Jennifer A. Blishen

The respondent father brought a motion to change a prior child support order, asserting a reduction in income from self‑employment as a roofing subcontractor and seeking a significant reduction in the amount of child support payable.

The court found the father’s financial disclosure incomplete and unreliable and determined that he continued to earn undeclared income from cash jobs and other work.

Applying ss. 19 and 21 of the Child Support Guidelines and s. 37 of the Family Law Act, the court imputed income substantially higher than the amount proposed by the father but lower than the previous imputed income.

The court varied the support order prospectively with limited retroactive adjustment while declining to rescind arrears.

No costs were awarded due to the moving party’s unreasonable conduct and deficient disclosure.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 14(22) of the Family Law Rules to strike multiple paragraphs from the respondent’s Amended Answer in ongoing parenting litigation concerning the parties’ child.

The challenged pleadings alleged details about the parties’ relationship, the applicant’s family finances, and prior litigation involving the respondent.

The court held that pleadings must contain material facts relevant to the issues and must not include inflammatory allegations, collateral matters, or evidence that could delay or prejudice a fair trial.

Several paragraphs were struck as irrelevant, prejudicial, or consisting of evidence rather than material facts, while some paragraphs were permitted to remain.

The respondent was granted leave to amend portions of the pleading consistent with the court’s guidance.

Following an 11‑day family law trial concerning parenting arrangements, child support, equalization, and related financial claims, the court addressed costs.

The court applied the presumption under Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules that the successful party is entitled to costs and assessed the parties’ success across each issue.

The applicant was found to be the more successful party overall, particularly on custody, decision‑making authority, primary residence of the child, and equalization, while the respondent was more successful on child support.

Allegations of bad faith were rejected, though both parties were found to have behaved somewhat unreasonably in aspects of the litigation.

Considering offers to settle and the factors under Rule 24(11), the court ordered the respondent to pay partial recovery costs.

Following a 15.5‑year marriage, the respondent sought ongoing and retroactive spousal support after the payor spouse ceased voluntary payments several years post‑separation.

The court found entitlement to both compensatory and non‑compensatory support under the Divorce Act due to the recipient spouse’s economic disadvantage arising from childcare responsibilities, immigration challenges, and career interruption while the payor spouse advanced his technology career.

Applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and considering the payor’s current income rather than averaging fluctuating earnings, the court ordered indefinite monthly support in the mid‑range of the guidelines.

Retroactive support was granted only from the date the claim for support was formally asserted, reflecting the significant delay in seeking relief.

The payor was also required to maintain life insurance to secure the support obligation.

Following a bifurcated family law and civil assault trial, the court determined the appropriate costs award between the parties.

The respondent succeeded on a damages claim arising from an assault and obtained damages, future care costs, and prejudgment interest, while the applicant obtained a modest additional equalization payment relating to disputed chattels.

The court considered offers to settle, the parties’ conduct under the Family Law Rules, and the proportionality of costs to the issues and outcome.

Full indemnity costs were declined because the result was less favourable than an earlier formal offer to settle.

The court awarded substantial partial indemnity costs for the damages claim, offset by limited costs payable to the applicant for the chattels claim and an adjournment caused by deficient pleadings.

The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000 under s. 380(1) of the Criminal Code after soliciting donations for new organizations while previously working as a field agent for a national taxpayer advocacy group.

Donors often assumed the new organizations were affiliated with the prior organization, and the court found that the accused failed to clearly disclose the lack of affiliation, constituting a misrepresentation by non‑disclosure and establishing the actus reus of fraud.

However, the evidence established that the accused genuinely intended to create a legitimate lobbying organization and did not subjectively intend to deceive or deprive donors or the prior organization.

The Crown therefore failed to prove the mens rea of fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also found the Crown did not prove that the alleged fraudulent amount exceeded $5,000.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment under s. 264 of the Criminal Code and the sentence of a suspended sentence with three years probation.

He advanced numerous grounds of appeal, including improper questioning during trial, inadequate disclosure, misapprehension of evidence, judicial bias, and errors in law.

The court held that the impugned questioning was relevant to the defence of lawful authority and that no disclosure issue affecting the fairness of the trial was established.

Although a minor factual error was identified in the trial judge’s description of an earlier altercation, it was not material and did not affect the verdict.

The court found no reasonable apprehension of bias, no error in law, and concluded the conviction and sentence were reasonable.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for possession of cocaine contrary to s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and reached an unreasonable verdict.

The cocaine was discovered in a plastic bag located beside the appellant’s seat in a vehicle after police removed him from the passenger seat.

The trial judge inferred knowledge and control based on the proximity of the drugs and their visibility once the appellant exited the vehicle.

The appellate court held that the trial judge’s findings of fact and credibility were entitled to deference and that the inference of possession was reasonably supported by the evidence.

No palpable and overriding error or misapprehension of evidence was established.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had concluded that breath samples were not taken “as soon as practicable” under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code due to several perceived unexplained delays.

The appeal court held that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding delays following arrest and during roadside investigation, which had reasonable explanations.

Because those errors materially affected the acquittal, the appellate court set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The accused brought a defence motion seeking severance of charges in a criminal prosecution.

The court considered the request and determined that severance was not warranted in the circumstances.

The motion was denied, with the court indicating that reasons would follow.