Hamoody Hassan

The applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis of $186,101.56 or partial indemnity basis of $122,951.98 following her substantial success at a family law trial.

The court noted the respondent's unreasonable positions and failure to make or respond to offers to settle, which prolonged the litigation.

However, the court found the applicant's claimed 450 hours of lawyer time to be excessive and noted jurisdictional issues regarding costs for motions heard in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $73,410.05, inclusive of disbursements and HST, to be enforced as a support order.

Following an interim custody motion where the applicant maternal aunt was awarded primary care of the child and the respondent father was awarded access, the court determined costs.

The court found the applicant was more successful and presumptively entitled to costs, despite divided success.

Considering the unreasonable behaviour of both parties and the excessive time spent, the court fixed costs at $7,000 payable by the respondent father to the applicant.

Applicants sought sole custody of a child born in Nunavut who had been in their care since shortly after birth.

The biological parents consented to the applicants having custody and provided executed consents supported by certificates of independent legal advice.

The court reviewed prior concerns regarding the removal of the child from Nunavut, compliance with documentation requirements under the Children’s Law Reform Act, and the involvement of child protection authorities.

Evidence confirmed the applicants complied with statutory requirements and that the child was thriving in their care.

Applying the best interests test under s. 24(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court granted a final custody order to the applicants.

Interim custody motion concerning a young child following a serious assault allegedly committed by the mother, who was subsequently charged under the Criminal Code and remained in custody.

The child’s maternal aunt and the father each sought interim custody.

The court applied the best interests of the child analysis under s. 24(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act, emphasizing stability, existing relationships, and the importance of maintaining elements of the child’s status quo following a traumatic event.

Given the father’s prolonged absence from the child’s life and the child’s strong integration into the aunt’s household and community, the court found it inappropriate to change the child’s principal residence on an interim basis.

The child was ordered to remain primarily with the aunt while the father received structured parenting time pending further investigation by the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The applicant mother sought to enforce a 1992 child support claim and calculate arrears for two children, now adults.

The respondent father had been a cab driver for many years and had periods of unemployment and underemployment.

The court analyzed the children's eligibility for support over a 23-year period, finding they were only eligible during months they were actually enrolled in full-time education due to sporadic attendance and significant employment income.

The court imputed the father's income at $34,000 for his cab driving years and credited him for direct payments made.

The applicant's claim for $53,891 in arrears was reduced to $1,072.

The respondent father added his father-in-law as a party to the family law proceeding, alleging the father-in-law exerted duress regarding a separation agreement and consent to the mother's relocation with the children.

The father-in-law brought a motion to be removed as a party.

The court granted the motion, finding that the father-in-law was merely a witness and that no foundational cause of action was pleaded against him, as duress is not a free-standing tort.

During an appeal from a child protection judgment, the father brought a motion alleging the child protection agency and the mother breached a court order by failing to facilitate access with the child, and sought a defined weekly access order pending the appeal.

The court found no breach of any order, as the earlier endorsement only required the agency to investigate and arrange a possible meeting rather than mandate access.

The motion judge reviewed the extensive factual findings of the trial judge, including that the child had experienced emotional harm and expressed genuine fear of the father, and that forced access could cause further harm.

Applying s. 69(4) of the Child and Family Services Act, the court held that ordering access contrary to the child’s wishes would not be in the child’s best interests.

The request for access and the request for appointment of a case management judge were dismissed.

The children's aid society appealed the dismissal of its child protection application regarding three children.

The respondent father brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing there were no current protection concerns.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the appeal lacked merit and that, in the absence of any evidence of existing child protection concerns, proceeding with the appeal would be contrary to the best interests of the children and the administration of justice.

Following a 154‑day child protection trial, the father sought full indemnity costs exceeding $3 million against the Children’s Aid Society and the mother.

The court found the mother had acted in bad faith by advancing false allegations that fueled prolonged litigation.

The court further concluded the Society breached its statutory duties by failing to conduct an objective investigation, withholding disclosure, and advocating for the mother rather than reassessing its case as contrary evidence emerged.

While rejecting costs against counsel for the children or the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, the court held that the Society bore the greatest responsibility for the extraordinary length and expense of the proceedings.

Costs were fixed at just over $2 million, apportioned 70% to the Society and 30% to the mother.

In a child protection proceeding arising from a high-conflict custody and access dispute, the court determined costs following an earlier order granting the father unsupervised access to the children.

The father sought substantial indemnity costs of $22,000 against the mother, while the mother argued for no costs or that the issue be reserved.

Applying rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and recognizing that the usual presumption of costs does not apply in protection cases, the court considered the parties’ conduct, the limited success achieved, and the modest means of both parents.

Although the father obtained some success on the access issue, both parties had engaged in past unreasonable conduct contributing to the conflict.

The court awarded a modest costs amount payable at the conclusion of the protection proceeding.

Prospective adoptive parents sought custody of a newborn child whom they had taken into their care shortly after birth in Nunavut pursuant to an informal arrangement with the biological parents.

The court raised serious concerns about the irregular process, including lack of personal service, absence of corroborating evidence confirming the biological parents’ identities, incomplete police record checks, and insufficient information regarding a prior child protection investigation.

The court also noted potential legal issues under the Child and Family Services Act regarding private placement of a child for adoption by non‑relatives.

Given the child was already residing in Ontario and decisions were required for the child’s care, the court granted interim interim custody on a without prejudice basis.

The applicants were ordered to obtain additional documentation, effect proper personal service on the respondents, and provide corroborating evidence from the Children’s Aid Society before the matter could proceed.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal portions of an earlier order concerning security for child support and related procedural matters involving a foreign support order.

The court considered whether failure to register a German support order under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002 constituted a jurisdictional defect invalidating the earlier order.

The court held that any deficiencies in complying with the statutory procedure were procedural irregularities capable of being cured nunc pro tunc and not jurisdictional prerequisites.

The motion was characterized as a collateral attack on an earlier order that had not been appealed, and the court found no basis to interfere with the discretion exercised by the earlier judge.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The applicant child protection agency brought an application regarding three children, while the parents concurrently sought a divorce, custody, and property division.

Following a 154-day trial, the court dismissed the protection application, finding that the mother had made false allegations of domestic violence against the father and had a significant, unacknowledged alcohol problem.

The court awarded sole custody of the youngest child to the father, with restricted access for the mother, and ordered the mother to pay child support for all three children.

The court also determined that funds in the father's offshore account were held in a resulting trust and excluded from his net family property.

The parents and two First Nations appealed a trial decision making two First Nations children Crown wards with no access for the purpose of adoption.

The appellants argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact, erred in finding Crown wardship was the least restrictive alternative, and that the mother received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, which included significant parenting deficits, developmental delays that improved in care, and the need for stability.

The court also admitted fresh evidence but concluded it did not warrant a new trial or a change to the order, affirming that Crown wardship with no access remained in the children's best interests.

During a highly complex and lengthy child protection trial, the oldest child turned 18.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion to vary the order appointing a lawyer for the child and to remove the OCL as his legal representative, arguing that the child was no longer a 'child' under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found that while the child aged out of the statutory provisions, fairness and due process required his continued legal representation.

The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to order that the child's lawyer continue to represent him and that the OCL continue to fund the representation until the completion of the trial.

The respondent father brought motions for interim child support and production of police records.

The applicant mother brought a cross-motion to dismiss the respondent's motions and to prohibit him from bringing further motions pursuant to subrules 1(8), 14(21), and 14(23) of the Family Law Rules.

The court dismissed the respondent's motions, noting his claims for child support had already been dismissed on a final basis and the requested police records were irrelevant.

Finding that the respondent had a history of failing to obey court orders, including an unpaid civil judgment for assault, and had abused the court process by bringing meritless motions, the court ordered that the respondent is prohibited from bringing any further motions without prior leave of the court.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claims for spousal support, a restraining order, and a $24,000 lump sum pursuant to a marriage contract.

The Divisional Court determined it lacked jurisdiction under section 19(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act because the total monetary value of the claims could not be ascertained to be under $25,000.

The court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario pursuant to section 110 of the Courts of Justice Act.