Joseph Y. Obagi

Following a jury verdict in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court addressed supplementary issues concerning assignment of future Statutory Accident Benefits and the award of costs.

The defendants sought broad assignment of accident benefits to avoid alleged double recovery, arguing that the value of future benefits exceeded the verdict when compared with their settlement offer.

The court held that the defendants failed to meet the strict evidentiary burden required under the Insurance Act because the jury’s global awards did not specify the overlap between tort damages and accident benefits.

The court limited the assignment of income replacement benefits to a defined period and accepted assignments for certain other benefits where not disputed.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $350,000 plus additional amounts for submissions and disbursements.

Following a jury verdict awarding damages for catastrophic injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the court addressed outstanding issues concerning prejudgment interest, the retrospective application of amendments to the Insurance Act, the assignment and trust of collateral accident benefits, and costs.

The court held that the amendment removing the 5% prejudgment interest rate for non‑pecuniary damages in motor vehicle cases was substantive and therefore did not apply retrospectively.

Prejudgment interest on non‑pecuniary damages was awarded at 5% pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also considered the statutory trust and assignment provisions governing future accident benefits and provided directions regarding potential assignments of benefits and further submissions.

Costs were to be determined following additional written submissions.

The plaintiff, a former tenant of a public housing corporation, sued the corporation and its lawyer after being evicted due to mould and water infiltration that rendered her unit uninhabitable.

The defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim.

The court struck the claim against the lawyer, finding no cause of action exists against opposing counsel for actions taken in their client's interest.

The court also struck the claim against the corporation, finding the eviction issues were already decided by the Landlord and Tenant Board and any claim for rent abatement was statute-barred under the one-year limitation period in the Residential Tenancies Act.

The action was dismissed without leave to amend.

In a long‑term disability insurance action, the plaintiff brought a preliminary motion to strike portions of an affidavit attaching a psychiatrist’s report relied on by the defendant in support of a motion for additional medical examinations under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Alternatively, the plaintiff sought the right to cross‑examine the psychiatrist.

The court held that the report was not being tendered as expert opinion evidence but merely to demonstrate that the examining physician recommended additional testing.

Because the court was not asked to accept the scientific validity of the recommendations, the report could be attached to an affidavit on information and belief and did not trigger the right to cross‑examine the physician.

The preliminary motion was therefore dismissed and the main motion for further examinations was permitted to proceed.

The defendant commercial tenant brought a Rule 21 motion to determine a question of law, arguing that the commercial lease agreement allocated the risk of loss from an oil spill to the plaintiff landlord, thereby barring claims in negligence and contract.

The court reviewed the lease provisions and the Supreme Court of Canada trilogy on the allocation of risk in commercial leases.

The court found no clear language in the lease absolving the tenant of liability for its own negligence, nor any evidence the tenant paid increased insurance premiums.

The motion was dismissed, with the court also declining to dismiss the motion solely on the basis of the defendant's delay in bringing it.