Joseph Obagi

During a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs objected to the admissibility of an expert report from the defendant's occupational therapist regarding the injured plaintiff's attendant care needs.

The plaintiffs argued the report did not comply with a previous court ruling that limited the expert's evidence to the practical delivery model of care rather than the quantum of hours required.

The court agreed with the plaintiffs, finding the report went beyond the permitted scope by critiquing the plaintiff's expert and opining on the number of hours needed.

The court ruled that only specific portions of the report addressing the cost and availability of personal support workers and handyman services were admissible.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice and proceed before a judge alone, arguing that a 19.5-day delay between the conclusion of evidence and closing arguments would prejudice the jury's ability to recall and understand complex medical evidence regarding post-traumatic stress disorder.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence was not overly complex, the actual delay was shorter than claimed, and the jury was capable of comprehending and weighing the evidence.

The court concluded that justice would be better served by retaining the jury.

The defendant solicitor brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' professional negligence claim against him.

The plaintiffs alleged the solicitor failed to advise them of a conflict of interest, failed to commence a negligence action against their former counsel, and failed to advise them of the applicable limitation period.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the solicitor's retainer was limited to the assessment of the former counsel's accounts, the plaintiffs were informed of the conflict, and the solicitor fulfilled his duty by advising the plaintiffs to seek independent legal advice regarding any potential negligence claims.

In a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs sought an order under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requiring a non-party medical assessment company to produce its complete files relating to defence medical examinations.

The plaintiffs alleged that partial productions suggested the company may have reviewed or revised draft expert reports prepared for the defendants.

The court applied the two‑part Rule 30.10 test of relevance and trial fairness, emphasizing concerns about the independence and integrity of expert witnesses.

Finding that the requested documents could reveal whether third‑party influence affected expert reports and that the materials were unavailable from other sources, the court concluded that production was necessary for trial fairness.

Leave to bring the motion was granted and the non‑party was ordered to produce the complete files.

The defendants moved under Rule 63.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for a stay pending appeal of a trial decision granting the plaintiffs title to a disputed strip of land by adverse possession.

The court applied the three‑part test requiring a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience.

Although the parties agreed the latter two elements were satisfied because the vesting order would render the appeal moot, the court held the appellants failed to demonstrate a serious issue with a reasonable prospect of success.

The alleged errors concerning the adverse possession test, factual findings, and natural justice were unsupported assertions.

The motion for a stay pending appeal was therefore dismissed.

The applicant sought to resign as trustee of a family trust.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a cross-application to appoint a new independent trustee, arguing that the settlor's children, who intended to appoint themselves as trustees pursuant to the trust agreement, had abused their discretion as directors of the trust's holding company.

The court found no evidence of abuse of discretion that would justify interfering under s. 5(1) of the Trustee Act, and held that the executors could appoint the next trustees pursuant to the trust agreement.