Arthur Hamilton

Following the dismissal of both the appellant's appeal and the respondent's cross-motion for leave to appeal costs, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The self-represented respondent sought approximately $40,000 in costs, claiming lost remuneration as a contractor.

The appellant argued for no costs due to divided success.

The Court of Appeal ordered no costs of the appeal, finding that success was divided and noting the additional time incurred due to the respondent's late filing of the cross-motion.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff contractor's defamation action.

The action arose from an email the defendant sent to his spouse expressing dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's renovation work.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the email was a private communication between spouses and did not constitute an expression on a matter of public interest.

No costs were awarded.

Following a jurisdiction motion where the defendant insurers successfully argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the proposed class actions, the insurers sought costs of approximately $620,000.

The court found this request preposterous and excessive, fixing costs payable by the plaintiffs to the 13 non-settling insurers at $28,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The costs payable by the government regulator to the plaintiffs were settled at $12,500.

The plaintiffs filed proposed class actions against 15 auto insurers and the provincial regulator, FSCO, alleging improper deduction of HST from statutory accident benefits.

The defendant insurers brought motions to dismiss the actions for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) has exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes.

The court agreed, dismissing the actions against the insurers and refusing to approve two early settlements, as the claims fell squarely within the LAT's exclusive jurisdiction under s. 280 of the Insurance Act.

However, the court found it had jurisdiction to hear the claims against FSCO for regulatory negligence, as those allegations did not directly concern benefit entitlements or amounts.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory injunction and the granting of the defendant's motion to stay the action based on an arbitration clause, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendant and IWS sought substantial indemnity costs, alleging the plaintiff made baseless claims of deceitful behaviour and brought a tactical motion.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the allegations did not rise to the necessary level.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, fixing the defendant's costs at $35,000 and IWS's costs at $9,000, noting the motions were important and of more than average complexity.

The moving parties (the Donato Parties) sought an order enforcing an arbitrator's confidentiality decision and sealing the arbitral award so it would not form part of the public record in the appeal proceedings.

The court applied the Sierra Club test for confidentiality orders and found that the moving parties failed to establish a serious risk to an important commercial interest that required protection.

The court held that the general public interest in encouraging private arbitration does not automatically justify a sealing order when an arbitral award is appealed to the court.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant appealed an arbitrator's decision granting a confidentiality order and permanent injunction against the applicant and its counsel for publishing a press release linking to an arbitral award.

The court determined the standard of review was reasonableness.

The court found the arbitrator did not err in interpreting the arbitration agreement's confidentiality provisions, in excluding certain extrinsic evidence, in finding a breach of confidentiality, or in granting a permanent injunction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to strike portions of a reply in a defamation action.

The underlying action alleged defamatory statements and economic interference arising from publications about forestry practices in the Canadian boreal forest.

The reply pleading introduced allegations concerning a decades-long history of alleged unlawful campaigns by environmental organizations unrelated to the pleaded claim.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge’s order permitting the expanded reply because it risked significantly broadening the scope of the litigation beyond the pleaded dispute.

Leave to appeal was granted given the importance of defining the permissible scope of reply pleadings and the risk of prejudice, delay, and unnecessary litigation costs.

The defendants brought a motion to strike several paragraphs of the plaintiffs' Reply under Rule 25.11, arguing they were irrelevant, scandalous, and would prejudice the fair trial.

The plaintiffs also sought leave to amend their Reply to add a new paragraph.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the impugned paragraphs were a proper response to the defendants' pleading of a 'moral and social duty' and 'public interest' in their Statement of Defence.

The court also granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their Reply, finding no prejudice to the defendants.

The defendants brought a Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion to strike portions of the statement of claim alleging intentional interference with economic relations in a defamation action.

They argued the plaintiffs failed to plead the constituent elements of the tort, including unlawful means directed at a third party and resulting economic loss.

The court held that the pleadings, read generously and together with the particulars provided, sufficiently alleged the elements of the tort, including allegations of intimidation and pressure directed at customers.

It was not plain and obvious that the claim would fail.

The motion to strike was therefore dismissed.

Following a trial judgment awarding over $16 million to the plaintiff in a commercial dispute, the court determined the appropriate costs award and prejudgment interest.

The court held that although the plaintiff’s Rule 49 offer was served slightly outside the formal timing requirements, it could still be considered under Rules 57.01 and 49.13.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded from the date of the settlement offer and for work responding to a serious trading‑manipulation allegation later abandoned by the defendant.

However, the court found the plaintiff’s claimed hours excessive and reduced the requested fees.

The court fixed total fees at $1,400,000 inclusive of taxes, allowed disbursements of $191,813, and awarded prejudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date the cause of action arose.

The plaintiff, a junior oil and gas exploration company, sued the defendant underwriter for breach of a 'bought deal' engagement letter.

The defendant failed to close the transaction, arguing the letter was merely an agreement to agree and relying on 'out clauses' due to a drop in oil prices.

The court found the engagement letter was a binding contract and that the defendant could not rely on the out clauses, as it had not negotiated an underwriting agreement and the drop in oil prices did not constitute a material adverse change or disaster.

The plaintiff was awarded over $16 million in damages, representing the difference between the contract price and the replacement financing price, plus interim loan costs.

During the first week of trial, the defendant moved to amend its statement of defence and counterclaim to add new factual allegations and a mitigation defence relating to transactions undertaken by the plaintiff after the alleged breach of a share purchase agreement.

The court considered whether the proposed amendments disclosed a tenable defence, including arguments that damages should be assessed at the date of trial due to the plaintiff’s claim for specific performance and that subsequent transactions mitigated any losses.

The court held that damages for breach of contract would normally be assessed at the date of breach and that the proposed allegations concerning the plaintiff’s later transactions were irrelevant to the proper measure of damages.

The proposed amendments concerning the Red Willow transaction and complete mitigation did not raise a tenable defence and were refused.