Igor Ellyn

This motion for supplemental reasons arose from a prior trial where neither party was entirely successful.

Pingyuan Zhao sought judgment for outstanding loans from Pingbo Zhao, repayment of improperly retained cash, and an order for compulsory transfer of Pingbo Zhao's shares in the 51.ca Corporations based on a valuation date of August 28, 2010.

The court granted judgment for the loans (net $81,093.90 plus pre-judgment interest) and repayment of cash ($21,799.54 plus pre-judgment interest), finding Pingbo Zhao liable for these amounts.

However, the court denied the request for a compulsory share transfer, concluding that the conditions for a "just and equitable" winding-up order under section 207(1)(b)(iv) of the OBCA were not met, particularly regarding the proposed valuation date and the lack of agreement between the parties on the relief sought.

No costs were awarded for the motion.

The applicants sought to enforce an arbitration award requiring the respondent to pay a sum determined by a mathematical calculation based on the dwelling's fair cost and a mortgage amount.

The respondent argued a trial was necessary to address issues like the mortgage amount, alleged fraud, and unconscionability.

The court found that the arbitration agreement clearly outlined the payment mechanism and the arbitrator's limited role.

It determined that the "forensic machinery of a trial" was not required, as the contractual issue could be resolved by reviewing the existing evidence.

The court enforced the award, ordering the respondent to pay the calculated difference and arbitration costs.

The applicant and respondent are brothers who were involved in a website business directed toward immigrants from mainland China.

The applicant claimed that the business was operated as a partnership in which he held a 40% interest, or alternatively, that he was a 40% shareholder in the corporations owning the business, and sought dissolution or an oppression remedy.

The respondent cross-applied, seeking a declaration that he owned 85% of the shares and an order requiring the applicant to sell his 15% shareholding due to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and oppression.

The court found that the applicant was an independent contractor, not a partner or employee, and dismissed his claims for partnership dissolution, wrongful dismissal, and oppression.

The court also dismissed the respondent's cross-application for a forced buyout of the applicant's shares, finding no breach of fiduciary duty or oppression by the applicant in his capacity as a director.

Both the application and cross-application were largely dismissed, save for some specific monetary accounting.

The plaintiff estate trustee brought an action regarding the proceeds from the sale of a property jointly developed by the deceased and the defendant, her former common-law partner.

The defendant relied on a cohabitation agreement that provided property division would be determined solely by legal ownership.

The plaintiff relied on a subsequent oral property development agreement, confirmed in writing by the defendant, that provided for the return of investments and equal sharing of profits.

The court found that neither party understood the cohabitation agreement to apply to their property development activities and set it aside in part under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The court awarded the plaintiff $3,145,682.88 based on the property development agreement.

Following a lengthy commercial dispute and trial judgment, the defendants wrote to the court alleging a calculation error in the trial decision and seeking informal remediation without bringing a formal motion.

The court considered whether to exercise its authority under r. 59.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend, set aside, or vary the order.

Emphasizing the strong policy of finality in litigation and the narrow scope of the rule, the court held that such powers should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances.

The proposed recalculation was considered too complex and inappropriate to undertake at that late stage.

The court declined to revisit the judgment and noted the parties had remedies elsewhere.

The applicants built a house on the respondent's property.

After a falling out, the parties agreed to arbitrate the fair cost of construction using a quantity surveyor.

The arbitrator issued a draft reproduction estimate, but the respondent terminated his counsel and refused to participate further, alleging bias and procedural unfairness.

The applicants sought to enforce the final arbitral award, while the respondent sought a declaration that he was not bound by it.

The court dismissed the respondent's claims of bias and jurisdictional overreach, finding the Arbitration Act applied.

However, because the final award failed to explicitly state its reasons, the court remitted it to the arbitrator to formally attach the reproduction estimate as reasons.

Following a lengthy oppression remedy trial involving a shareholder dispute in a real estate investment company, the court determined the appropriate costs award and interest payable after judgment.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $1.3 million, alleging reprehensible litigation conduct by the defendants.

The court rejected the request for elevated costs and held that partial indemnity costs were appropriate, emphasizing proportionality, the plaintiffs’ limited success compared to the amounts claimed, and duplication resulting from multiple counsel.

The court also addressed costs related to several pretrial motions, expert witness fees, and disbursements, reducing certain expert accounts and awarding the defendants $5,000 for a post‑judgment remediation motion.

Prejudgment and postjudgment interest were fixed under the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiffs moved to amend post-trial reasons to obtain a formal adjudication of the phrase “the necessary funds” in a shareholders’ agreement, or alternatively to recalculate share value by treating cash calls entirely as equity.

The court held that the requested procedure was inappropriate because the moving parties had appeal rights and the authorities relied on were distinguishable.

The court further observed that the interpretation now advanced had been implicitly rejected, was not grounded in the trial record, was not within the parties’ reasonable contemplation when negotiating the agreement, and was not reflected in the pleadings.

The alternative valuation argument was also rejected because it had been abandoned at trial and was inconsistent with the moving parties’ prior position.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff, a minority shareholder in a closely held real estate joint venture, brought an oppression action against the majority shareholders.

The dispute arose after the plaintiff was forced to resign as a director following allegations of misappropriating a minor corporate opportunity.

Subsequently, the defendants made two cash calls and granted a mortgage that significantly diluted the plaintiff's interest in the corporation.

The court found that the defendants' actions, particularly the granting of a mortgage for an amount greater than the corporation's immediate needs, unfairly disregarded the plaintiff's interests and constituted oppression under s. 248 of the OBCA.

The court ordered the defendants to buy out the plaintiff's shares at a valuation of $858,468.31, awarded the plaintiff a portion of a deferred management fee, and ordered two of the defendants to pay $25,000 in punitive damages for their reprehensible conduct.

In a case‑managed Commercial List proceeding, the successful parties sought full indemnity costs following success on a motion to compel production of documents and to resist a motion for bifurcation.

The court emphasized that case management aims to ensure timely, fair, and cost‑effective resolution of civil disputes and that parties are expected to resolve procedural disputes informally where possible.

The court held that litigation conduct undermining case‑management objectives—such as unreasonable resistance to documentary production or attempts to derail an agreed timetable—may justify elevated cost sanctions even absent traditional “reprehensible” conduct.

Applying Rule 57 factors and proportionality principles, the court found the requested costs reasonable.

Full indemnity costs were therefore awarded.

Following a successful application under the Competition Act resulting in restitution orders and administrative monetary penalties against multiple respondents, the applicant sought partial indemnity costs of $231,768.35.

One respondent opposed the request, arguing the matter was over-lawyered, that legal research disbursements should be excluded, and that costs should be apportioned based on the relative administrative monetary penalties imposed.

The court accepted that the proceeding was complex and a matter of first impression requiring extensive investigation and research, but found some duplication of work by counsel.

The court reduced the overall fees by 15% while allowing the legal research disbursement.

Costs were ordered jointly and severally against the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order imposing a $500,000 administrative monetary penalty for misleading business practices under the Competition Act.

He argued he was deprived of a fair hearing due to ineffective counsel and sought to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge had no independent obligation to adjourn the hearing to allow the appellant to adduce evidence.

The court also upheld the quantum of the penalty and refused to admit the fresh evidence, as it would not have affected the result.

Following a motion in which the plaintiffs were completely successful, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The court considered the defendants’ extensive submissions that went beyond the jurisdictional issues raised by the motion and addressed the merits of the case.

Applying the principles governing costs awards and recognizing the additional time and materials used by the defendants, the court held that costs somewhat above the partial indemnity scale were appropriate.

The plaintiffs were awarded a fixed all-inclusive costs amount payable within 30 days.

The defendants brought a motion to stay the plaintiffs' action based on a lack of jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and abuse of process.

The plaintiffs alleged they released their interest in Ontario lands based on fraudulent misrepresentations regarding real estate and escrow funds in Dubai.

The court found a real and substantial connection to Ontario, noting the alleged fraud occurred in Ontario, the contract was governed by Ontario law, and the defendants attorned to the jurisdiction by arguing the merits of the claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Ontario was the appropriate forum and the claim was not an abuse of process.

The judgment debtors moved under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act to stay enforcement of a judgment and the scheduled sheriff’s auction of a residential property pursuant to a writ of seizure and sale.

They argued equitable considerations, including a potential future claim for overpayments under earlier share purchase agreements that might support a set‑off against the judgment.

The court held that a stay of execution of a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy exercised only in rare circumstances where enforcement would be oppressive, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The proposed claim was speculative, likely statute‑barred, unrelated to the subject matter of the judgment, and raised only as a last‑minute attempt to delay enforcement.

The court concluded that enforcement was not oppressive and that a stay would instead cause injustice to the judgment creditors.

The appellant appealed an order allowing the respondent to enforce an arbitration award.

The appellant argued that enforcement should be refused on public policy grounds under art. 36(1)(b)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law because the respondent had brought related proceedings in the United Kingdom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a legal dispute over choice of law and legal rights does not rise to the level of a public policy violation sufficient to defeat the enforcement of an arbitration award.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding his employment termination.

On appeal, he raised a new issue claiming entitlement to stock options promised in his employment letter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the options were not granted until the end of his probationary period and did not start to vest until a year later, which was well after his employment had terminated.

The appellant defaulted on two mortgages over her home.

The respondent mortgagee issued a notice of power of sale and entered into an agreement of purchase and sale with a third party.

The appellant's application to enjoin the sale was dismissed.

On appeal, the appellant argued there was no admissible evidence of a valid sale and that the sale was a sham at an undervalue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding adequate evidence of the sale and no evidence of fraud, bad faith, or a sham transaction.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing the respondent breached fiduciary duties through non-disclosure of financial dealings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant knew of the non-disclosure and the additional mortgages, yet chose to compromise his claim and sign a release with the benefit of legal advice.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed for failing to meet the Palmer test.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment holding him personally liable for a corporate debt of $89,969.11 based on a standard form contract.

The Court of Appeal found the contract ambiguous, as the signature line indicated he was signing in a representative capacity, contradicting a clause imposing personal liability.

Applying the doctrine of contra proferentem, and noting the respondent failed to draw the appellant's attention to the personal liability clause in what was presented as a credit application, the Court allowed the appeal.

The action against the appellant personally was dismissed.