Jason Kirsh

The respondent Chief Animal Welfare Inspector brought two motions to strike grounds of appeal, including Charter claims, related to the removal of over 200 dogs from the appellants' dog sledding business.

The appellants requested an adjournment of the motions because a recent disclosure order required the respondent to produce extensive materials regarding the removal and care of the animals.

The Animal Care Review Board granted the adjournment, finding that the pending disclosure would facilitate a more open process and informed participation by providing factual context relevant to the motions.

The appellants, who run a dog sledding business, appealed the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector's decision to remove over 200 dogs from their properties.

The appellants brought a motion for further disclosure, including documentation of the removal, the subsequent care of the dogs, and the Informations to Obtain (ITOs) used for the search warrants.

The respondent refused, arguing the information was irrelevant.

The Animal Care Review Board granted the motion, finding the requested disclosure was relevant to whether the removal was lawful and necessary for a full understanding of the issues.

The appellants, owners of a dog sledding business, appealed the removal of over 200 dogs by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector.

They brought a preliminary motion seeking the interim return of the dogs pending the full hearing, arguing that a multiplicity of proceedings between the parties offended natural justice.

The Animal Care Review Board dismissed the motion, finding that the other proceedings did not address the same issues and were mostly initiated by the appellants themselves.

Furthermore, under the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, the Board only has the authority to order the return of animals after a full hearing on the merits, unless both parties consent, which did not occur here.

The Animal Care Review Board considered requests for reconsideration from both the appellants and the respondent regarding a previous decision concerning the care of sled dogs.

The respondent sought to reinstate original compliance dates, arguing the Board erred by extending them without reasons or evidence.

The appellants argued the Board incorrectly interpreted the requirement in Regulation 444/19 that outdoor dogs must have a chain at least 3 meters long.

The Board dismissed both requests, finding no errors of law, fact, or procedural fairness that would warrant reconsideration under Rule 18.2 of the Common Rules.

The appellants appealed compliance orders issued by Animal Welfare Services regarding the care of approximately 240 sled dogs and 14 horses at their commercial dog sledding and horse-riding facilities.

The Board confirmed the orders relating to the dogs' tether lengths and shelter insulation, finding they did not meet the minimum standards under the Regulation, but varied the order regarding dog house dimensions.

The Board revoked the orders relating to the horses, finding they had adequate natural shelter and no statutory requirement for bedding existed.

The appellants' argument that the inspection warrants violated section 8 of the Charter was dismissed, as the inspectors did not search any dwellings and were authorized to inspect the commercial operation.

Following the dismissal of an appeal as an abuse of process, the Crown sought costs.

The appellant, a declared vexatious litigant, had used an alias to subvert a prior order and commence the appeal without leave.

The court found the appellant's conduct reprehensible and outrageous, warranting full indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 payable to the Crown.

The Crown moved to dismiss an appeal brought by 'Maxine Adwella' against a decision of the Animal Care Review Board regarding the removal of abandoned pets.

The Crown argued that 'Maxine Adwella' was an alias for Althea Reyes, who had previously been declared a vexatious litigant and was prohibited from commencing proceedings without leave.

The court found that the appellant was indeed Althea Reyes using an alias to circumvent the vexatious litigant order.

The appeal was dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1.03(1) and as an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a Hearing Officer's decision finding the respondent police officer not guilty of neglect of duty and deceit under the Police Services Act.

The appellant argued the hearing was procedurally unfair regarding new evidence (scratch notes) and the refusal to allow a witness to testify about GPS data.

The Commission found no procedural unfairness, noting the appellant was provided the new evidence and the Hearing Officer properly exercised her gatekeeper function to exclude irrelevant testimony after the respondent admitted his error.

The Commission declined to re-examine the evidence, deferring to the Hearing Officer's factual findings, and dismissed the appeal.