Joseph Youssef Obagi

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion where the defendant SCM Insurance Services Inc. successfully obtained an order prohibiting the plaintiff, Joanne Burwash, from using documents subject to the deemed undertaking rule.

SCM sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued for costs to be in the cause or for a reduction based on proportionality and the potential future admissibility of the documents.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, finding that the deemed undertaking ruling was a final determination on the use of the documents.

The court awarded SCM its full requested partial indemnity costs of $52,573, payable within 30 days.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order striking out claims against Maureen Harvey (superintendent of Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre), John Doe, and Jane Doe.

The appellant sought damages for negligent investigation by Ontario Provincial Police officers and breach of duty of care by corrections officials during three years of custody.

The motion judge had struck the claims without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge failed to properly apply the generous reading standard for pleadings and set aside the striking order, allowing the appeal.

The respondent brought an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration in writing.

The court awarded costs to the responding parties, rejecting the moving party's argument that costs should be modest because the motion was made in writing.

The court found that the 18.6 hours spent by counsel responding to the motion was reasonable, as the motion required a review of materials filed on the appeal and arguments made at the hearing.

Costs were fixed at $8,249, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The moving party sought an order to withdraw the Court of Appeal's reasons for decision dated September 19, 2017, and to grant a rehearing before a five-judge panel, or alternatively, to stay the decision pending determination of related appeals.

The moving party argued that the Court had effectively overruled Bannon v. Hagerman Estate without notice and had addressed a new issue regarding the Ontario Drug Benefit Program that was not raised by the parties.

The Court dismissed the motion, finding that it had not overruled Bannon but rather distinguished it on its facts, and that the Ontario Drug Benefit Program issue had been squarely addressed by both parties during the appeal.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal by the defendants.

The appellants sought partial indemnity costs of $56,676.40, which reflected their full indemnity rate.

The respondent argued for a significant reduction, contending that the court's decision had changed the legal landscape in personal injury litigation.

The court reduced the costs award to $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, reflecting a partial indemnity rate and accounting for the complexity of the issues involved.

Appeal from a jury trial judgment in a catastrophic motor vehicle accident case.

The appellants challenged five rulings by the trial judge regarding prejudgment interest, assignment of statutory accident benefits (SABs), and treatment of collateral benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reducing the prejudgment interest rate from 5% to 2.5%, amending the retirement age for income replacement benefit assignment from age 60 to age 64, and ordering assignment of future SABs for medication, assistive devices, and professional services.

The court declined to order assignment of drug benefits after age 65 due to the Ontario Drug Benefit Program, but found the trial judge erred in treating this as a contingency rather than a certainty.

Michael Dawson sued Halpenny Insurance Brokers Ltd. (HIBL) and other related entities for financial losses stemming from changes to his mother's will, which he alleged were caused by the defendants' actions.

HIBL moved for summary judgment, asserting it had no involvement in financial management or estate planning and no partnership with Halpenny Insurance Benefit Partners Ltd. (BPL), the entity whose principal advised Dawson's mother.

The court found no actual partnership between HIBL and BPL and determined that Dawson failed to establish his mother subjectively believed in such a partnership or relied on it when dealing with the financial advisor.

Consequently, HIBL's motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing Dawson's claim against HIBL.

Following a jury verdict, the plaintiff brought a motion for judgment to determine the pre-judgment interest (PJI) rate applicable to general non-pecuniary damages.

The plaintiff argued for a 5% PJI rate, asserting that amendments to the Insurance Act effective January 1, 2015, were not retroactive as PJI is a matter of substantive law, relying on the Divisional Court's decision in Carr v. Modi.

The defendant conceded the court was bound by Carr, despite believing the case law was wrongly decided, given a pending Court of Appeal decision in El-Khodr v. Lackie.

The parties agreed to issue judgment with a 5% PJI rate, with a mechanism to revisit the calculation if the El-Khodr appeal decision impacted it.

The court ordered judgment for the plaintiff in the agreed amount.

The defendant brought a threshold motion under section 267.5 of the Insurance Act, seeking a declaration that the plaintiff had not suffered a permanent and serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function as a result of a motor vehicle collision.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that her injuries, including PTSD and major depression, met the threshold criteria.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that the plaintiff had, on a balance of probabilities, suffered a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function caused by the collision.

The court also made findings on the credibility and reliability of the defence medical expert.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle collision action brought a motion to include the names of the parties' respective motor vehicle insurers (Belair Direct and Aviva) in the jury pre-screening process.

The plaintiff argued that public awareness of mandatory insurance mitigated prejudice and that broader "connections" beyond employment should be screened.

The defendant opposed, citing potential prejudice and increased complexity.

The court dismissed the motion, affirming that civil jury selection in Ontario does not permit challenges for cause based on unspecified partiality and that the presumption of juror impartiality is strong.

The court held that identifying insurers at the outset could mischaracterize the dispute as one between insurers rather than individuals and potentially mislead the jury regarding a defendant's personal exposure.

The plaintiff sought a specific instruction to the jury regarding the defendant's in-court admissions concerning fault for a collision.

During cross-examination, the defendant stated she did not believe the plaintiff was responsible and that her decision to enter a lane ultimately caused the accident.

The court had previously given a general instruction that the jury are the triers of fact and the defendant's views on fault are merely her views.

The plaintiff argued these were in-court admissions warranting a specific instruction that the jury should rely on them unless contradicted.

The court ruled that the defendant's answers were her views, not admissions of fact based on all relevant evidence, and therefore did not warrant specific mention in the jury charge.

The defendant in a personal injury action sought to rely on approximately 20 posts from the plaintiff’s Facebook page for cross-examination, which had been retrieved through an agreement but not formally disclosed.

The plaintiff objected, citing prejudice due to the late disclosure of a significant volume of materials, which prevented proper trial preparation, expert review, and settlement negotiations.

The court dismissed the defendant's request, emphasizing the importance of full and rigorous compliance with disclosure obligations under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the agreement between counsel.

The defendant sought to admit surveillance video of the plaintiff as substantive evidence in a personal injury action.

The court applied a three-part test for admissibility (accuracy, fairness/absence of intention to mislead, and verification on oath) and found that the surveillance evidence did not meet these criteria due to issues with inconsistent time-stamping, selective editing, subjective descriptions by the investigator, and significant gaps in footage.

The court also determined that the evidence had minimal probative value and that its potential prejudice to the plaintiff, particularly given the claim of post-traumatic stress disorder and the lack of expert review of the surveillance, outweighed any probative value.

Additionally, the defendant's late disclosure of 2016 surveillance evidence, two weeks before trial, was deemed non-compliant with disclosure obligations, and leave to rely on it was denied.

The motion to admit the surveillance evidence was dismissed in its entirety.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence claims against their former lawyer, John Cardill, following a summary judgment motion.

The motion judge had determined that Cardill was retained only to assess the accounts of their previous lawyer, Donald Good, and therefore owed no duty of care regarding a potential negligence action against Good.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by narrowly focusing on the written retainer agreement without examining all surrounding circumstances.

The court held that where a lawyer's duty of care is alleged to extend beyond the retainer, the court must meticulously examine all relevant circumstances, including the nature of instructions and client sophistication.

The appeal was allowed and the action was directed to proceed to trial.

Intact Insurance Company brought an application seeking a declaration on the interpretation of s. 44(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS), specifically whether an insured is required to sign any consent form dictated by the insurer for a s. 44 examination.

The respondent, Anne Beaudry, argued that such consent forms must be "reasonable and justifiable." The court found that any required consent form must be "reasonable," based on the language of s. 44, the insurer's duty of utmost good faith, and the Unfair and Deceptive Practices Regulation.

The court dismissed Intact's request to unilaterally dictate consent terms, emphasizing the need for reasonableness and negotiation.

The court determined costs following a summary judgment in favour of a defendant.

The successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs, while the plaintiffs argued for a lower partial indemnity award.

The court found that while some aspects of the plaintiffs' position had no chance of success, their argument regarding the nature of the retainer required judicial interpretation and was not unreasonable.

Consequently, costs were awarded on a partial indemnity scale to the successful defendant, payable by the plaintiffs, in the amount of $25,200.16 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

This decision addresses a costs award and ancillary matters following a jury verdict in a personal injury action.

The jury found the defendants 62% liable, awarding substantial damages for pain and suffering, future care costs, and family law damages.

The court ruled on four key issues: ordering an assignment of accident benefits, limiting the McEwens' personal liability to insurance policy limits due to their bankruptcy, applying a 5% pre-judgment interest rate for non-pecuniary damages (finding the relevant statutory amendment not retrospective), and applying the new statutory deductible of $18,270.00 to the Family Law claim.

Despite the jury verdict exceeding some settlement offers, the court significantly reduced the plaintiffs' requested costs from $795,616.09 to $375,000, citing the plaintiffs' conduct, including late expert reports, changing their position on calling the plaintiff, and engaging in "sharp practice" by attempting to enforce a settlement offer while simultaneously initiating a bad faith claim against an insurer.

The plaintiff, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 449 (CCC 449), brought a motion for partial summary judgment against 622294 Ontario Limited (622) to enforce a Joint Use Agreement (JUA) regarding shared common roadway expenses.

CCC 449 sought a declaration that 622 remained liable for 38.45% of these expenses and that two small structures built by 622 did not trigger the JUA's reapportionment provisions.

The court also addressed 622's arguments regarding a statute-barred claim for asphalt repairs and alleged changes in cost calculation and square footage by CCC 449.

A property dispute concerned a narrow strip of land between neighbouring residential properties.

The applicants sought declarations and a vesting order establishing title to the strip by adverse possession.

The court examined decades of evidence showing that the applicants and their predecessors openly used and maintained the disputed strip as part of their driveway and yard, believing a hedge marked the boundary line.

Applying the test for adverse possession and the provisions of the Limitations Act, the court found that more than ten years of continuous, open, notorious, and exclusive possession had accrued prior to the application of the Land Titles system.

The court also found the possession reflected a good faith boundary mistake shared by neighbouring owners.

Title of the respondents to the disputed land was extinguished and vested in the applicants.

Following a prior judgment finding the defendants liable for a fraudulent carpet supply scheme, the court issued supplementary reasons clarifying how the plaintiff must elect judgment between an undisclosed principal and its agents for contract damages while allowing fraud-based damages to be enforced against all defendants.

The court explained the composition of the compensatory damages award and confirmed that only the contract-based component required an election of judgment.

In determining costs, the court considered the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Given the defendants’ fraudulent conduct and the complexity and length of the litigation, the court concluded that full indemnity costs were justified.

The plaintiff was awarded $630,475.47 in costs jointly and severally against the defendants.