H.M. Pierce

The appellant pleaded guilty to uttering threats, theft, and fraud.

He appealed the one-year custodial sentence imposed for uttering threats, which arose from Twitter posts expressing support for ISIS and offering to ensure 'something happens' if given Canadian addresses.

The appellant, an Aboriginal man with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, had already served the sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice exercised its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

The court found the sentencing judge erred in principle by overemphasizing denunciation and deterrence based on public sensitivity to terrorism, noting the appellant's cognitive limitations, lack of sophistication, and the limited public alarm caused by his actions.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served (four months).

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the respondent, an Indigenous man convicted of sexual assault.

The respondent had a lengthy criminal record involving 18 violent offences over nearly 30 years.

The court considered Gladue factors but found the respondent's severe childhood trauma did not mitigate the high risk of future violent and sexual re-offending.

The court declared the respondent a dangerous offender based on a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding that lesser measures would not adequately protect the public.

The plaintiff landlord sued the defendant tenant, a dental corporation, for breach of a commercial lease after the tenant abandoned the premises and stopped paying rent.

The tenant counterclaimed, arguing the landlord fundamentally breached the lease due to pest infestations, garbage, improper back charges, and unreasonably withholding consent to sublet.

The court found no fundamental breach, noting the tenant continued to operate for years despite the alleged issues and failed to provide sufficient information for proposed sublets.

The court also found the landlord reasonably mitigated its damages.

The landlord was awarded $86,615.97 for unpaid rent, utilities, and the cost of removing tenant improvements.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The charge, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, remained outstanding for approximately 905 days from arrest to the hearing of the application.

The court applied the Morin framework and found extensive delay attributable to the Crown, particularly relating to late and incomplete disclosure and failures to attend scheduling courts.

Institutional delays also contributed, while only limited time was waived by the accused.

The court concluded the Morin guidelines were exceeded and the delay was unreasonable, warranting a stay of proceedings.

The applicant, a police officer charged with trafficking oxycodone, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the date of the charges to the hearing of the application was approximately 45 months.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that the majority of the delay was attributable to the applicant's actions, including changing counsel multiple times, and waiver by defence counsel.

The court concluded that the remaining institutional and Crown delay fell within acceptable guidelines and dismissed the application.

The plaintiff, a not-for-profit corporation representing aboriginal communities, brought an action for trespass and damages against the defendants, who claimed to be the elected representatives of a member First Nation.

The plaintiff moved to strike portions of the defendants' statement of defence and their entire counterclaim.

The court struck certain paragraphs of the statement of defence that pleaded irrelevancies, with leave to amend one paragraph.

The court also struck the counterclaim in its entirety, finding that claims for interference in an election or internal governance are not causes of action known to law, and that the allegations of defamation and injurious falsehood lacked the necessary elements and particulars.

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after deliberately using a vehicle to intimidate and cut off a cyclist during a dispute arising from a drug transaction.

The collision propelled the cyclist into a building, causing fatal head injuries.

The court considered Gladue factors, including the accused’s Indigenous background, family circumstances, addiction history, and efforts at rehabilitation.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the deliberate endangerment of road users and the decision to flee the scene, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence.

Consecutive sentences were ordered for criminal negligence causing death and leaving the scene.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to strike portions of a reply in a defamation action.

The underlying action alleged defamatory statements and economic interference arising from publications about forestry practices in the Canadian boreal forest.

The reply pleading introduced allegations concerning a decades-long history of alleged unlawful campaigns by environmental organizations unrelated to the pleaded claim.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge’s order permitting the expanded reply because it risked significantly broadening the scope of the litigation beyond the pleaded dispute.

Leave to appeal was granted given the importance of defining the permissible scope of reply pleadings and the risk of prejudice, delay, and unnecessary litigation costs.

In a wrongful dismissal action with a counterclaim alleging conversion of drilling equipment, the plaintiff sought leave under Rule 36.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to examine two non‑party witnesses before trial in order to preserve their testimony.

The witnesses were elderly and resided outside the jurisdiction, and one had a history of medical issues.

The court considered the discretionary factors under Rule 36.01(3), including convenience, risk of unavailability, and the uncertain timing of trial.

Finding no prejudice to the defendants and recognizing the prudence of preserving evidence while memories were fresh, the court granted leave for the videotaped examinations before trial.

The parties separated after a long-term marriage.

The husband subsequently declared bankruptcy, leaving the wife solely responsible for their joint debts, and defaulted on the mortgage of the matrimonial home, triggering a power of sale that depleted the home's equity.

The court dismissed both parties' claims for retroactive child support.

The court awarded the wife retroactive spousal support from the date of the husband's bankruptcy, ongoing compensatory spousal support of $900 per month, and an unequal division of net family property due to the husband's unconscionable depletion of family assets.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their slip and fall action for delay.

The action was dismissed after plaintiffs' counsel failed to set the matter down for trial or respond to a status notice due to inadvertence.

The court applied the Reid criteria and found that while inadvertence was shown, the motion was not brought promptly and the defendants would suffer significant prejudice.

The defendants had lost their ability to crossclaim against a co-defendant who was responsible for maintaining the premises, and maintenance records and witnesses were no longer available.

The motion to set aside the dismissal was dismissed.

The accused brought a constitutional application alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter following a roadside stop, detention, arrest, and search that led to the discovery of marijuana in a vehicle.

Police stopped the vehicle while investigating a reported gasoline theft based on a vague suspect description and observations they considered suspicious.

The court found the officers lacked reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was connected to the reported offence, rendering the investigative detention arbitrary.

Because the detention and arrest were unlawful, the subsequent search of the vehicle and seizure of marijuana were also unlawful.

Applying the s. 24(2) test from Grant, the court excluded the seized marijuana and the accused’s statements as admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

In a corporate governance dispute among shareholders and directors of closely held corporations, the individual plaintiffs moved for an order appointing independent counsel to oversee and control the corporate plaintiffs.

The applicants argued that independent counsel was necessary to represent the corporations’ interests where conflicts existed between shareholders and directors.

The court held that appointing independent counsel would add cost and delay while providing no practical benefit, particularly because the corporate claims had been stayed and any counsel would require instructions from directors who were defendants in the litigation.

The court concluded that such counsel would face an unavoidable conflict of interest and could not act effectively.

The motion was therefore dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle collision on the basis that the plaintiff was operating an uninsured vehicle.

The defendants relied on s. 267.6(1) of the Insurance Act and evidence indicating the vehicle was not insured and not properly registered to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff argued that his proof of insurance was destroyed in a post‑collision fire and that his memory loss prevented him from identifying his insurer.

The court held the defendants established a prima facie case that the plaintiff was uninsured and that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence capable of showing a genuine issue for trial.

As a result, the statutory bar against recovery applied and the claim was dismissed on summary judgment.

The court determined costs arising from three related procedural motions in a partnership dispute among lawyers.

One motion compelled the departing partner to attend cross‑examination on an affidavit filed in a pending summary judgment motion; another sought a further and better affidavit of documents; and a third sought removal of a lawyer as solicitor of record.

The court addressed whether a represented lawyer‑litigant could recover costs for personal legal work performed on the file.

Applying authority including Fong v. Chan, the court held that a represented litigant who is a lawyer cannot recover personal time at counsel rates without proof of opportunity cost.

The court further emphasized the principle of reasonableness in costs and reduced the amounts claimed, awarding limited costs on the first two motions and none on the solicitor‑removal motion.

Following dismissal of a civil action alleging assault, unlawful arrest and detention, and breaches of Charter rights against several police-related defendants, the successful defendants sought costs of a ten‑day trial.

The plaintiff opposed the amount, arguing the bill of costs was excessive, that some issues were not fully successful, and that personal financial hardship should mitigate the award.

The court reviewed the lengthy procedural history, the defendants’ partial indemnity rates, the existence of a prior offer to settle, and the defendants’ complete success on the core liability issues.

Finding the bill of costs reasonable and modest given the complexity and duration of the proceeding, and noting the absence of evidence supporting impecuniosity, the court awarded the defendants their costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, inducing breach of contract, intentional interference with economic relations, and claims for aggravated and punitive damages arising from a failed joint venture concerning a key‑cutting machine.

Applying the “plain and obvious” test from Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., the court held that the pleadings sufficiently disclosed causes of action for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and inducement of breach of contract.

However, the claims for intentional interference with economic relations and interference with prospective economic relations were struck as they lacked the necessary allegations that a third party had an actionable claim against the defendant.

Claims for aggravated and punitive damages were also struck for lack of particularization but with leave to amend.

Certain evidentiary paragraphs were struck for breaching pleading rules.

The plaintiff managed a resort under an oral commission-based agreement and sued following termination of the relationship.

The court determined the plaintiff was an independent contractor rather than a dependent contractor and therefore not entitled to reasonable notice of termination.

The defendants breached the agreement by failing to pay commissions on revenues received prior to termination, and were also liable for modest damages for conversion of personal property and for unjust enrichment relating to additional services performed as the defendants’ de facto Canadian agent.

The court rejected claims for further commissions, punitive damages, and most conversion damages.

The defendants succeeded on a counterclaim for possession of two boat motors.

During a lawful strike at the plaintiff’s manufacturing facility, the employer sought variation of a prior court order governing picketing and requested an injunction against certain strike activities.

Evidence showed incidents of delay, intimidation, and obstruction at the picket line, including targeted delays of supervisory staff and confrontations with delivery vehicles and bus passengers.

The court emphasized that picketing is constitutionally protected expressive activity but may be limited where unlawful conduct occurs.

Applying the modified interlocutory injunction test for labour disputes, the court held that the threshold requirement of demonstrating unsuccessful reasonable efforts to obtain police assistance had not been met.

The injunction was denied, but the court varied earlier orders to simplify wait‑time rules, expand the pedestrian corridor for bus passengers, and clarify police enforcement obligations.

Owners of forested property commenced an action alleging neighbouring landowners constructed a roadway that encroached onto their land, cutting trees and altering the terrain.

The defendants denied liability and advanced a counterclaim for defamation arising from letters sent to neighbours describing the dispute.

The court accepted survey evidence establishing that a road approximately six metres wide encroached for nearly 200 metres onto the plaintiffs’ land and concluded the defendants intentionally continued using the road despite notice and a court order.

The court found the conduct constituted trespass and awarded compensatory damages for rehabilitation costs, survey expenses, and related losses, as well as damages at large and punitive damages.

The counterclaim in defamation was dismissed for lack of evidence of defamatory publication or reputational harm.