Ground

Following a successful appeal, the appellants sought costs of $42,000 and $15,000 to $22,500 respectively.

The respondents argued the claims were excessive.

The Divisional Court considered the complexity of the Human Rights Code issues and the unusual circumstance of the Tribunal accidentally losing the record, which increased preparation time.

However, noting the similarity of interests between the two appellants and the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable to the losing party, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale of $10,000 to each appellant.

Following a successful appeal regarding entitlements under the Employment Standards Act, the appellant sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $31,000 for the entire action.

The respondent argued for no costs or partial indemnity costs of $5,000.

The Divisional Court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, noting the offers to settle did not strictly comply with Rule 49.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonable expectations, the court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs fixed at $4,500 for the motion and $6,000 for the appeal, plus disbursements.

The appellant employee appealed a decision dismissing his motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal damages and ESA entitlements.

The motion judge had held that ESA standards were only enforceable through administrative procedures and were alternatives to common law damages.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that ESA entitlements can be claimed in a civil action and are not subject to mitigation, as they are statutory minimums, not damages.

The Court granted summary judgment for the outstanding balance of the appellant's ESA entitlements.

Following an appeal of a professional discipline decision where the appellant succeeded on one of twelve grounds, both parties sought costs.

The Divisional Court found that success was not evenly divided, as the appellant failed to upset the basic findings of professional misconduct against him.

The Court awarded costs to the respondent College on a partial indemnity basis, reduced to reflect the appellant's limited success, fixing the amount at $9,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The successful respondents sought costs of the appeal in the amount of $23,013.02 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants argued the amount was excessive and suggested $6,731.58.

The Divisional Court found the respondents' claim high given the narrow and straightforward issue on appeal.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the court fixed costs at $12,000 all inclusive.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board decision that upheld a union grievance after the employer's consultant destroyed interview notes.

The Board found that the destruction of these documents irreparably prejudiced the union's case and prevented a fair hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Board did not deny natural justice by deciding the matter on a preliminary fairness issue without hearing the merits.

The Court further held that the Board had the implied statutory authority to enforce disclosure obligations by allowing the grievance.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Transportation's decision to deny him a religious exemption from the requirement to have a digital photograph on his driver's licence.

He argued the requirement violated his freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter, citing beliefs based on the Book of Revelations and the Second Commandment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that his objection was based on a sincere religious belief, noting inconsistencies in his practices and evidence that his true concerns were secular privacy issues.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing her complaint that her union breached its duty of fair representation under s. 74 of the Labour Relations Act.

The Divisional Court applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review.

The Court found that the Board was fully cognizant of the relevant facts and legal principles, and its decision was not patently unreasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant denturist appealed a Discipline Committee's findings of professional misconduct and the resulting penalty.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings of misconduct, which included fabricating inadequate dentures, poor record-keeping, and secretly tape-recording a conversation with a patient.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that evidence was obtained through an unlawful warrantless search and seizure, noting the items were voluntarily supplied or in plain view.

However, because the Committee's reasons contained factual errors regarding the timing of the denture fabrication and the appellant's practices after taking remedial courses, the court remitted the matter of penalty to the Committee for reconsideration.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment regarding the equalization of net family property and time-limited spousal support.

The Divisional Court first determined it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 19(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the net payment ordered by the trial judge was under $25,000, despite the amount in dispute being much higher.

On the merits, the court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's property division was supported by evidence and that time-limited spousal support was appropriate given the husband's failure to rehabilitate himself and his persistent prescription drug abuse.

The defendant appealed a Master's order dismissing her motion for leave to issue a third party claim.

The Master had dismissed the motion due to an 18-month delay, finding the defendant failed to prove there would be no prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the onus is on the opposing party to establish prejudice, and the plaintiffs had not opposed the original motion.

The court found the delay would not cause undue prejudice that could not be compensated by costs, and granted leave to issue the third party claim to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The respondent school board brought a motion to strike paragraphs of an affidavit filed by the applicant union in support of an application for judicial review of an arbitration award.

The arbitration award upheld the termination of a teacher.

The union argued the affidavit was necessary to show the arbitrator's findings of fact were unsupported by evidence.

The court held the motion was not premature and struck the paragraphs, finding there was no basis in law under the Keeprite test to admit the affidavit to augment the record, as there was ample evidence before the arbitrator to support the findings.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motions to strike portions of the plaintiff's statements of claim in two related defamation actions.

The primary issue was whether the plaintiff could salvage a defamation claim regarding radio broadcasts by commencing a second action after failing to provide the required Section 5 notice under the Libel and Slander Act prior to the first action.

The court granted leave to appeal the refusal to strike the paragraphs in the second action relating to the radio broadcasts, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and noting the issue's importance to the administration of justice.

Leave to appeal was denied on the other grounds.

The applicant brought a motion to stay ongoing discipline proceedings before a hearing panel of the Law Society of Upper Canada pending a proposed application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, applying the established principle that the court will not intervene in or fragment ongoing administrative proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.

The court noted the applicant must exhaust her remedies, including an appeal to the Law Society's appeal panel, before seeking judicial review.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order certifying a class action.

The certification judge had certified the proceeding on the basis that 'waiver of tort' constituted an independent cause of action.

The Divisional Court found good reason to doubt the correctness of this conclusion, noting conflicting decisions and academic commentary suggesting waiver of tort is merely a choice of remedy rather than a standalone cause of action.

Leave to appeal was granted.

The defendants appealed an order of a Master that set aside a default judgment on the condition that the amount claimed in the construction lien action be paid into court.

The plaintiff argued the appeal was improperly brought before the Divisional Court.

The court held that an order setting aside a default judgment is an interlocutory order, not a final order, because it does not finally determine any substantive rights of the defendants.

Consequently, under section 17(1)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act, the appeal should have been brought to a single judge of the Superior Court.

The appeal was quashed.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a costs order made after a summary judgment motion.

The motions judge had found the defendants' summary judgment motion reasonable but unsuccessful, and reserved costs to the trial judge.

The plaintiff argued this conflicted with case law requiring costs to be fixed on a partial indemnity basis and payable forthwith under Rule 20.06(1).

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions, as the cited cases merely reflected the exercise of judicial discretion regarding costs.

The applicants, chartered accountants charged with professional misconduct, brought a motion for review of an order dismissing their request to compel the respondent's Professional Conduct Committee to file a record of proceedings under section 10 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the committee's power to investigate and charge is not a 'statutory power of decision' as defined in the Act, and therefore section 10 does not apply.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision refusing to bifurcate a personal injury trial where a jury notice was outstanding.

The motion judge found that there were conflicting decisions on whether bifurcation could be ordered in the face of an outstanding jury notice, specifically noting a conflict between the lower court's decision and Morniga v. State Farm.

Finding the issue to be of general importance to the personal injury bar and the administration of justice, the court granted leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed a Tribunal decision finding breaches of the Mortgage Brokers Act and revoking its licence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no breach of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, ample evidence of regulatory breaches, and no apprehension of bias.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the penalty, finding the Tribunal erred in law by imposing licence revocation without allowing submissions on penalty, considering alternatives, or reviewing similar cases.

The revocation order was set aside and replaced with conditions on the appellant's licence.