James Riewald

The applicants brought a motion opposing the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's decision regarding a solicitor's account.

The respondent law firm had charged block fees for mortgage enforcement and power of sale proceedings without recording the time spent by lawyers and clerks.

The Assessment Officer reduced the account by approximately 21% due to the lack of recorded time.

The applicants argued for a further reduction, claiming the Assessment Officer failed to properly weigh the factors from Cohen v. Kealey & Blaney and should have applied a volume discount.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in principle in the Assessment Officer's decision and dismissed the motion.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his claim against CIBC for allegedly damaging his credit rating.

The trial judge had found the claim was statute-barred and that there was no basis in law for finding CIBC liable.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the appellant was aware of his credit issues more than two years before commencing the action, and that the continuous act provisions of the Limitations Act did not apply.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant bank held a mortgage on a condominium owned by the respondent, who defaulted.

After default, the respondent leased the property to another respondent on highly favourable terms.

The bank applied under s. 52 of the Mortgages Act to set aside the tenancy.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding a conflict between s. 52 of the Mortgages Act and the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that there is no conflict because setting aside a tenancy agreement under the Mortgages Act means the tenancy never existed, whereas terminating a tenancy under the Residential Tenancies Act brings a valid tenancy to an end.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his action and granting judgment to the respondent bank for outstanding credit card debt.

The appellant argued that a promotional 2.9% interest rate should have continued to apply to past balances after the introductory period expired, rather than increasing to 19.5%.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was bound by the clear terms of the credit card agreement.

The self-represented appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his action against a mortgage lender for incorrect credit reporting as statute-barred.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to consider whether the claim involved a continuous omission, whether separate injuries arose over time, or whether the appellant's physical condition tolled the limitation period under s. 7(1)(a) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

At a status hearing requiring the plaintiff to show cause why a long-delayed civil action should continue, the court applied the conjunctive test requiring an acceptable explanation for delay and absence of non‑compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The action had experienced approximately ten years of unexplained inactivity between the issuance of the claim and the service of the trial record.

The plaintiff relied on evidence of alcoholism, incarceration, family illness, and lack of funds to explain the delay.

The court held these explanations were unsupported or logically insufficient, particularly where the plaintiff had demonstrated an ability to instruct counsel at other times during the same period.

Having failed to establish an acceptable explanation for the delay, the action was dismissed without considering the prejudice branch of the test.

The applicant mortgagee took possession of a residential property under a power of sale.

Prior to possession, an air conditioner subject to a registered Notice of Security Interest by the respondent was removed by an unknown party.

The respondent refused to discharge its notice without payment from the sale proceeds, arguing a priority dispute under the Personal Property Security Act.

The court held that the PPSA establishes rights for fixtures that exist on properties, and since the fixture was removed, no priority dispute existed.

The respondent was ordered to bear the loss and discharge its interest.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants for default on a mortgage, a line of credit, and a credit card.

The default arose after the defendants failed to pay property tax arrears, prompting the bank to pay the arrears and demand repayment.

The defendants argued they believed the bank was paying the property taxes from their mortgage payments, but provided no evidence to support this claim.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the mortgage documents clearly did not include property taxes, and granted summary judgment in favour of the bank.