $250,000 in general damages for the plaintiff, $90,000 each to his parents for loss of care, guidance, and companionship, over $1.5 million for past attendant care, and over $5.7 million for future care costs, subject to a 15% negative contingency.