Jacob A. Polowin

The applicants sought to sever their property and obtained provisional consent and minor variances from the Committee of Adjustment.

The City subsequently amended its Zoning By-law, rendering the variances unnecessary.

The Committee then changed a condition of the consent to reflect compliance with the amended by-law, deeming the change minor.

The appellant appealed both the minor variance and the change of condition.

The applicants brought a motion to dismiss the appeals.

The Tribunal found the Change of Condition Appeal invalid because the Planning Act does not provide an appeal right for changes deemed minor.

The Tribunal also dismissed the Minor Variance Appeal as moot and lacking any land use planning grounds, since the variances were no longer required.

At a pre-hearing conference in a municipal drain matter, the Tribunal considered whether to accept an appeal purportedly brought under s. 54 of the Drainage Act from the Court of Revision.

The Tribunal held that the moving landowners had not filed an appeal to the Court of Revision and did not dispute their assessment, so there was no appealable decision under s. 54.

The concerns raised to the Court of Revision were outside that body's jurisdiction.

The Tribunal therefore declined to accept the appeal, while indicating that any further challenge to the drainage report would have to proceed, if at all, by a late motion seeking an extension of time for an appeal under ss. 48 and 100.

The Ontario Land Tribunal held a third Case Management Conference regarding multiple appeals against the City of Ottawa's Development Charges By-laws.

The Tribunal noted the withdrawal of two appeals, that six matters remained under active discussion, and that one matter (Chapman Mills) required a hearing.

The Tribunal scheduled a five-day hearing for the Chapman Mills appeal and set a fourth Case Management Conference for the remaining matters.

The appellant appealed the City of Ottawa's refusal to enact zoning by-law amendments to permit a 17-storey hotel at 116 York Street, located near the ByWard Market Heritage Conservation District.

The Tribunal determined that a heritage permit was not required because the heritage district had not been upgraded to a Plan under the Ontario Heritage Act.

However, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the architectural design attempted to respect nearby heritage structures, the proposed height and lack of adequate setbacks constituted overbuilding for the small site and failed to meet urban design guidelines.

The applicant appealed the City of Ottawa Committee of Adjustment's refusal to grant provisional consent and minor variances to create four lots for the construction of four triplexes.

The Tribunal allowed the appeals, finding that the proposed infill development was consistent with the Provincial Policy Statement, conformed to the Official Plan, and that the requested variances for reduced lot width and area were minor and compatible with the existing neighbourhood character.

The applicants, developers in the City of Kingston, challenged the validity of the City's Impost By-law, which imposed fees for the capital costs of water and sewer infrastructure.

The applicants argued that the City was required to impose such fees under the Development Charges Act, 1997, and that the Impost By-law conflicted with that Act, was ultra vires the Municipal Act, 2001, and was discriminatory.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the legislative framework allowed the City to enact the Impost By-law under the Municipal Act, 2001, that there was no conflict with the Development Charges Act, 1997, and that the by-law was neither ultra vires nor discriminatory.

The applicant appealed the City's failure to make a decision on a site plan application for a 1,900-unit residential development.

The sole issue was parkland dedication.

The applicant argued the City was bound by a 2005 Site Plan Agreement (SPA) that required only 2% cash-in-lieu of parkland.

The City sought a 10% dedication based on its current by-law, arguing the 2005 SPA contemplated only commercial/industrial uses.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 2005 SPA was predicated on commercial uses, and under s. 42(7)(b) of the Planning Act, the City had the authority to demand additional parkland conveyance because the lands were now proposed for residential development.

Following a decision regarding the sale of historic properties, the successful applicant Township sought costs of $170,647.85 based on an unaccepted offer to settle.

The respondent Society, a charitable organization, argued each party should bear its own costs.

The court noted both parties had engaged in blameworthy conduct but found the Township's offer to settle was reasonable.

Balancing the Society's charitable status with the costs consequences under Rule 49.10 and Rule 57 factors, the court ordered the Society to pay the Township's costs fixed at $75,000.

The Corporation of Loyalist Township sought to enforce an option to purchase two historic properties (Layer Cake Hall and Old Town Hall) from The Fairfield-Gutzeit Society for a nominal sum of two dollars each.

The Society, which received the properties from the former Village of Bath (predecessor to Loyalist Township) for preservation, had listed them for sale to the general public.

The Township argued this triggered its contractual option to repurchase.

The Society counter-applied, challenging the covenant's validity and enforceability, and seeking vacant possession due to the Township's alleged lease breaches.

The court found the Township's option to purchase was a valid contractual right, not an interest in land or a restrictive covenant, and was triggered by the Society's public listing of the properties.

The court granted specific performance to the Township, entitling it to purchase the properties.

The Township was also found to be in breach of its lease obligations by overholding, but this was deemed of limited consequence given the option to purchase outcome.

Neighbouring homeowners disputed rights over a 14-foot strip of land between their properties containing two abutting driveways.

The respondents claimed a prescriptive easement based on historical use by predecessors in title.

The application judge found the easement had been acquired through the doctrine of lost modern grant and ordered the appellants to remove a fence erected on their property.

The appellants appealed, arguing the requirements for a prescriptive easement had not been met.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the evidence did not establish use "as of right" and that the easement was not reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant property.

The applicants, representing taxi drivers and plate holders, sought to quash the City of Ottawa's 2016 Vehicle-for-Hire By-law, which created a separate regulatory regime for Private Transportation Companies (PTCs) like Uber.

The applicants argued the by-law was enacted in bad faith, granted an illegal bonus to PTCs, and was ultra vires.

The court dismissed the majority of the application, finding the City conducted extensive consultation, acted within its broad regulatory powers, and did not grant an undue advantage.

However, the court severed and quashed two specific provisions that were added to the by-law without notice to the stakeholders.

A utility company and rural municipality disputed cost-sharing for gas pipeline relocation necessitated by municipal drainage works.

The utility sought 35% cost contribution from the municipality under a franchise agreement, while the municipality argued the utility should bear the full cost under section 26 of the Drainage Act.

The application judge held that section 26 of the Act overrode the franchise agreement's cost-sharing provisions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act does not prohibit contracting out of its cost-allocation provisions and that the franchise agreement's cost-sharing mechanism applies to drainage works undertaken by the municipality.

The applicants and respondents are neighbours who share a driveway.

The respondents built a fence down the middle of the driveway on their property line, preventing the applicants from accessing their rear parking spaces.

The applicants brought an application claiming a prescriptive easement over the respondents' portion of the driveway based on the doctrine of lost modern grant.

The court found that the applicants established 20 years of continuous, uninterrupted, open, and peaceful use of the driveway prior to the properties being registered in the land titles system.

The application was granted, and the respondents were ordered to remove the fence.